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Glossary of Indonesian Terms and Abbreviations:
- abangan	 refers to nominal, syncretist Muslims, mostly
Javanese, influenced by Hindu culture.
- ABRI
	
(Angkatan Bersenjata Republik Indonesia):
The Indonesian Armed Forces.
- ASPRI	 (Asisten Pribadi): Personal Assistant, refers to
officers who formed a group of advicers to President




(Badan Kordinasi Intelijen Negara): The Indonesian
State Intelligence Co-ordinating Agency.
(Badan Perencanaan Pembangunan Nasional):
The National Development Planning Board of
Indonesia.
"fortress", refers to the 1950s policy of protecting
pribumi importers.
- BULOG	 (Badan Urusan Logistik Nasionat): The State
Logistics Agency that purchases and sells basic
foodstuffs, such as rice, to stabilise their prices.
- cukong	 "master" in Hokkien. A pejorative term for wealthy
Chinese businessmen, particularly the main clients
of the Indonesian military and bureaucracy.
-DPR
	
(Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat): "People's
Representative Council", Indonesia's Parliament.
- Drs.	 "Doktorandus", prefixed as a title, a Dutch
educational degree, roughly equal to an M.A.
- Dwi-Fungsi	 "Dual Function", the dual role of the Indonesian
military as a defence force and as an organisation
with social and political rights and responsibilities.
- GBHN	 (Garis Besar Haluan Negara): "Broad Guidlines of
State Policy", the five year policy statement of the
government passed by the MPR.
- GESTAPU	 (Gerakan September Tiga Puluh): "The September
30 MovementK, refers to the abortive coup attempt
by military officers in 1965 that prompted Suharto's
assumption of power.
- GOLKAR	 (Golongan Karya): "Functional Group", the political






(Himpunan Pengusaha Muda Indonesia): The
Young Entrepreneurs' Association of Indonesia.
(lnstruksi Presiden): "Presidential Instruction", an
extra budgetary device for government expenditure.
(Kamar Dagang dan Industri): The Indonesian
Chamber of Commerce.
Islamic scholar.
- KOPKAMTIB	 (Komando Operasi Pemulihan Keamanan dan
Ketertiban): "Operations Command for Restoration
of Order and Security", the powerful and
unconstrained military and intelligence organisation
underpinning the New Order.
- KOSGORO	 (Koperasi Serba Usaha Gotong 'Royong): The
military controlled "Mutual Aid Cooperative".
- KOSTRAD	 (Komando Cadangan Strategis Angkatan Darat):
"Army Strategic Reserve Command", the army unit
commanded by Suharto in 1965, strategically
crucial for control of Jakarta.
- kretek
	
clove, used in popular cigarettes.
- Malari	 (Malapetaka Limabelas Januari): "January 15th
Disaster", the anti-Japanese riots in Jakarta of
January 1974.
- Masyumi	 (Majelis Syuro Muslimin Indonesia): Modernist
Muslim party, influential in the 1950s, later banned
by successive regimes.
- MPR	 (Majelis Permusyawaratan Rakyat): "People's
Consultative Assembly". Constitutionally the
highest authority of the Indonesian state, elects the
President, passes the GBHN, consists of all DPR
members and Presidential appointees
- NU	 (Nandatul Ulama): "The Union of Muslim Scholars".
Traditionalist Muslim organisation, the largest
organisation of any kind in Indonesia, an influential




- Pancasila	 "Five principles". The proclaimed ideological basis
for successive Indonesian regimes since
independence.
- PDI	 (Partai Demokrasi Indonesia): "Indonesian
Democratic Party". The smaller "opposition" party,
created by amalgamation of diverse nationalistic
and Christian parties.
-PKI
Assimilated, Indonesian speaking Chinese.
(Pertambangan Minyak dan Gas Bumi Nasional):
The Indonesian state owned oil and gas monopoly.
(Partai Komunis Indonesia): "The Communist Party
of Indonesia", banned since 1966.
- PNI	 (Partai Nasionaiis Indonesia): "Indonesian
Nationalist Party", party of Sukarno, influential in the
1950s, merged into P01 in 1974.
(Partai Persatuan Pembangunan): "United
Development Party", originally Muslim party created
by mergers in 1974, later non-denominational,
larger of the two "opposition" parties.
- pribumi	 Indigenous Indonesian, most often used as contrast
with Chinese Indonesian.
priyayi	 Javanese nobility or elite, the indigenous




Orthodox Muslims, traditionalist and modernist,
contrasted with the syncretist abangan.
- yayasan	 "Foundatjon. Legally constituted as charitable
foundations, the yayasans are controlled by leading
military and political figures and used as holding
companies. Highly important in the 1970s, less so
in recent years.
Note:
The Indonesian custom of referring to individuals by their given names rather
than their family name is followed in the text. In the bibliography, however,
Indonesian individuals are listed under their surnames.
Most of the Indonesian Chinese business tycoons discussed in the text have
adopted Indonesian names. These names are used in the text, usually both
family name and first name, except when the individuals concerned are more
commonly known by their Chinese names.
Abstract
The concern behind the thesis is with the potential for democratisation of
Indonesian politics. It is shown that the undemocratic form government has
taken in Indonesia has not been determined by a cultural predisposition but is
the logical outcome of politics of access to economic resources. Political
history of Indonesia is interpreted through theorisation structured around three
concepts, state, regime and class. The state is understood as the site of
economic conflict as well as an integrating principle. Its role in structuring the
interests it represents is given attention. A difficult problem in Identification
and understanding of the interests promoted by the state is overcome through
theoretical separation of regime from state. It is shown that the state is not an
entity with a life of its own, nor has it been an instruments of any class.
Moreover, the state has not been under military control in recent years, nor
furthered military interests in politics or business. This, as well as the
continued centrality of the state, is explained through analysis of imperatives
generated by economic forces and the evolving class configuration at the top
of society. The business interests of a ruling group are mapped out in some
detail, and so is the interlinking between these and the Chinese owned
conglomerates dominating the economy, It is shown that these interests,
advanced by monopoly access to the state, have now transformed the state to
a much greater degree than did the assumed watershed events of past
decades. The political and economic imperatives generated by the interests
represented by the Suharto and Chinese owned conglomerates, and
companies under their umbrellas, provide a framework of constraints and
opportunities with regard to democratisation. This is understood through
focus on the politics of gradual elite inclusion in an exclusionary system
constituted by dominant economic interests, now increasingly privatised, but
still dependent on privileged access to the state.
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INTRODUCTION
The inter?st behind this thesis is with the failure of the Indonesian political
system to include the Indonesian public in any meaningful sense. Its subject
matter, however, is not democracy, or the lack of it. It does not attempt to
analyze the concept of democracy nor does it evaluate Indonesian experience
in this respect. Instead, it seeks to identify some structural impediments to
inclusion of the general public in political affairs. This is done through
analysis of economic and political structures that generate imperatives,
opportunities and constraints in the political system. The analysis is
structured around the concepts of state, class and regime. Much attention
is paid to these concepts, their meaning and their use. This is a somewhat
unusual undertaking in the context of Indonesian studies where these
concepts have tended to be used in a notably relaxed fashion.
Most political analysis of Indonesia has been structured around another
threefold set of elements, namely the military, Islam and Javanese culture.
Such analysis has produced valuable insights and rewarding descriptions of
the way politics are conducted in Indonesia. The intention of this thesis,
however, is to show that for an understanding of the dynamics of Indonesian
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politics, particularly with regard to fundamental questions of the distribution of
power, this focus on the military, and on ideological elements highlighting the
unique and the peculiar, is misplaced.
By focusing on the state and on the formation of classes at the top of
Indonesian society, the thesis attempts to analyze the ways in which
economically rooted structures have set the scene for Indonesian politics, and
how the imperatives they generate form opportunities and constraints for the
political actors. These imperatives have, so far, as wUl be shown, not made
it expedient for the dominant economic and political interests of Indonesia to
include the public in politics.
The reasons for this, and the ways in which power has been attained,
exercised, kept or lost, and how group interests have been formed, served
or ignored, is analyzed in the thesis. Politics, of course, is about power, its
distribution and its use. The exclusion of the vast majority of the public from
any meaningful exercise of political power and the extremely inequitable
distribution of economic resources in Indonesia are not two unrelated
phenomena. Neither of these phenomena is rooted in the unique and
captivating culture of the country, nor in its religious divisions. The rapid:
changes in the configuration of economic and political power is also not to
be traced to sudden changes in culture or religion. This is not to minimise
the uniqueness of some aspects of Indonesian history. The thesis attempts
to understand some singular features of its development, particularly class
formation at the top of society and the nature of the New Order regime. It
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will be shown, however, that the poUtically important aspects of these unique
features are not rooted in a complex, perennial culture but in economic
structures that are presently undergoing essential change. In analyzing such
economically rooted structures and the imperatives they generate, through
application of various theoretical devices, it is believed that some fundamental,
and frequently overlooked impediments to democratisation in Indonesia will
become clear.
it is not the intention with this thesis to provide a narrative account of
Indonesian political history. It is based on the understanding that events and
personalities have played a far lesser role in shaping the fundamental realities
of power and prospects for democracy in Indonesia than is frequently
believed. Large part of it, however, is structured around recent political
history. The selection of events and their treatment is entirely based on the
narrow focus and scope adopted in the thesis and is not intended as a
balanced narrative in any other sense.
The thesis has been partly overtaken by the rapid evolution of the Indonesian
economic and political scene in a process that confirms the relevance of its
focus. This is both in the sense that the question of democracy has suddenly
come to the fore in Indonesia as the thesis is being completed, and in the
fact that the business conglomerates, extensively discussed, have steadily
gained more prominence during the four years it has been in preparation.
Information, on the other hand, that was extremely hard to come by during
the initial period of research in Jakarta is now in many cases fairly easily
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available, although often in a somewhat coded form and mostly in an
anecdotal fashion. Information on individual conglomerates, and on the
financial links of powerful political figures to these, is to a large extent pieced
together from printed records that confirmed what had already been surmised
from interviews. It is believed, however, that this information does not exist
anywhere else in the form it is presented here.
When the thesis was started, in 1987, the question of democracy was hardly
central in political analysis of Indonesia. That year, and the year that
followed, was probably the high water mark of "Pancasila Democracy", the
integralist, anti-democratic, authoritarian political formulation of the pervasive
New Order ideology. The year before, Richard Robison had published a path
breaking study of the structures of ownership in Indonesia and what he saw
as the genesis of a bourgeoisie in the country. Robison identified capitalist
development as dynamics of change in Indonesia. His study has greatly
influenced this one, although it is substantially different with regard to focus
of attention, theoretical guidance, political analysis and indeed, conclusions on
major problems.
The analysis that follows may stand on its own as an explanation of
relationships between state, regime and class in Indonesia, or more generally,
as an interpretation of political history. Its primary purpose, however, as
already indicated, is to construct a vantage point for a particular use, namely
the study of economically rooted structures that may impede, but also
potentially facilitate, extension of effective political franchise in Indonesia.
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CHAPTER 1
APPROACHES TO THE INDONESIAN STATE
The ubiquitous presence of the state in Indonesian society and politics, its
pivotal economic role, its dominant command of resources and political
organisation, and its autonomy from the class structure, puts the state itself
at the centre of all national political questions. This centrality of the state is
implicitly acknowledged in most political analysis of the country. There is,
however, little agreement among observers on what constitutes the state, or
on the political implications of some of its commonly discussed features, a
problem, of course, not unique to Indonesia.
Much material exists on various facets of the state in Indonesia. This is
largely of a descriptive nature, and much of it deals with the ways in which
the norms and relations of society permeate the operations of the state.
Many studies have illustrated how patron-client relationships prevail at all
levels of the state machinery. Others have shown how ideological and
religious beliefs of society have influenced both popular and elite perceptions
of the role of the state and the arrangement of power within it. Yet others
have focused on the style of government and on various other political and
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institutional manifestations of the country's culture within the framework of its
state.
Lack of comparative analysis is noticeable with regard to the Indonesian state.
Far more often than not, studies of the state and its various aspects
emphasize the peculiarities of Indonesian culture and politics. Comparative
study of other countries and systematic application of general theory is a
infrequent exception. Comparison to similarly concerned literature on the
Indian sub-continent, on the neighbouring Philippines, and on Latin America
yields a strong impression of a paucity in systematic analysis of the state and
its economically rooted structures, as opposed to analysis of the culture and
style of groups shaping its operations.
With regard to the concern behind this thesis, the question of democracy,
something of a mainstream conclusion is discernable from this large body of
literature that deals explicitly, or more often implicitly with the Indonesian state.
Democracy, in the liberal sense of the word, is often seen as being culturally
unsustainable in Indonesia, and even unacceptable on ideological, cultural and
religious grounds. The main supporting structures of Indonesian culture, as
far as political considerations are concerned, are seen to be hostile to what
is taken to be a precondition for democracy, namely a certain respect for
individual rights and responsibilities. Such rights and responsibilities are often
seen to be precluded by patron-client relations leading to authoritarian ways
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and caprice in government. General lack of interest in liberal democracy is
often assumed, a natural assumption if little allowance is made for the direct
and indirect control over ideological expression exercised by the state and the
various dominant elites over the years. In addition to this cultural
predisposition to forms of communalism that preclude meaningful assertion
of individual political rights, native Indonesian commentators in particular, have
often found the sheer diversity of cultures and religions to forestall the
establishment of liberal democracy.
In this mainstream framework for political analysis of Indonesia the focus is
most often, implicitly or explicitly, on the culturally conditioned acceptance of
various aspects of authoritarian rule. This is in the broadest sense a study
in regime legitimacy. Some studies have dealt with performance legitimacy
and argued that the New Order regime has been partly or even largely
sustained by successful development efforts that are easily traded against
suppression of democratic values, which in any case are not found to have
many roots in Indonesia.
More often, though, the basis for the long reign of the New Order regime is
seen to rest on successful manipulation of cultural symbols and cultural
cleavages, and in President Suharto's shrewd management of politics within
a system essentially constituted by cultural elements. The behaviour of the
political elite of the country is in this way studied with reference to cultural
realities, rather than to the economic organisation of society. The divisions
within society are, in the main, treated as cultural phenomena, and the key
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to Suharto's long rule is seen to be his manipulation of these cultural divisions
coupled with his ability to either pacify, or crush, the forces they have
generated.
The willingness and ability of the military to sustain Suharto's rule is often
primarily traced to cultural predisposition and ideological conviction, while the
acceptance of military rule is seen to be based on the historical genesis of
the military and the cultural cleavages threatening the unity of the country.
Matters of resource allocation within the economy where military officers have
reaped particularly noticeable benefits, figure in such studies as aspects of
patrimonial rule, rather than as the very basis of the political system.
This general framework for the study of politics has in many other Asian
countries lead to extensive studies of the problems of institutionalisation. In
many cases this has proved rather unfruitful as these studies tend to focus
on shifting patterns of institutions rather than on the dynamics behind them.
In Indonesia this is noticeably absent and this further suggests the strength
of a fairly narrow cultural paradigm in Indonesian studies. Institutions, such
as political parties, parliamentary assemblies and the bureaucracy have been
almost exclusively studied from a cultural vantage point, and very few
systematic attempts have been made to understand institutions from either a
political economy point of view, or from the various theoretical vantage points
offered by studies of institutionalisation of politics and administration.
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Studies of the type most prevalent in scholarship on Indonesia often yield
valuable descriptions of the way politics are conducted between individuals
and within the various institutions of society and state. They describe political
conflicts as they are actually carried out from day to day and over longer
periods.
This mainstream framework of culturally oriented study of Indonesian politics,
however, is of limited use for anything but a study of the same peculiarities
as it offers as explanatory factors. It is a study of the manifestations of
politics, as opposed to analysis of the roots of political conflict.
The concern of this thesis is not with such peculiarities that set Indonesia
apart from other countries. On the contrary, the concern is with a very
common and general problem, that of structural impediments to democracy,
essentially rooted in the economic interests of privileged groups,
For all its well documented peculiarities, the Indonesian state is a part of a
ubiquitous phenomenon in the Third World. It is a strong, authoritarian state,
dominated by the military, in a society characterised by extremely inequitable
distribution of wealth and the absence of any sustained political organisation
outside the perimeter of the state, or independent of its patronage. The
domination of the state in political affairs is coupled with a leading role in the
economy where, in the absence of a strong indigenous entrepreneurial class,
the state has been a leading investor, an omnipresent regulator, and an
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essential broker between international capital on the one hand, and domestic
resources, capital and labour on the other.
All of these basic features of the Indonesian state, and the society it
dominates, can be observed in various proportions and prominence in
societies as diverse as Bangladesh, Brazil, India, Pakistan, Thailand and the
Philippines. In all cases there may be cultural explanations for the lack of
democracy, the acceptance of authoritarian rule, the lack of independent
political organisation and the toleration of extremes in poverty and
conspicuous consumption.
In Latin America the influence of Iberian culture has been used as an
explanatory tool for many of the same features as the exceedingly different
Javanese culture supposedly explains in Indonesia. In Bangladesh, Indonesia,
India and Thailand, diverse religions are also frequently held accountable for
essentially the same phenomena, treated as it frequently is, as a feature
specific to each country.
A political economy approach to Indonesian politics has long been outside the
mainstream scholarship on the country. Matters of resource allocation come
up in other frameworks but are treated as features or results of culturally
determined systems rather than as basic to the political system and roots of
divisions.
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Recently, however, a few scholars, and one in particular, have made use of
political economy frameworks for political analysis of Indonesia. By far the
most prominent and important of such works are those of Richard Robison.
[1] Major contribution has also been made by Dorojatun Kuntjoro-Jakti, and
although not within a strict political economy framework, by Mochtar Mas'oed,
and in a somewhat less systematic fashion, so far, by Arief Budiman.
This thesis will draw on the extensive data presented by Robison in his
pioneering works, and it is heavily indebted to Mas'oed and Kuntjoro-Jakti for
their insights and data. The general approach taken here is in some ways
similar to that taken by Robison, although the focus is different. Also, as
made clear later, on some points of fundamental importance to the thesis, the
conclusions reached are different from those that may be drawn from
Robsison's recent works, and indeed from those of Mas'oed.
in writings on Indonesia the features of inequity, authoritarianism and state
domination have been commonly observed by scholars of different theoretical
persuasions, but there is little agreement on their relationships to the nature
of the state, or their meaning and implications for Indonesian politics.
This is partly a problem that does not lend itself to resolution, a problem of
different assumptions on human organisation and the dynamics of history.
Even within schools of thought sharing many such assumptions, there is no
such thing as a general theory of the state. Such is the complexity and
elusiveness of the concept, that branches of such schools, centred as they
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are on a specific understanding of the structures and processes that make
up the state, have failed to produce anything that could be recognised as a
cohesive theory of the state. Partly, however, this is a problem of confusion
and mistaken attempts at general theorisation on the state from enquiries
into particular levels or aspects of the state. This is not the least noticeable
with regard to Indonesia.
While no theoretical innovations in the study of the state have been made by
Indonesianists, or for that matter scholars of Southeast Asia in general, a
plethora of theories and frameworks has at various times been applied to the
Indonesian state. In recent years this effort has generated a large number
of designations, concepts and labels that have been attached to the state in
Indonesia. The state has been termed a "Bureaucratic Authoritarian State",
a "Beamtenstaat", a "Patrimonial State", a "Praetorian State", an "Integralist
State", a "Politico-Bureaucrat State", a "Military-Bureaucratic State", a "Rentier
State", a "Military Rentier State", a "Bureaucratic Polity State", a "Military
Dictatorship", a "Dependent Delayed Development State", a "Developmental
Fascist State", and a "Repressive Developmentalist State".
This large number of designations illustrates the considerable attention given
to the problem, but it is also indicative of a certain confusion over the nature
of the state in general, and over the features that constitute the state. As
already pointed out, large part of the scholarly work on the Indonesian state
is confined to a description of institutional arrangements, and analysis, at a
low level of abstraction, of the manifestation certain cultural peculiarities may
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gain in such institutions. This level of enquiry is sometimes used for the
construction of a general theory of the state, where particular characteristics
are seen to be sufficiently dominant to provide a basis for classifying the state
and give it designations of the kind indicated above.
As will be made clear later, a failure to distinguish between state and regime
in theoretical enquiry has lead to much of this conceptual confusion and
mistaken theorisation. With regard to the concern of this thesis, a
differentiation between these two concepts is far from being a futile exercise
in abstraction. The implications of a lack of clarity on this point, which has
been almost entirely overlooked in analysis of the Indonesian state, will be
returned to at a later stage.
In spite of the absence of bomparative studies and the relatively parochial
nature of much scholarship on the Indonesian state, most of the various
approaches to it have been grounded in, or influenced by, theories or
traditions developed in the context of other societies. The growing interest
in the Indonesian state for political analysis is also a part of a general trend.
The state, as a concept for analysis, was conspicuously absent from
mainstream political science scholarship for decades after the war. American
political scientist dominated the field, not the least because research was far
better funded there than elsewhere. One of the reasons for generous funding
of political research was America's assumption of a global military and
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security role, a role in many cases directly inherited from Britain and to a
lesser extent from other European powers.
It is beyond the scope of this discussion to examine how the global political
role of America affected scholarship on the Third World, or indeed the origins
of the dominant framework for political analysis, which American social
scientists extended from their own society to those of the Third World. It
suffices to point out that the pluralist, society centred framework accorded
minimal importance to the state in political analysis, a position that is both in
keeping with prevailing American ideology and in line with Anglo Saxon
tradition and experience. The difference in tradition between the European
continent and the Anglo Saxon countries has been analyzed by K. Dyson. [J
The development of the state concept in American scholarship has recently
been discussed by several leading political scientists, including G. Almond,
E. Nordlinger and T. Lowi. [3]
In the pluralist tradition the question of the state is sidestepped and the
concept is often altogether sidelined in favour of such concepts as 'political
systems', 'government' or in the influential writings of Robert Dahi, 'polyarchy'.
Pluralism, in this way, as pointed out by Dunleavy and O'Leary, is primarily
a theory of politics in society, rather than a theory of the state. [4] The state
is in this tradition seen as a pawn, to use the description given to it by DahI,
or as a wetherwane, to use another frequently cited label. [}
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For many pluralist scholars, however, the input-output model of the state,
where the state was seen as an inconsequential machine processing inputs
from pressure groups in accordance with the strength of such groups, was
insufficient. A famous statement of this was Schattsneider's remark to the
effect that the flaw in the pluralist heaven is that the chorus sings with an
upper class accent.
A certain fusion with elite theories was seen by many to supplement the
simple model of the more or less neutral state processing inputs from
multitudes of interest groups. It should be noted, however, that although elite
theories often described state domination of society, they left the state
intrinsically as neutral as before, but saw it as a pawn in the hands of elites.
This was not the least influential in Third World societies, where pluralism was
not much in evidence, and elite domination of both state and society clear.
Influential early works on Third World elites include Fred Riggs study on
Thailand. [6]• Studies on Indonesia guided by some conception of elite
positions are numerous. Among them are studies focusing on priyayi elites
and more recently, on technocrats, usually seen to operate in the interests of
an assumed impartial knowledge, studies on bureaucratic elites, that
conversely focus on the appropriation of public office for personal gain, and
studies focusing on military elites that sometimes fuse the two contradictory
points of modernity and patrimonial ways. These will be discussed where
immediately relevant.
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In Third World societies, especiafly, cultural consensus was seen as the
critical factor of integration and as the determinator of political behaviour. This
perception was easily fused with various elite theories. This culturally
determined elite-pluralism, along with notions of modernisation, referred to
below, has been especially influential in scholarship in Indonesia, as will be
further discussed.
The mainstream framework for Indonesian political analysis was further
influenced by functionalism, particularly of the ilk most often associated with
Talcot Parsons. [7] The influence is most often implicit, as political and social
studies of Indonesia are for the most not notable for theoretical rigour, or
explicit 'theorisation. As pointed out by S. Mennel, function in this type of
functionalism can usually be translated as 'consequence'. [8] A pertinent
example of this has to do with the perception of the state in functionalist
thinking, as being the maintenance of order. Equally, order can be seen as
the consequence of state activity. [Dunleavy and O'Leary: 1987]. This is of
much relevance to Indonesia, as consequences of state action are often
confused with their causes, as discussed in a different context in chapters
that follow.
This is especially noticeable with regard to maintenance of order and search
for assumed legitimacy. The focus on order is one of the preoccupations of
this school of thought, particularly the maintenance of order in the face of
increased differentiation in society. This will be discussed a little further below
in the context of modernisation theories, It may also be pointed out at this
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juncture, that the studies in state or regime legitimacy, noticeably numerous
in Indonesian studies, often borrow from this general school of thought. Such
studies, as made clear in subsequent chapters, are seen by this thesis to be
largely irrelevant for understanding of the Indonesian state.
The emergence of almost a hundred new states in the former colonial
territories of Asia, Africa, the Caribbean and the Pacific generated scholarship
on the state, with different concerns from the established state analysis of the
industrial world. This increase in interest in the state, however, has not been
confined to scholarship on the Third World. One of the best known new
theorists of the state, Theda Skocpol, who has primarily written on the West
and Russia, spoke in 1979 of an "intellectual sea change....., because not
long ago the dominant theories and research agendas of the social sciences
rarely spoke of states" [9]
A caveat should be added to this generalisation, though, as this trend is
neither universal nor in any way uniform. With regard to research oriented
towards political or developmental strategy the move has in many cases been
in the opposite direction. As argued by Martin Doornbos, the non-state
sphere of society has rightly been receiving increased attention in this respect,
not the least with regard to the question of democracy. [10] Although
Doornbos was writing on Africa, the point is of some validity for Asia too. [11]
The two approaches are far from being mutually exclusive. On the contrary,
neither stands alone as analysis or basis for strategy. The thesis, as made
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clear in the introduction, is only concerned with the state-sphere and its
structures, while conscious of the limitations of this approach.
Initially, scholarship on Third World states tended to sidestep the concept of
the state in favour of conceptualisations of some features of society, which
were thought to represent political cleavages and their management. The
most influential of the early society based paradigms was the "modernisation"
paradigm, which has continued to guide much theorisation on Third World
societies, and is still a highly influential notion, if not a carefully worked out
framework, among both native and foreign writers on Indonesia. The
modernisation paradigm benefits from many of the theoretical positions of
pluralism and functionalism discussed a little earlier.
This framework is constructed around a dichotomy between the traditional
and the modern, and assumes a transition from the former to the latter. This
transition was often seen to happen through the emergence of a capitalist
business class and an emergence of an economy capable of self-sustained
growth. [12] The state was not seen to be central to this process, at least in
the initial works of this school, and political analysis was therefore centred on
society rather than the state.
This general paradigm has roots in Indonesian studies that go much further
back than the influential post-war American scholarship that put this to the
fore as an analytical conceptualisation of the development process. J.H.
Boeke, the influential Dutch scholar working during the early years of this
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century, had concluded that the non-rational world view prevalent in Indonesia
forestalled development through economic incentives in native society. [13]
The same argument has been taken up more or less systematically by several
commentators on Indonesia who have often reached a similar conclusion with
regard to democracy as with economic development. [14] This general notion
on the need for cultural transformation prior to sustained economic
development of pribumi society and the establishment of democracy has also
been influential in a more casual commentary on Indonesia.
Another, and somewhat less culturally deterministic form of the modernisation
paradigm, is the study of social and political organisation around concepts
such as patrimonialism, denoting pre-modernity. This has been especially
influential in Indonesian studies, and informs, as indicated earlier, the
mainstream of scholarship on indonesian politics. it would be beside the
point to go into a lengthy discussion on the various works and contributions
in this respect. It suffices to mention a few of the more remarkable, and at
the same time somewhat typical works of this genre.
The pioneering, if controversial, work of Fred Riggs on Thailand influenced
Karl Jackson to write on the Bueaucratic Polity in Indonesia. [15] As in
Rigg's analysis, the work revolves around cliques, groups and circles where
patron-client relationships prevail over modern institutions, Inter-elite rivalry,
competition for patronage and personalistic factionalism from the top of
society downwards are the subject matter of this study and others like it.
William Uddle adopted a similar framework and concluded similarly on the
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factionaUsm, power of individuals and cliques and the general diffusion of
power among competing personalistic factions of the elite, as explanatory
tools for understanding Indonesian politics. [16] Donald Emmerson, likewise,
focused on elite rivalries within the bureaucracy and the government, but
deals with intra-agency competition more than personalistic conflict, while not
denying the importance of the latter. [17]
A more recent article by Emmerson sums up the various positions of this
mainstream genre of writing and its conclusions are worth quoting from: [18]
"Neither a particularistic, nor a state-reifying viewpoint does full justice to the
ways in which New Order policy decisions are actually reached. Groups and
personalities do matter, the palac& remains central to the process, and the
New Order has transformed a previously polycentric bureaucracy into a
military instrument for internal security and economic growth. But these
partial insights should not be interpreted to preclude, on economic policy, the
relative autonomy of civilian lead agencies". In augmenting these partial
insights, Emmerson goes on in his conclusions to claim "that the
bureaucracy as a set of programmatic organisations is superseded in
Suharto's Indonesia by higher personalistic and clientilistic ties" while arguing
for the notion of "bureaucratic pluralism" and claiming in conclusion that "there
will be more to the regime than meets the eye that sees only and army
general in a sultan's palace."
A different way of conceptualising the Indonesian state and politics along
culturally determined lines was taken by Ben Anderson, who far from focusing
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on inter-elite competition and personalistic factions as the subject of state
analysis, conceived of the state as an entity with a life and will of its own. [19]
Anderson claims that "key aspects of policy behaviour of the New Order are
unintelligible from the point of view of the nation's interests, but quite rational
from that of the old state", and he speaks of the triumph of the state over
society and nation.
The triumph of the state over society, as identified by Anderson, and the
prevalence of its interests against those of the nation, are seen, in this thesis
as according with facts. Anderson's search for the forces that effected this
triumph and benefitted from it, however, are seen as being misplaced and
failing. As returned to in the last part of the thesis, this failure has become
increasingly clear, as the interests of the dominant political forces vis-a-vis the
state are changing. Instead of looking for such forces in inexorable
movements of culture and history, an attempt will be made here to identify the
ways in which the state's dominant position has been effected and exploited
by forces that do not originate in Indonesia's cultural peculiarities, however
facilitating the existence of this culture may have been for the course of
events.
Radical scholarship on the Third World in the 1960s and into the 1970s was
heavily influenced by another paradigm giving limited attention to state-society
dynamics. The "dependency" theories developed mainly in the context of
Latin America, but also systematically applied to Thailand and some other
Asian countries was influential for a short time among radical observers of
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Indonesia. [20] The dependency paradigm, however, went out of vogue in
scholarship on Southeast Asian countries even more than that on some other
parts of the world, as the nature and speed of industrialisation in the region
called the basic premises of the paradigm into serious question.
It is of some interest to note that the two major works on Indonesia informed
by the dependency paradigm, those of Rex Mortimer and Richard Robison,
ran in many ways parallel to the mainstream works influenced by the
modernisation paradigm and cultural determinism. [21] These works affirm the
patrimonial nature of politics and business in Indonesia, but put it into a
global framework of metropolitan domination, where the dominant local
players are seen as tools in the hands of international capital.
The most fundamental differences in conceptualisation of the state among
radical scholars were crystallised in the well known debate between the two
Marxist theoreticians, Ralph Miliband and Nico Poulantzas, in the late 1960s
and early 1970s. [] This debate dealt with general issues of the state, and
although it was conducted with a more direct reference to industrialised
countries than the Third World, it raised a number of points of a more general
relevance.
The writings of Hamza Alavi since the early 1970s similarly raised a number
of points of even more direct relevance to Indonesia, and indeed numerous
other Third World countries. [23] Theoretical innovations made by Alavi will
be used in the text that follows. Also of relevance to the field and this thesis
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are debates that have taken place in the context of state formation in Africa
and industrialisation in Latin America. These will be briefly discussed at
relevant junctures.
Before discussing the particulars of the Indonesian state and the similarities
it shares with some other post-colonial states, a few more general points on
the study of the state need to be made.
Even confined to scholarship influenced by the Marxist tradition, no
comprehensive or general theory of the state can be spoken of. Marx himself
never formulated such a theory, although he used the concept of state
extensively. Along with class, the state may be the most recurring
preoccupation in Marx's works. In his earliest writings Marx was influenced
by the Hegelian position on the state, and his own views began to crystaUise
as a critique of Hegel's position.
Hegel had pointed out the separation of civil society from the state. He
argued, however, that this separation was overcome in the state's
representation of society's nature and meaning. The contradiction between
man's private interests, and his interests as a citizen of a state, was for Hegel
transcended or resolved by the state being an embodiment of the general
interests of society. The state, for Hegel, in its developed form, stood above
any particularistic interests and thus eliminated the division between the
private individual and the citizen.
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In the context of Indonesia, it is of interest to note the affinity between the
position of Hegel and that of several highly influential thinkers on the state in
Indonesia. Thinkers such as Ki Hajar Dewantoro and Professor Supomo, who
had much influence on the formulation of the Indonesian constitution, and on
what became the ideology of the Indonesian state, portrayed the state in
Hegelian terms, although not referring to Hegel, describing it as the
embodiment of the people's general interests. [24]
Such formulations of the state in Indonesia have continued to be highly
influential, and they form the basis for the state's all pervasive ideology of
Pancasila, which is said to inform all political life in the country. [25] This
notion of the transcendent state is the basis for the illegality of opposition to
state and regime in Indonesia.
Far from being an embodiment of the general interests of society, the state
is, according to Marx, subordinated to interests of private property. Because
of this, he asserted, the state was bound to act in the interests of the
economically dominant class, the class controlling the means of production.
[26] The state, however, was not necessarily directly controlled by this class.
The problem is non-existent in feudal societies, but in post feudal societies the
state becomes an institution quite separate from the ruling class. [27] The
roots of the modern state are in the division of labour emerging with
commerce, urbanisation and industrialisation. The political domination of the
economically dominant classes is, according to Marx and Engels, achieved
through their control over the state. [28]
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The way the dominant class exerts its control over the state, and through it,
over society, is a matter of much contention within Marxism. Put negatively,
this is the question of the nature and extent of state autonomy from class.
For a long while this question was not very central to Marxist political
analysis. The character of the new states emerging in the Third World after
1945, as well as certain developments within the industrial world served to
change this during the 1960s and since.
What has been termed as the instrumentalist view of the state had long been
held to be Marxist orthodoxy. The standard reference to Marx's own work
in this regard, is the passage in the Communist Manifesto, where he and
Engels describe the executive of the modern state as "but a committee for
managing the common affairs of the whole bourgeoisie". [] This view was
the basis for the Marxist-Leninist position that was to dominate radical
scholarship for some time.
There is, however, a different view of the state to be found in some of Marx's
own works, and this has become the basis for voluminous writings that have
in some cases departed radically from the instrumentalist position. Much of
this is of limited relevance to the matter in hand, because of the particular
focus of the thesis. What follows on the theoretical developments generated
by the radical search for a new theory of the state in the 1 960s and I 970s,
is.therefore not only brief, but equally selective.
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The most obvious problem with a purely instrumentalist view of the state rises
from the almost universal experience that it is not the bourgeoisie itself that
tends to occupy positions of power within the state. This fact was well noted
by Marx, particularly in the context of the Bonapartist state in France, which
will be briefly discussed below. Judging from the works of Marx on actual
historical states, as well as from much subsequent analysis, one could indeed
conclude, that the bourgeoisie rarely occupied such positions in capitalist
societies. [30] Among other obvious problems with the instrumentalist view
are those that have to do with the very different forms of state, that are
nevertheless seen as neutral class instruments. In the more sophisticated
instrumentalist theories these problems are overcome invarious way, most
basically by making a distinction between a state acting at the behest of a
class, and one acting in the general interests of a class.
The same distinction forms a basis for the non-instrumentalist, or structuralist
views of the state. Structuralism usually accords limited importance to the
intentions of actors, although within that general position great differences
may be discerned. Structuralism is in the most simple terms an examination
of systemic patterns at work in a given phenomenon.
The structuralist view of the state finds support in Marx's own writing on the
Bonapartist state in France and similarly in Engels' Origin of the Family where
he speaks of the regimes of Napoleon 1st and Napoleon 3rd in France, and
Bismarck's Germany. These instances were, however, for Marx and Engels,
always a temporary phenomena caused by the balancing out of the strength
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of warring class forces. The roots of the strong, autonomous Bonapartist
state are, however, instructive with regard to the Third World in general. Marx
claimed that the Bonapartist state represented the abandonment of the
bourgeoisie of its commitment to a liberal democracy in favour of a regime
that could better protect its essential interests. In return for protection of
property rights against the politicised masses, the bourgeoisie handed over
power to a dictator. The bourgeoisie had not proven to be strong enough
to fill the vacuum created by the declining class of landowners, who had been
retreating from political power. As will be discussed a little later, the natural
function of the state, as seen by structuralist, that is the maintenance of
conditions conducive for capital, can also been discerned from these writings.
A certain parallel can be drawn between this, and the inability of the
bourgeoisie in many Third World countries to fill the vacuum left by the
colonial power and the metropolitan bourgeoisie. A parallel can also be
drawn between the large bureaucratic and military organisation sustaining the
Bonapartist state and what is commonly observed in Indonesia and
elsewhere. Similar phenomenon was observed by Engels, e.g with regard to
the German state under Bismarck, where a militarist bureaucratic state
acquired, according to Engels, a certain degree of independence from warring
classes that temporarily balanced each other. [31J However temporary such
a situation may be, this provides possibilities, and indeed necessities within
Marxist theory, for studying the state as an independent force.
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Instead of looking at the state as an instrument, Poulantzas and many other
theorists of a similar ilk, have looked at it in terms of its functions. This, of
course, is also the starting point of many pluralist perspectives on the state.
Poulantzas argues that the general function of the state is to be the factor of
cohesion and unity in a class divided society. He further argues that the
particular form and institutional structure each state takes on, depends on the
dominant mode of production, while all its functions are determined by the
general function of maintaining cohesion. {32]
Poulantzas adopted the notion of the state's relative autonomy from Althusser,
who had spoken of autonomy of the political, ideological and economic
"instances" in the social formation. [] In a similar way, many structuralist
came to view the state, and society, in terms of systems or levels that move
unevenly and partly autonomously, but where systems or levels have to move
into some correspondence in the end. In this way, the state, its different
levels or systems, and the various levels or systems of society could be seen
as partly autonomous systems under various mutual influences. In the final
analysis, the whole would be kept together by the state in a wider sense.
This position opened up vast new possibilities for abstract theorising on the
state and on human organisation in general. In such writing, the state tended
to take on a highly abstract character, giving a different quality to the whole
problem of the state.
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In rejecting the instrumental nature of the state, and by giving it certain
autonomy from all particular instances in its overriding function of maintaining
social cohesion, economic determinism was also rejected by Poulantzas and
others of the same general school. For Poulantzas, the state could, however,
in the long run, "only correspond to the political interests of the dominant
classes". [35]
Poulantzas, in this way, gives autonomy to the state, and to politics, in the
short run, but takes it away in the longer run. He also makes the state itself
a site for class struggle. The extent of the state's autonomy from the
dominant classes, he argues, depends on the class struggle within a "power
block" consisting of different organised fractions of the capitalist or dominant
classes. [] This, as returned to later, provides one way of looking at the
Indonesian state, not the least in the late New Order period. This notion of
a divided and internally struggling dominant class, and a correspondingly
autonomous state is also one basis for Alavi's theories, discussed below.
Apart from his theorisation on the post-colonial state which will be discussed
in a foUowing chapter, Alavi has developed a theoretical device which is
helpful for the analysis that follows and should be noted at this juncture. He
uses the concept of "structural imperative", which was borrowed earlier for
describing the external economic dimension of the world trading system.
Alavi refers to this concept as the "basis of economic calculation in capitalist
society, and the conditions that govern their outcome, both at the level of
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individual enterprise, and at the level of the state. It defines the conditions
of profitable economic behaviour, and the allocation of resources". [37]
Structural imperative does not determine in advance the actions of individuals,
or the state, but it determines the consequences of these actions. It thus
imposes itself indirectly on the making of state policy. In Alavi's words, "this
alerts us to the fact that the state bureaucracy itself calculates its policy with
the dictates of capitalism without having to receive orders from the capitalist
class. []
A similar point is, in fact, made by Miliband, who is often seen as one of the
chief contemporary proponents of the instrumentalist view of the state.
Miliband mentions three ways in which the state comes under the sway of the
economically dominant class in an industrialised society. The first is the
shared outlook and background of state managers and the owners of capital,
the second is the mobifisation of capital for the promotion of its own interests,
and the thirdly, Miliband speaks of the structural constraints on the state elite
provided by capital and the logic of the economic system, grounded as it is
in the domination of capital. [39]
However different the historical experience of Indonesia from the western
industrialised countries, and however different the exact relationships between
state and class, the essence of the problem remains the same. Who controls
the state, for whose benefit, and how? The differences are as clear and
important as this essential similarity and these will be discussed in a following
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chapter on theories of the post-colonial state and the bureaucratic-
authoritarian state. For this initial discussion, however, only one further point
remains to be made, namely to establish the broadest contours of the way
in which insights from both the instrumentalist and the structuralist
approaches to the state can be used for understanding of the Indonesian
state.
In simplest terms, this is by making a careful distinction between state and
regime, and by using the latter concept to represent the instrumentalist forces
that have controlled the Indonesian state for their own benefit during the New
Order regime, while the state itself is seen to consist .,of structures best
understood through the structuralist approach discussed above.
As argued later, state policy in Indonesia, and outcome of state policy, has
been partly shaped, on the one hand by the structural imperatives of the
world trading system, and, on the other hand, by such imperatives of the
essentially capitalist economic system of the country, even in the absence of
any identifiable, or unambiguous, indigenous capitalist class.
In addition to these structural imperatives and constraints, and in the absence
of an indigenous capitalist class, there is, however, or has been, a force that
leads the state and uses it as an instrument for the advancement of its own
interests in much the same way as a class in direct control of the state could
be expected to do. The force is not a class, it has more the character of
a loose grouping, whose membership is neither fixed nor unambiguous. At
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the heart of this force has been a group, which for a certain period, and only
for a certain period, could be conceptualised as the ruling group of Indonesia.
This group derived all its power from a position within the state, unlike a
ruling class. It has been neither independent of the structural constraints and
imperatives discussed above, nor totally of other groupings within the state,
notably within the institutions of the army and the bureaucracy.
In studying Indonesia for a limited period of time, e.g 1970-1980, one could
easily conclude that this ruling group was running the state and the private
as well as public sectors of the economy in its own interests, and in such a
manner and to such an extent that Indonesia could be spoken of as a rare
example of a direct unconstrained rule by a tiny class. In looking at
Indonesia in the decade that followed, one could as easily conclude that a
capitalist class was rapidly being formed and that this class was equally
rapidly positioning itself for the type of politics associated with such forces.
Looked at together, however, and seen in the light of how these forces have
come into being, and how longer term structures dictate constraints and
opportunities, neither conclusion stands up to scrutiny.
This will be made clear in the latter part of the thesis. First, an account of
the historical genesis of the state and the forces controlling it is needed.
The theoretical perspective used for this, and for the analysis in the last part
of the thesis will be further developed, in parts, parallel to this historical
account. Before looking at the post-colonial state, the genesis of the class
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configuration of the country and the roots of the economic organisation need
to be looked at.
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A key feature in separating the political experience of Indonesia from that of
numerous other countries was the absence, at independence, of a powerful
landowning class. In sharp contrast to much of Asia and Latin America,
where landowners made up a class of crucial economic and political
importance at independence, ownership of land was not, and had never been
the chief basis of wealth, status and power in pre-independence Indonesia.
In pre-colonial times, and well into Dutch presence on the island of Java,
which is the basis for much of the following • discussion, land was regarded
as being under the sole disposition of the ruler. [1] In return for taxes, paid
in kind, the performance of labour and military service, the peasants enjoyed
the right of use to agricultural lands. Between the ruling royalty and the
peasants was a class of officials, the priyayi. The priyayi have often been
referred to as a class of feudal lords as their position between the royal
centre and the peasant class was in some ways comparable to that of the
feudal classes of Europe.
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Comparison along these lines, however, can be highly misleading, particularly
since the priyayi enjoyed far less opportunity for independence from the
centre, than the European feudalist frequently did. The priyayi were not
granted ownership of land by the monarchy, but the right to control parcels
of land and the people it supported. Their income was, in effect, derived
from a cut of the taxes they collected for the king. The position of the priyayi
was not hereditary in principle, although it tended to be so in practise.
Inheritable property rights to land also existed in some cases, but as an
exception. The wealth and power of the dominant class in pre-colonial
Indonesia was therefore based on occupation of office of state and not on
ownership of the means of production.
The colonial government superimposed itself on this system, and although
it made some changes to the system, the fundamentals remained the same
Position in relation to the state, rather than property, continued to be the
chief basis for class division. [2]
The changes, however, were instructive for the nature of dominant class in
native society. Before Dutch rule on Java, the peasants of the main rice
growing areas were required to contribute produce from around 40 per cent
of the village lands to the king and his priyayi officials. [3] The Dutch East
India Company, the VOC, initially made no changes to this system. After the
collapse of the VOC and the British interregnum in the early 19th century, a
new system was imposed by the colonial state founded by the Dutch. This
system, the Cultuurstetsel, or the cultivation system, was essentially a system
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of forced delivery of crops to the state. The villagers were forced to set
aside prime land for crops specified by the state, and obliged ro provide
labour for its cultivation and harvesting. [4]
The priyayi administered this system along with Dutch colonial officials. As
with the king's taxes in former times, their income was basically that of a
commission. The commissions, however, were later replaced by regular
salaries, turning the priyayi into a class of regularised colonial officialdom.
At one time the priyayi were given the choice between land rights and a
combination of salaries and commissions. Most chooe the latter, which
seemed the more profitable and expedient course of action at the time. [5]
In reality, there may, in fact, not have been much of a choice for the priyayi,
as pointed out later. During the 19th century traditional rights of the priyayi to
peasant labour were abolished along with the system of commissions, further
regularising the priyayi nobility as a new bureaucratic class [Onghokham,
1975, Rahardjo, 1985]
This transformation of a dominant class into a class of landless officialdom is
probably without parallel. In several other Asian countries, large and powerful
classes of bureaucrats developed with colonial rule, and in many cases these
were later to wield decisive political influence. Parallel to this, however, in
other Asian countries, a class of landowners was perpetuated or created,
forming • a potentially countervailing force to the bureaucrats and the
indigenous bourgeoisie.
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Further compounding this situation in Indonesia was the failure of a native
entrepreneurial class to emerge as an economic and political force of much
consequence. This made the structure and dominance of the bureaucratic
class in Indonesia in many ways unparalleled in a major country of Asia.
In the neighbouring Philippines, a powerful class of indigenous landowners
had developed well before independence, and this class has continued to
dominate the politics of the country, giving Philippine politics a shape
substantially different from those of Indonesia. [6] On the Indian sub-
continent classes of landowners and entrepreneurs competed with a
bureaucratic class for political influence at the time of independence, and this
conflict has given shape to politics and state since. [7] In Thailand the
dominance of the bureaucrats came closest to that of Indonesia. There were
however crucial differences in the relationship of the ruling class to the land,
in greater extent of private landholding outside the ruling class as well as
greater level of enterprise outside the perimeter of the state. This and the far
greater fusion between bureaucratic power, landholding and entrepreneurial
groups created less of a vacuum around the state. [8]
The system of forced crop delivery had in the final decades of colonial rule
given way to policy designed to provide conditions for the expansion of
private European capital in the colony. The main function of the colonial state
under this system was to secure the conditions needed by the plantation
economy. Land was handed over to the villages and taken over for use by
the peasantry. The plantations established by European concerns could not
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own land, but had to rent it from the locals. The system adopted for such
transactions proved to be extremely disadvantageous for the landowning
villagers, who were in effect forced to lease out their best land on very
unfavourable terms. [9]
Landownership by the peasants was crucial to the workings of the system.
Land became the basis for taxation on the peasantry. The taxes were
payable in money, which forced peasants to seek work at the plantations in
spite of very low wages. [10] The plantation economy was thus best secured
through a maximum number of peasants owning land [Onghokham, 1975].
In only very few cases did native individual landlords emerge out of this
system, and these were mostly modest in wealth [Mortimer, 1982, Rahardjo,
1985]. More typical was a system of shared poverty characterised by a
growing number of people eking out existence through steadily more intensive
farming of finite land resources, a system analyzed by Geertz and termed by
him as "agricultural involution" [11]
Because of the centrality to the system of peasant ownership of land with
corresponding taxation, the choice aflegedly enjoyed by the priyayi over
whether to become landlords or officials may not have been real at all. The
system. of communal village land was viewed by the priyayi as means of
keeping the peasants tied to their villages, which along with the taxation on
landownership, was the basis for creating a stable pool of cheap labour for
the plantations [Onghokham, 1975].
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The social and political effects of the systems operating in peasant agriculture
and in the plantation economy were, on the one hand, the perpetuation of
undifferentiated peasantry in subsistence conditions, and on the other, the
perpetuation of a dominant native class without a commercial potential. While
the colonial regime lasted, the dominant native ctass had very limited political
potential as it was almost entirely in a dependent position vis-a-vis the colonial
state and the foreign owned plantation economy.
Society as a whole, can be seen to have lost political power and capacity
vis-a-vis the state as this colonial economic system developed. This has
been pointed out by Onghokham, who describes the strengthening of the
colonial state around this economic system in terms of society becoming
impotent and the state supreme. [Onghokham, 1975] This also accords with
Anderson's notion of the triumph of state over society. [Anderson, 1983]
Apart from the ruling Europeans, the priyayi and the peasants, two other
groups or classes were much in evidence during the latter part of colonial
rule. These groups were engaged in trading and petty commodity
production, but divided by race, one indigenous, the other Chinese.
Chinese traders have roots in Indonesia stretching back further than European
influence. Nevertheless, they have remained a conspicuously separate
minority community, in sharp contrast to the way a similarly constituted
Chinese minority was integrated into the dominant classes of Thailand, and
in a different way but to an important extent in the Philippines.
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The Chinese thrived in Indonesia for various reasons during colonial rule.
The VOC, and later the colonial administration found it expedient to use the
Chinese as collectors of various dues from native society, and as operators
of monopolies. Some of these monopolies came to be leased out to Chinese
entrepreneurs, such as road tolls, bazaar fees, salt collection and even
custom duties. Whole villages were also sometimes leased out to Chinese
middlemen through the system of tax farming, also known in some
neighbouring countries. The position of the Chinese merchants was in this
way not too dissimilar to the position of the largely Chinese merchant class
in Thailand, where they cooperated with the sakdina class in running royal
monopolies and tax-farming. [12] The far greater integration of these
cooperating classes in Thailand in entrepreneurial activity contributed to a very
different class formation from what happened in Indonesia. Whereas in
Thailand a bourgeoisie, however fragmented, grew out of a fusion of Thai
landowning, aristocratic, bureaucratic and trading classes with a Chinese
merchant class, such classes and groups remained separate in Indonesia,
leaving the land in the hands of peasants, commerce with the Chinese and
an antagonistic declining Muslim trading class, bureaucratic power with the
priyayi, and political power eventually with none of these groups.
With the rise of colonial capitalism and expansion of the money economy,
the Chinese entered commerce outside state patronage, such as imports,
retailing, collection of produce and money lending [13] Indigenous traders
also emerged with the introduction of money economy. This development
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was much stronger in Sumatra than in Java, but was in evidence in most of
Indonesia in the final decades of the 19th century. The Chinese were
restricted from trading in the interior, which facilitated this growth. Indigenous
entrepreneurs were also engaged in petty commodity production at this time
and had at the end of the 19th century a significant hold on small scale
industrial production, such as textiles, batik and household production of
commodities was enjoyed by pribumi entrepreneurs. Chinese merchants,
however, partly controlled this production as middlemen and traders. The
modern sector of industry was in the hands of European companies.
During the early decades of the 20th century, indigenous elements started to
lose out in competition with Chinese and foreign capital. Soon after the turn
of the century, Chinese traders were permitted to trade in the interior of Java,
where they also moved into the traditionally indigenous sector of batik
production. This strong competition against the emerging, but still feeble
class of indigenous merchants and commodity producers became the focal
point for the first national political activity of lasting importance, the founding
of Sarekat Dagang Islam, the Islamic Union of Commerce [14]• The Union,
which soon dropped its middle name of commerce and became the Sarekat
Islam, was founded by indigenous merchants anxious to resist Chinese
encroachment in business. One of the aims of the organisation was the
development of commerce among the pribumis. There were hopes that the
organisation might facilitate networks for mutual assistance among pribumi
entrepreneurs, which was an attempt at emulating what was seen to be one
of the keys to Chinese success in business.
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Mobilisation of capital through such networks did not materialise, but the
organisation enjoyed a spectacular, if short lived, success, and became
instrumental in fostering the development of indigenous politics. In less
than two decades all the most important political streams of the succeeding
decades had been crystallised out of this movement. The class based
divisions of native society gained certain expression in the way the union
disintegrated, although it would be a misleading oversimplification to see the
divisions between the modernists and the traditionalists as a simple class
division between traders and peasants.
The merchants who founded SDI had little in common with the prevailing
sentiments in the villages, or indeed the radical thinking emerging around
the formation of working classes in the towns. The villages were feeling the
impact of the intrusion of money economy and the peasants tended to react
in a conservative way. On village level the SI was controlled by the kiyayi,
the religious scholars and took on a mainly conservative religious outlook.
What the merchants and modernisers in towns and cities wanted, was in
many cases the opposite of the views taken by the rural kiyayis and
peasants. The villages had long been isolated and the production system
had perpetuated old divisions, while the same system was changing the
towns and cities.
The indigenous merchant class which could have been the foundation for a
native bourgeoisie, largely failed to secure its interests through this movement.
In the towns communists managed to win control of local branches, while the
45
kiyayis held sway in rural areas. Neither group had a commitment to the
original aims of the SDI or much sympathy for the creation of a strong
modern trading class in native society.
There were, however, some significant opportunities for the development of
pribumi commerce, particularly after the start of the Great Depression in the
early 1930s [15]• Colonial policy at this time facilitated the development of
small scale pribumi industries in Java and in the outer islands. Export of
manufactured goods from Java to the outer islands started at this time, and
parallel to that, the outer islands gained a far greater economic importance
than before , primarily as a result of changing markets in Europe for colonial
produce.
In spite of these opportunities, Chinese capital consolidated its position in the
last decades of colonial rule, as the most important non-European element in
the modern economy. Gradually, the plantation economy, along with the
growing minerals, oil and timber extraction sectors, came to be dominated by
a few large companies, mostly Dutch, but also some British and American.
The primitive native economy along with this concentration in the modern
economy, and Chinese ownership of intermediate sectors, gave shape to the
economy of newly independent Indonesia.
The political and social effects of all this were to entrench pre-capitalist
structures by limiting class differentiation and preventing formation of native
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classes capable of taking over the colonial economy. This was further
thwarted by the size and structure of the colonial enterprises.
Like in other countries, colonial economic domination was not only a question
of direct ownership, but also a question of the economic logic constituted by
the international trading system, a dimension largely beyond domestic control.
The new states differed sharply in their approach to this. In Malaysia large
parts of the economy remained in foreign hands for a long time after
independence, Important enterprises were eventually acquired through the
stock exchange and take-overs. In Thailand various policies were followed
in the 1950s and 1960s that were designed to ensure Thai control over the
economy, and whatever the side effects of these policies, a dominance of
Thai capital in local industry was ensured. In India, total native control of
industry was achieved from early on through far more restrictive measures.
A brief comparison of the nature and political effects of these different policies
will be made at a later stage.
In Indonesia much effort was spent on political attacks on foreign economic
domination and on the international trading system, while the transfer into
native hands of the main productive assets occurred through a burst of an
ill prepared nationalisation, a subject of a subsequent chapter.
As argued later, post colonial policy choices and policy outcome was chiefly
shaped by the weakness of the entrepreneurial classes and the relative
strength and autonomy of the state, on the one hand, and by the structural
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imperatives and the strength of the external dimension, that is the logic of the
international trading system, on the other. Nationalisation of foreign
enterprises and their transfer to military control was in large part effected by
the former, while the failure of this and the attendant economic policy was
determined by the latter.
In addition to these difficulties in digesting the colonial economy, its shape
at independence was not promising. The war and the Japanese occupation
was a heavy blow to most of the foreign enterprises, and in addition, some
sectors of the economy had suffered severe difficulties since the onset of the
Great Depression almost two decades earlier. While the domination of the
modern economy by a few large foreign companies was hardly unique to
Indonesia, both the extent of the foreign domination and the the size of the
enterprises relative to the local economy were unusual for Asia, although
parallels were certainly to be found, e.g in neighbouring Malaysia. The basic
organisation of the colonial economy around extraction of minerals and a few
types of produce was similar to what occurred in Latin America, Africa and
some Asian countries under European domination.
Like in many other former colonies, the key political question after
independence, at least in retrospect, was on how control over the economy
could be transferred into native hands. At the time, this question was seen
mainly in terms of the native versus the foreign and took on strong
nationalistic overtones. Although the question of who should take over the
foreign enterprises was much debated at the time, most participants will have
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failed to grasp the fundamental importance of the way this question was
handled for the future political structure of the country.
From the preceding pages, however, it should be clear, that choices in this
respect were severely limited. Native society was not economically organised
in such a way as being able to absorb the concentrated colonial economy.
The state, however weak and fragmented at independence, was to gain a
pivotal economic role with crucial implications for the formation of dominant
political and economic forces.
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THE POST-COLONIAL STATE IN INDONESIA
The perpetuation of the colonial enclave production of plantations and
extraction, discussed above, where economic power was in the hands of
foreign enterprises and a class of Chinese merchants, but political power had
passed on to a native elite, has been described as an "indeterminate social
formation". Speaking of the mode of production prevailing in Indonesia 1942-
1965, Alec Gordon claimed that Indonesia had joined "Third World normality"
only in 1965 [1]
The newly independent state of Indonesia can be similarly described as
having been of an indeterminate and intermediary character. Compared to
the states established at much the same time in India, Pakistan and in the
Philippines, where one or more identifiable indigenous classes were clearly
dominant in the economy, the early independent state in Indonesia seems
conspicuously divorced from the organisation of production. Compared to
India, Pakistan and Thailand the early post-colonial state in Indonesia also
seems underdeveloped, fragmented and weak.
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Hamza Alavi's theory of the strong, "overdeveloped" post-colonial state seems
inapplicable to Indonesia in the early 1950s. These theories, however,
approximate to an important extent, to features of the state that emerged
more than 20 years after the declaration of independence. The theory of the
"overdeveloped" state being inherited from the colonial power, is then clearly
not applicable. In this sense, the Indonesian state, like the social formation in
general, was indeterminate at the beginning and grew to approximate other
Asian states during the first two decades of independence. The reasons for
this were chiefly to be found in the economic organisation of the archipelago,
peculiarities of the class structure, and the partly related weakness of the
state, as well as in historical cleavages founded in religious differences.
These factors will be discussed at various points below.
Alavi's theory of the strong autonomous post-colonial state in South Asia can
be used in reverse to highlight the predicament of the Indonesian state at
independence. Alavi argues, that the post-colonial state enjoyed great
strength, relative to that of society. [2] This is because the colonial state was
used to control the whole of native society for the benefit of forces alien to
it. The state represented the interests of the bourgeoisie of the industrialised
colonial powers, and its mechanism of control was "overdeveloped" for the
purposes of an independent democratic state. The weak indigenous
bourgeoisie was, at the time of independence, unable to subordinate the
highly developed state.
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The Indonesian state at independence, however, was for several reasons very
different from this picture of what the British left on the Indian sub-continent.
To start with, the Indonesian state was established after a prolonged armed
conflict with the colonial state. This conflict was carried out without much
central command on the Indonesian side. The military of the newly
independent state was as a result substantially different from the British
trained armies of India and Pakistan inherited by the new states there. The
incohesive military will be discussed in some detail in a following chapter.
Secondly, the constitution of the new state was in dispute from the start. The
dispute was not confined to the institutionalised political arena where it was
played out over a decade or more, but lead to separate outbursts of civil war
during the 1950s on the main islands of Java, Sulawesi and Sumatra. Both
the form of government and the territorial integrity of the new state was
challenged in these rebellions after independence. Crucial implications of the
second rebellion when' forces in the outer islands, rooted in economic
structures, geographic realities and religious differences sought to break up
the Indonesian state will be discussed in the chapter that follows.
The colonial power also approached its former possession in a manner
different from the British in India and Malaysia. Whereas the British fought an
armed campaign against external and internal challenges to Malaysia before
full independence, the Dutch, after conceding defeat in keeping Indonesia,
attempted to weaken the central control of Jakarta over the country by
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encouraging a non-unitary form of state with much devolution of powers to
the regions.
In addition to this, and probably more importantly, no one class was clearly
in a dominant economic position in society, a situation with a certain parallel,
but a parallel of a different nature, in South Asia, where instead of a pair of
fundamental classes generated by a particular mode of production, the picture
was far more complex. The reason for this complexity, observed by Alavi in
India and Pakistan, is the way colonial capitalism interacted with pre-colonial
and pre-capitalist social formations, producing several fundamental classes
within one social formation rather than a single pair.
In Pakistan, Alavi speaks of three dominant classes, namely landowners,
indigenous bourgeoisie, and the metropolitan bourgeoisie. In the short term,
the interests of these three classes are frequently in conflict, while in the long
run, they have a shared stake in the preservation of the existing social order,
based as it is on private property, and on capitalism as the dominant mode
of production.
In the case of Indonesia, neither landowners, nor an indigenous bourgeoisie
could be spoken of as dominant classes, at least not in the same sense as
in Pakistan. The dominant class in native society, to the extent that such
terminology is applicable, was landless and not involved in commerce, as
discussed earlier. This was a bureaucratic class that owed its dominant
position in society to its management of the state rather than to ownership
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of the means of production. Better-off peasants and merchants undoubtedly
had more political clout than workers or poor peasants, but these did not
form strong organised classes capable of imposing their will through the state.
The economically dominant class of Chinese traders held no sway over the
state and was, in fact, systematically discriminated against in various ways.
The central position of the state, and its relative autonomy from any one class
is, in post colonial societies, further compounded by the weakness of
indigenous private capital, which leads the state, according to Alavi, to
assume a pivotal position in the economic development and industrial(sation.
The state appropriates economic surplus, and along with funds borrowed
from abroad, this is deployed, under the control of bureaucrats, for economic
development.
An argument of the same nature has been taken much further by theorists
working on industrialisation in the Third World. It has been shown that the
longer industrialisation is delayed, the greater amount of capital is needed to
carry it out, and hence, the greater tends to be the role of the state as the
only indigenous party capable of mobilising funds on the scale needed, or
that of foreign companies controlling technology and capital. (3) This
important point will be returned to at a later stage in the context of
industrialisation in Indonesia, the onset of the New Order and the political and
economic conditions developing in the 1960s.
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While the colonial genesis of the state gives it strength vis-a-vis society,
according to Alavi, the fragmentation of dominant classes gives it a measure
of autonomy from any one class. Almost all studies of the Indonesian state
have either assumed or concluded that the state has enjoyed considerable
autonomy from social classes. There has, in fact, been no published study
explicitly concluding otherwise.
The possibility of a class control over the state in Indonesia falls, of course,
outside the framework employed by most Indonesianists. For what would
constitute a mainstream framework for Indonesian studies, the state may at
any time pursue policies that are at variance with the intrests or wishes of
aH classes and groups in society, except perhaps, the elite within the state
itself, which is not conceived of as a class.
Neither has the question of state autonomy in Indonesia been greatly
debated by those guided by political economy paradigms. Studies directly
focusing on class in Indonesia have either been influenced by the
dependency theory, which is generally not concerned with the possibility of
indigenous class control over the state, or, they have concluded that due to
the fragmentation and political impotence of the economically dominant
classes in Indonesia, the state has enjoyed relative autonomy.
Studies focusing on the indigenous bourgeoisie in the first two or three
decades after independence have generally concluded that this was a class
in decline, and as no other class could be seen to be both economically
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dominant and with a purchase on the state, it was generally concluded, that
the state, since independence has enjoyed high degree of autonomy from
class control. The often related question of the strength of the state, has
likewise not been extensively analyzed with regard to Indonesia.
For those subscribing to a functionalist framework, or a culturally derived
paradigm, the question of strength is mainly interesting with regard to the
capacity of the state to deal with various groups in society. A state that can
impose its will on all groups in society would be a strong state from this point
of view. The New Order state, as opposed to the Old Order state for most
of its history, has therefor been conceived of as a strong state.
In traditional Marxist scholarship, on the other hand, a strong state is not one
that is autonomous and with a capacity to repress all groups, but one that is
not autonomous at all, but a highly developed tool in the hands of a powerful
class pursuing its interests. The state is not seen to have any basis for a
strength, that is in the long term, except the one that is derived from the
economic organisation. A strong state that is also autonomous of all class
forces is for Marxism something of a contradiction of terms.
The possibility for a state that controls the whole of society and its monetised
economy for the benefit of anything but a class, domestic or a foreign, is not
evident in traditional Marxism. Such a construct, however, a strong politically
and economically interventionist state free from class control forms the
mainstream view of the Indonesian state. For scholars guided by political
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economy paradigms the dependency theory, whereby political control was
seen to be exercised for the benefit of a foreign bourgeoisie solved part of
the theoretical problem created by the observed absence of a local
bourgeoisie. The dependency theory, however, was to an important extent
disproved by industrialisation in Latin America and East and Southeast Asia,
as pointed out earlier.
The importance of the external dimension, the world trading system, however,
is clearly vast in the formation of the Indonesian state and in the creation of
the conditions for the existence of classes, groups and the regime. As
suggested earlier, this external dimension creates ppportunities and
constraints, the structural imperatives that largely determine the outcome of
economic activity and political choices with regard to external trading and
industrialisation. This dimension, as important as it is, will not be analyzed
separately in this thesis, a task that is outside the scope of the thesis. It will
be conceived of as a framework of constraints and possibilities and
acknowledged as such.
This external system does not directly dictate policy, but dictates what is a
profitable economic behaviour for the state and for individual enterprises, arid
as such, provides constraints and possibilities. This dimension has already
been indirectly discussed in the preceding chapter on class formation in
colonial times. In the chapters that follow, its existence will be similarly
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After independence, in something of a reverse process of class formation and
state formation, the state attempted to create a class of indigenous
entrepreneurs. This was not a very systematic or sustned attempt, but it
was an important dimension in the economics and politics of the new state.
A new class of political rent seekers was created. Partly as a result of this,
and very importantly for the longer term, the economic policy favouring this
new class was highly detrimental to the small but already established
indigenous class of traders and producers.
Most of the political leadership was in a broad agreement on the need to
change the structure of ownership in the economy in favour of indigenous
elements and at the cost of foreign concerns. What united in this respect,
was nationalism. Economic independence was seen to be lagging behind the
political independence won in an armed struggle against the colonial power.
The Dutch had insisted on guarantees for foreign enterprises before
transferring sovereignty to the new republic. These guarantees made
nationalisation both difficult and costly. In spite of this, numerous and strong
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voices called for speedy transfer of large foreign enterprises to native hands.
Even the most moderate and business oriented leaders vowed to change the
structure of the economy. Mohammad Natsir, the first Prime Minister of the
unitary republic and leader of the Masyumi party, which was among the most
cautious of all parties in this respect, called on behalf of his government for
a "complete change" of the structure of ownership in the economy. [1]
Athtudes, however, differed greatly between parties and individual leaders with
regard to what form ownership should take, and what policies should be used
in attaining this. In general, the communists, the PKI, not surprisingly,
favoured state ownership and a quick transition to a ntionally controlled
economy, while the nationalists, the PM, favoured a more cautious pace
towards a mixed economy of private and co-operative ownership. Masyumi,
the largest party in the provisional and unelected parliament favoured, in
general, private enterprise and caution in nationalisation, pointing out the
scarcity of capital and human resources for running large enterprises in
Indonesia.
Judging from the extensive debate taking place among the political elite of
newly independent Indonesia over the future organisation of the economy,
and over short term and long term economic policy, however, a somewhat
confusing picture of blurred lines emerges. A general lack of commitment
to ideological projects can be surmised from these debates, and class
interests are hardly identifiable.
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It seems possible to conclude from these debates, extensive and wide
ranging as they are, that the politics of the early years of the republic were
significantly autonomous from the economic organisation of society, in the
sense that interests of identifiable classes were not systematically articulated.
[2]
This autonomy can also be surmised from the treatment of the politics of the
time by Herbert Feith. [3] Robison, commenting on this autonomy, explains
it in terms of the erosion by the money economy, commodity production and
the colonial state of the pre-capitalist structures of social class and political
power that took place without being replaced by politically organised classes
of landlords, labourers or capitalists. [Robison, 1986]
It seems to have been the conscious intention of all the major parties in
Indonesia, apart from the communists, to facilitate the growth of an
indigenous bourgeoisie through state policy. Various ideas were put forward
with regard to co-operative ownership, an important plank in the political
ideology put forward by nationalists, particularly by Haifa, the co-proclamator
of independence with Sukarno. Relatively little came of these ideas but they
continued to figure prominently in political debates. The cooperative ideal is
much in line with the fundamental principles of the ideology articulated by
both the Sukarno regime and the Suharto regime, the ideology of Pancasila,
such as the principle of gotong royong, the mutual help principle, and has
for this reason been advocated as a part of a political ideology. These ideals
/
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have been revitalised again for political purposes in 1990, as discussed later.
State enterprises were also discussed by several leading politicians as one
way of transferring the foreign owned economy to native hands. A mixture
of all three, private pribumi enterprises, co-operatives and state enterprises
was favoured by many, even most, judging from debates in parliament. This
mixture may not have only been a political preference, but a reflection of the
fact, that not only was indigenous capital very weak, prompting those
advocating free enterprise to acknowledge a major role for the state, but so
were also the administrative and capital resources the government could draw
on, a fact generally recognised.
In 1951, soon after full independence had been achieved, the government of
the day formulated what was to be a comprehensive plan for economic,
industrial and agricultural development. This plan, called the Economic
Urgency Programme, EUP, was mainly drawn up by Dr. Sumitro
Djodjohadikusumo, who was later to become an influential architect of the
New Order economic policy, after an earlier involvement with the regional
rebellions in the late 1950s. The plan proposed the consolidation of all efforts
at industrialisation through government sponsored finance and production
schemes. The object of the policy was to use the large scale, mostly foreign
owned companies, for the creation of an integrated industrial base, for the
most consisting of import substitution industries. [1
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The plan largely failed. The isolation of politics from the economy may have
been an important factor in this failure. Kuntjoro-Jakti describes the failure of
the plan in terms of a "fatal combination of its isolated origin, the highly
decentralised execution, and lack of continuity in government". [Kuntjoro-Jakti,
1982] He points out that the economically dominant European and Chinese
elements in the economy, crucial as they were to the success of the plan,
were not invited to participate in its formulation.
In spite of much talk on the need to transfer the economy into native hands
and on the need to help indigenous elements to shoulder this responsibility,
there was little commitment to the creation of a truly independent capacity in
this respect. The political system at this time was only willing and able to
facilitate the creation of a group of client capitalists, dependent on the
bureaucracy and the party system for favours.
In spite of considerable differences of opinion, all the major parties taking part
in the various parliamentary government of the 1950s, lent their hand in the
formulation and execution of policies that were supposed to facilitate the
creation of a class of indigenous entrepreneurs. The communists and some
left wing members of the Parliamentary Assembly warned, though, at times
against the social and political effects of the growth of such a class. State
finance was used liberally for these purposes during the period of
parliamentary government, as discussed briefly below.
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The task was daunting. Robison, quoting from Ansbach and Suffer cites
three examples of the extent of foreign ownership in the economy in the mid
1950s. [Robison, 1986] [5] In the financial sector, the 42 indigenous banks,
in spite of a strong support from the government, accounted for only 11 per
cent of outstanding credit. In many cases these banks were dependent on
continued government finance. In the rural credit sector, according to
Anspach, government initiated credit institutions failed to reduce the Chinese
hold on village credit. In the agricultural sector, 70 per cent of the estates on
Java and Sumatra were still in foreign hands by 1953. The Chinese had
moved into this sector rather than the pribumis, and while Chinese ownership
of estates had been negligible in 1929, by 1952 it had reached almost 20 per
cent, leaving little more than 10 per cent of this vital sector to the government
and indigenous investors. This increasing share of Chinese capital has a
certain parallel in later developments in Malaysia, when initial attempts at
reducing foreign control of the economy lead temporarily to a greater share
for Chinese capital.
In the manufacturing sector, Anspach's study of the textile industry in
Bandung, the centre of the weaving industry, shows the same pattern of
foreign and Chinese ownership. Of around 150 million Rps. of employed
capital, only 5 million Rps., less than 3 per cent was indigenous capital
employed by indigenous enterprises. Around 90 million Rps. of this capital,
well over half, was entirely foreign and foreign operated, while the remainder
was Chinese, foreign or partly foreign and operated byChinese and pribumi
enterprise. This situation prevailed in the late 1950s after several years of
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government schemes designed to alter this state of affairs. In each of these
sectors government policy sought to effect such change through a complex
mixture of incentives, subsidies and regulations. In all these cases, and in
most other sectors, progress was at best slow and in some cases none at
all.
The greatest intensity of government effort in this respect was reserved for the
import sector. The economic or political logic of concentrating efforts on this
particular sector is not entirely clear, and still less so if viewed in the light of
the stated objectives of government policy. This sector, however, was in
many ways more easily manipulated by licensing policy, without much danger
of complete strangulation, than the manufacturing sector. It also required less
capital, and a quick and substantial return on investments could be effected
through government policy.
Through what was known as the Benteng programme, the government used
allocation of import licenses and provision of credit to increase the share of
pribumi enterprises in this sector. The programme was on a very large
scale, given the size of the Indonesian economy. This lasted for five years
in its original discriminatory form, but was not consistently implemented. The
extent of the programme can be judged from the proportion of foreign
exchange credit channelled through it. In 1954 this rose to more than 75 per
cent. The scale can also be seen from the number of pribumi importers
enjoying its benefits. This rose from 250 in 1950 to 7000 in 1953. [Robison,
1986 Widespread corruption in allocation of licenses and credit was evident
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in this programme. Through their increasing hold over the bureaucracy, a
phenomenon to be discussed later, the political parties were very active in
using the scheme for patronage and fund raising.
The effect on the structure of ownership in the import sector was of a far
lesser importance than the impact of patronage and corruption on the political
system. Many of the licensees sold their permits to Chinese importers. The
government sponsored credit, extended on easy terms to pribumi importers,
was in many cases not fully paid back. A screening process in 1954,
designed to weed out corruption, cut the number of pribumi importers in half.
Even after this screening, however, a government agency estimated that 90
per cent of the registered importers were not bona fide. [Robison, 1986]
The Benteng programme, and others like it, were on the whole costly failures.
Even if the structure of ownership in the economy was not significantly
altered, however, several individual fortunes were made. This was mainly
through continued privileged access to political and bureaucratic power,
creating a pattern for the future. In many cases these fortunes declined with
changing political fortunes of the individuals concerned, and only in few cases
did they form a basis for self-sustaining enterprises. 	 This, however,
happened, although probably not without strong political contacts, and will be
discussed at a later juncture.
Many of those most active in reaping government patronage had direct
political connections to one or more of the political parties in the shifting
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coalitions governing Indonesia, or to bureaucrats, who in turn were often
sponsored by political parties. Close to a half of the members of the
provisional parliament, serving up to 1955, were directly involved in business.
[Suffer, 1959, p:1311] The debates in parliament documented by Suffer also
show that a number of people voicing caution against the development of
capitalism, or even an active hostility to that system, were themselves privately
involved in business.
The political parties also became directly involved in business, capitalising on
the access to state credit and to the bureaucracy, which apart from handing
out licenses and concessions, controlled the single most nportant source of
purchasing power and contracting. Largest of these party owned enterprises
were those set up by the PNI, but other parties were also active in this
field.[6J [Robison, 1986] The interests of the parties and those of .private
individuals within them were often less than clearly separated in the various
enterprises springing up in constellations around the parties.
Much of this set the pattern for, and has a parallel in, the rise of military
owned corporations after the military had displaced the parties and gained
domination over the bureaucracy, instituting a system where individual officers
were shareholders along with the military institutions concerned.
A few individuals or groups, however, were to emerge from this system as
traders of some substance. Robison has identified a few such enterprises
that either emerged from this environment or were able to expand through
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governent patronage and go on to greater things. Most of these, it seems,
enjoyed close association with one or more of the political parties. Those
that have survived to this day have since formed alliances with powerful
figures in the military, or the families of such men, particulary the Suharto
family.
As briefly mentioned earlier, traders from Sumatra had prospered during the
latter part of colonial rule, when the economy was undergoing structural
changes, and in some cases moved on to Java and other islands. A few
of these traders, like the Dasaad, Djohan, Djohor, Tamin and Aziz groups,
had expanded into the inter island trade that had grown during the depression
of the 1930s. They had competed successfully with Chinese elements and
even in some cases operated international trading. Some, like the Tamin
group, became involved with networks dominated Chinese merchants.
[Robison, 1986]
Some of these groups, such as the Tamin, Dasaad and Aziz groups
expanded significantly as a result of Benteng programme patronage. The
groups already possessed capital base and trading structures and were
therefore in a far better position to succeed than the ad hoc companies
formed to capitalise on political connections.
Among the individual Sumatran businessmen with strong connections to
political parties, mentioned by Robison, is Hashim Ning, who rose in the
1950s on connections to the PNI. Ning continued to prosper during the New
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Order regime on strong connections to the Suharto group. His business
enterprises and those of some other Sumatran businessmen, particularly
those linked to the automotive industry, is discussed by Ian Chalmers in his
study of the Indonesian car industry. [7] Another, Soedarpo Sastroamoto,
a brother of the leader of the PSI group in parliament, benefitted from
Benteng and was later able to regenerate political connections after the
change of regimes. Another Sumatran family that has prospered under the
New Order is the Bakrie family, which enjoys particularly strong business
connections to the President's family, with several jointly owned companies
and joint ventures of various kind, from import monopolies to manufacturing
industry. Some others, who based their operations on pQlitical connections,
failed to find new patrons after the military had replaced the parties as the
source of government patronage and went into decline.
The Sumatran traders can to a certain extent be seen as an exception from
a structural division within the nascent bourgeoisie in Indonesia. With a
simplification, it seems possible to speak of those who benefitted from the
government attempts at creating such a class, people chiefly based in Jakarta
and almost all enjoying political patronage, on the one hand, and of those
who were hurt by the economic policies of the 1950s, on the other.
The irony in this, if the government policy is seen as an attempt at creating
a class of entrepreneurs, is that the real looser during the 1950s was a class
of far more promising entrepreneurs than anything created in Jakarta.
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The policies leading to the demise of this class and the creation of the client
capitalists in Jakarta, first through the parties and later through the military,
proved to be crucial for the creation of economic and political structures in
Indonesia. Some of the most prominent features of the Indonesian state and
the constitution of the dominant classes can be traced back to this. Not only
did this shift power and resources from one class fraction to a qualitatively
different one, it was also instrumental, along with some other historical
processes, in unifying the military and pushing it to the centre of economic
and political power.
In the early part of the 20th century there had been a shift of investments
from Java to the outer islands. This coincided with the attainment of Dutch
supremacy over the entire archipelago, but the main reasons for this were
external to Indonesia. Demand for agricultural produce of the Javanese
plantations had stagnated in the early part of the century, while increased
industrial production in Europe and America created a growing demand for
raw materials, such as oil, tin, bauxite and coal, all found in quantities on
Sumatra, Kalimantan and Sulawesi.
Wertheim has pointed out that the adaption to the modern economy in these
islands was carried out by indigenous Indonesians to a far greater extent than
was true on Java. [8] Pribumi Indonesians embarked on the cultivation of
rubber and coconuts on their own initiative. These entrepreneurial farmers,
however, were often dependent on Chinese middlemen.
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During the first three decades of the 20th century, this increased economic
activity in the outer islands lead to a major shift in the colonial economy. By
1930, the exports of the outer islands exceeded those from Java. [9] At the
same time there was a growing disparity in income between Java and the
more prosperous outer islands. [10] During the Great Depression of the
1930s, the produce export from Java declined sharply, while the outer islands
fared better. At the same time, however, there was a significant increase in
the inter-island trade and in industrial production on Java. Java sold by then
both manufactured products and rice to the outer islands, while the imports
from abroad to Java were increasingly financed by outer island exports.
This trend continued beyond independence, and in 1956 even Kalimantan was
exporting more than Java. At this time, or slightly later, the outer islands
were exporting almost seven times more than Java. [Paauw, 1963] Java,
however, was taking most of the imports.
This superiority in export performance was not translated into political power
to the increasing dissatisfaction in the outer islands. Nor did the creation of
a small bourgeoisie in the outer islands lead to a cohesive representation of
their interests at national level. These interests found their voice most clearly
in Masyumi. The party, however, was constituted in such a way as to make
cohesive articulation of such interests difficult.
Without going in to the complex history of Masyumi and religious politics in
Indonesia, one or two features of its history need to be underlined in this
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context. The foundation and disintegration of Sarekat Islam has already been
mentioned, along with the fact that the main streams of political thinking had
crystallised out of it in the 1920s. Masyumi had been created during the
Japanese occupation as an umbrella organisation for several Islamic groups,
and in a reconstituted form, it became the largest party in the unelected
parliament that served until 1955. Differences within Indonesian Islam,
however, lead to the disintegration of Masyumi. The remnant of Sarekat Islam
left in 1947 to form the PSII, while Nandatul Ulama, the organisation of the
predominantly rural and mainly traditionalist ulama left Masyumi in 1952.
What remained was a party of modernist Islam, strongest in the outer islands
and in Sundanese western Java.
In the only democratic parliamentary elections in Indonesia, held in 1955,
Masyumi became the second largest party, just behind the PNI. The
combined vote of NU and Masyumi was 40 per cent. For those opposing
Islam in politics, particulary with regard to the often heated debate over an
Islamic or secular constitution, this was a potentially formidable block, if
somewhat smaller than many had feared before the elections, while in reality,
the two parties were far apart on many issues and often at loggerheads.
The fight over the constitution became one of the most dangerous schisms
in Indonesian politics of the 1950s. Aspects of this will be discussed at a
later stage. What is important at this stage, is the effect this had on the outer
island bourgeoisie through pushing Masyumi out of mainstream politics. The
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constitutional issue itself, however, was only one of the issues that estranged
Masyumi from the state.
Masyumi was banned after the outer island rebellions in the mid to late 1950s.
NU had taken a firm stand against the rebellions but Masyumi had its main
base in the rebel areas and sympathised with the rebellion. Before that the
party had taken less than clear stand on the Dar-ul Islam rebellion in western
Java, southern Sulawesi and Sumatra. [111 These rebellions will be
discussed in a following chapter on the rise of the military.
At this point it suffices to underline that the interests of the nascent
bourgeoisie in the outer islands became fused with the fate of political Islam.
Together they became the loosing side in a crucial political conflict in the
1950s.
It would be quite wrong, though, to see Masyumi as a bourgeois party bent
on the creation of capitalism in Indonesia. The parliamentary debates of the
1950s chronicled and analyzed from different concerns by Feith and Suffer
reveal suspicion of capitalism and unfettered private enterprise among
Masyumi leaders. [Suffer, 1959, Feith, 1962] This opposition to capitalism,
however, was mostly directed at international capital and the western
countries.
It would be even more misleading to assume that all private pribumi
entrepreneurs in Indonesia at the time were modernist Muslims. Sufficient
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number of them in the outer islands were modernist Muslims to generalise
about this particular fraction of the Indonesian trading class or bourgeoisie,
but this was not necessarily true of Javanese traders or indeed the new class
of entrepreneurs rising around the political parties and the bureaucracy. The
significance of Masyumi for the development of Indonesian bourgeoisie was
neither a total inclusion of the bourgeoisie in its ranks, nor an unambiguous
pro-capitalist stance.
What was important about Masyumi in this sense was more by default than
by design. It was the only major party likely to uphold the interests of the
entrepreneurs that were independent of state privilege.' NU was largely
indifferent to these interests, the PKI hostile, while PM, for long periods the
most powerful of the parties, was deeply involved in, or allied with the import
business and client capitalism in general. [12]
Masyumi, however, took part in formulating state policies that were as inimical
to the interests of the outer island bourgeoisie as they were beneficial to the
creation of client-capitalism. These policies, followed to a different extent by
all governments of the 1950s, overvalued the exchange rate of the rupiah,
harming outer island exports and facilitating imports, mainly consumed in Java
and mostly traded through political privilege.
During the first decade of independence, political power and bureaucratic
authority were fused, and the state apparatus appropriated by the political
elite. This created a pattern of client capitalism and the policies followed
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severely weakened export production and the nascent bourgeoisie of the
outer island, while a group of traders, rather than producers, survived the
demise of the system and forged new alliances with the military after the
parties had been displaced as sources of patronage.
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CHAPTER 5
RISE OF THE MILITARY
In its origins, the Indonesian military differs greatly from the armed forces of
most other Asian states. Its genesis in armed guerilla struggle set it apart
from the armies of most of the countries Indonesia could possibly be
compared to politically. In India, Pakistan, Malaysia and in the Philippines,
cohesive and professional military organisations were inherited from the
colonial power, whereas in Thailand the military had been an arm of an
independent state for centuries. Other Asian armies with origins in guerilla
war, like those of Vietnam and, in a different way, China, were lead by a
political leadership and a cohesive political ideology.
The Indonesian army was created outside the perimeter of the state and was
independent of the political leadership of the nationalist movement. It was
self-created, in the words of Nasution, its long time commander, 'an army
which formed itself on its own initiative, which armed and equipped itself and
which carried out is operations according to its desires." [1]
Parallel to this, and also connected to the way independence was gained in
opposition to the colonial state, was the initial weakness of civilian political
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institutions, particularly during the struggle itself, when the military was being
formed. A lasting legacy of these origins is to be found in the relationship
between the military and civilian politicians. The military was not only formed
without a central political command, it also, in its own view at least, won
Indonesian independence without the benefit of a civilian leadership. [2]
Relations were strained during the war of independence and almost
continually since, although the relative strength of the military and civilian
politicians differed sharply from one period to another.
Initially, though, and with much impact on the political strength on the military,
a more important legacy of these roots was manifested through disunity within
the ranks, reflecting the diversity of the component parts of the army. One
part had been trained by the Dutch colonial army, other parts had been
formed under Japanese auspices, and some had their roots in largely
localised units formed during the war of independence. [3] The militias
formed during the Japanese occupation and during the war of independence
had in many cases particular religious or political affiliation.
The men joining the militias did so, on the whole, for political reasons rather
than out of a wish to pursue a military career. The combat methods of a
guerilla campaign helped to blur the distinction between military membership
and civilian concerns. [4] The militias were therefor not only independent of
civilian control, they were largely of a particularistic political or religious
outlook, often localised and in limited contact with a centralised military
command, and separated from civilian society only to a low degree.
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The first major test of strength between the military leadership and the civilian
government reflected disunity within the military more than the strain in civilian-
military relations. After fighting had ended and independence was gained the
military leadership sought to streamline the forces and create a more
professional and cohesive armed services. This was met by opposition by
many of the officers who had entered the army through the militias. These
people saw their position being undermined by the Jakarta based hub of the
professional and largely Dutch trained officer corps.
After 1950 the army was in the hands of General Nasution and General
Simatupang, who were both keen on rationalising, modernising and
professionalising the army. The army was largely preoccupied with its own
internal affairs and its political role was minimal for some time, although the
military's acceptance of civilian supremacy was probably never a reality. [5]
The governments of the Republic supported, in principle at least, the
streamlining efforts of the military leadership, headed by General Nasution.
President Sukarno, however, was critical of the policies pursued by the army
leadership, probably because the personnel changes instituted by Nasution
had reduced his own influence in the army. [6]
When plans were made for the retirement of some 60.000 troops in 1952 as
a result of a difficult budgetary situation, the opposition took up the cause of
the militia officers concerned as a part of a more general attack on the
government, and on the army leadership. Sukarno and the opposition parties
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engaged in complex moves where divisions within the military were made use
of, both with regard to the question of reorganisation of the army, and also
in ongoing parliamentary conflicts of the day. [7] This was regarded by the
army as an intolerable interference in the army's affairs and its leadership
called on the President to dissolve parliament. The affair lead to the dismissal
of General Nasution and a loss of position by several regional commanders
of the army. [Crouch, 1978]
No simple dichotomies explain the position of the protagonists in this affair.
While the army leadership was protesting against political interference with
the military, and taking a stand for professionalisation of the army, it was
probably engaged in political plotting against the government and parliament.
What complicated the affair was the alleged intention of the military
leadership to carry out a military coup rather than just the protest that
materialised outside the Presidential Palace in Jakarta. Herbert Feith asserts
that "it may be regarded as established that General Nasution was engaged,
for several months before October 17th 1952, in working out plans for a type
of military coup". [Feith, 1962:262] The effects of such a coup, according to
Feith, would have been to strengthen Sukarno's powers, but at the same time
make him dependent on the military. The logic of this was not very different
from what emerged several years later with Guided Democracy.
The elements Nasution was attempting to root out of the military were no less
distrustful of the civilian leadership of the country or less disenchanted with
the politics of parliamentary democracy. Nor was the opposition in parliament
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at this time any different from the government with regard to military policy.
The contending interests at the heart of this affair in 1952 were to align
themselves in a far more clear cut manner three years later. The government
of the day, lead by the PNI, appointed at this time a relatively junior officer
and a PNI sympathiser to be the army chief of staff. This appointment was
rejected by both main factions in the army.
Between 1952 and 1955 the shared sentiments of the factions within the army
had gradually come to prevail over the divisive issues that could be traced to
the way the army was formed. What brought the army together was a
common interest in avoiding civilian interference. This shared wish was
strong enough, according to Feith, for the forces that had prevailed in the
army after the 17th of October affair to accept the return of Nasution and his
men to a position of dominance in the army. [Feith, 1962]
In 1955 their unity was sufficient to bring down the government over the
appointment of army chief of staff. After this it became clear that the army
was not be pushed aside or used in inter-party rivalry.
The significance of this affair may have been even greater. Some have seen
the army manoeuvres at this time as crossing the threshold between
defensive action against civilian interference, and active involvement in politics.
Guy Pauker, for example, claims that this incident forms a "dividing line
between the period when the army was mainly concerned with resisting
political interference in its internal affairs and the period when it began to play
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an active role in politics." [8] For all the new found unity and confidence,
however, divisions still existed within the military, and according to Crouch,
who points to the "brithe quality" of the unity at this time, a successful coup
by the military was a virtual impossibility. [Crouch, 1978:31-32]
The most serious division within the military at this time was between the
Jakarta based leadership and the outer island commanders. This regional
division within the military, however was only a part of a more complex divide
with roots in colonial and even pre-colonial times. At the most basic level, of
course, is the fact that Indonesia is a recent colonial creation out of diverse
geographic and cultural component parts. Probably more importantly, though,
the economic organisation of the archipelago was imbalanced in various
ways.
In the previous chapter on the indigenous bourgeoisie it was pointed out that
the outer islands had come to be responsible for most of Indonesia's exports
during the final decades of colonial rule. Imports, on the other hand, were
mainly traded through Java and consumed there to a large extent. The
exchange rate policy pursued by successive governments in the first few
years of independence, as discussed earlier, penalised the outer island
exporters and favoured the import consuming economy of Java. In effect,
the outer islands were forced to part with their foreign exchange earning
produce at an artificially low price, which subsidised import consumption in
Java and particularly in Jakarta.
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In response to this, the military commanders of the outer islands, particularly
Sumatra and Sulawesi started to organise large scale smuggling operations.
Military organisation of smuggling, which was not an entirely new
phenomenon as will be discussed in the following chapter, was to become
an important economic feature in Indonesia with highly important political
impact and long term implications. The regional division within the military
came to a head after Nasution had regained his post as army commander.
He almost immediately took steps towards centralisation of the army
command, which undermined the powerful position of the regional
commanders in the outer islands. For the outer islanders this came on top
of not only the unfavourable exchange rate policy, but' the growth and
centralisation of the national bureaucracy in Jakarta, and their distrust of the
ever shifting coalitions in the increasingly isolated world of Jakarta politics.
The whole question of Javanese domination of Indonesia was, of course the
underlying factor. Daniel Lev claims that the regional rebellions may be
summed up as a test of Java's real and inevitable domination of the
archipelago. [9]
All the main political parties in Indonesia, except for Masyumi, the PNI, the
PKI and the NU had more than 85 per cent of their electoral support in Java
and could be considered primarily as Javanese parties. [10] Masyumi, as
has been pointed out in the previous chapter on the pribumi traders, was
primarily based in the outer islands. Masyumi, unlike the other parties, was
deeply suspicious of the expanding bureaucratic control over the economy,
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centralised as it was in the Jakarta based, and party influenced, hub of the
bureaucracy. While most of the party leaders, apart from those of Masyumi,
reacted with little sympathy for the rebellions that broke out in 1956, there
were strong sentiments within the army for a compromise with the rebels.
The rebels were army commanders who had taken over the civilian
government in areas of Sumatra, Sulawesi and some other islands. A number
of ranking officers in Jakarta were from the outer islands and in addition,
many in the army shared the strong anti-communist sentiments expressed by
the rebels.
Many of the Javanese officers, however, wanted no compromise. One of the
most outspoken of these was the army commander of Central Java, the
Diponegoro command, the then Colonei, later General and President, Suharto.
He spoke strongly against appeasement at the National Conference called in
1957. He claimed there that the people of Java, numerically superior as they
were, would feel unjustly treated if the government shifted development efforts
towards the unruly regions in response to their grievances. [11]
The rebellions and their outcome, which was decided by a swift military
campaign in 1958, served to redraw the political map of Indonesia, with
power passing away from the parties to the army and to the President.
Masyumi was eventually banned and as pointed out previously, the political
forces protecting the independent pribumi bourgeoisie were greatly weakened.
At the same time the political role of the military was greatly enhanced, and
so was the unity in the ranks. Strength of political sentiments grew in the
86
army and its successful defence of the unitary republic served to give
increased legitimacy to its political claims.
During the rebellions Sukarno had declared martial law to be in force. The
task of administering this fell to the central army leadership. For this purpose
the Central War Authority, later renamed Supreme War Authority, Penguasa
Perang Tertinggi, or Perperti was established. Sukarno himself was the
supreme commander of Perperti, but he had to rely on the existing army
hierarchy and personnel. The army as also given a direct responsibility for
administering the re-captured regions in the outer islands. [12]
Coinciding with the regional rebellions was the collapse of parliamentary
democracy. The complex chain of events leading up to its demise will not be
entered into here. With regard to the focus of this thesis, and matters already
discussed, it suffices to say, that the system was not sustained by strong
forces grounded in society or its economic organisation.
The establishment of a cabinet government answerable to a strong parliament
had in any case been somewhat accidental. The 1945 constitution provided
for a system of strong presidential government, but this was sidestepped in
favour of a parliamentary system out of concern for foreign opinion more than
anything else. Between 1950 and 1959 there were seven short lived
governments, and although some enjoyed a measure of success, the system,
on the whole, did not work very well. Aside from a growing economic crisis
and the problems associated with the regional rebellions, corruption was
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rampant and as pointed out before, the parties made extensive use of their
powers to penetrate the bureaucracy and enrich themselves, their leaders and
their clients.
The ideological cleavages running through Indonesian society were not
bridged by the parliamentary system, which could not in ten years of
operation resolve the question of whether the state should be based on Islam
or on secular principles. [13] The regional divide had erupted into full scale
rebellions and growing support for the communists threatened increased
polarisation in the countryside.
Two major political forces had been excluded to a large extent by the
parliamentary system, namely President Sukarno and the army. The basis for
Sukarno's powers proved limited and short lived. He enjoyed great powers
for a few years based on his historica' role, his charisma and to no less
degree based on a political vacuum created by structural changes in the
political and economic organisation of the country.
His role, like that of the equally short lived parliamentary democracy, is largely
outside the scope of this thesis, which is concerned with the development of
long term structures of economic and political power.
After the last parliamentary government left office in 1957 and the regional
rebellions were quashed a year later, Sukarno and the army gradually became
the main pillars of power. The PKI is often spoken of as the third pillar in a
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troika characterised more by competition than cooperation. [14] The strength
of the PKI proved to be equally temporary to that of Sukarno in spite of its
well organised base among the masses in Indonesia. The complexities of
the power arrangements during Guided Democracy are, again, mostly outside
the scope of the thesis. [15]
The main features of the system replacing the parliamentary democracy were
strong presidential powers and a representation at the highest level of groups
other than political parties. The latter feature, along with martial law
administration, was the basis for military participation in government. Formal
military representation was instituted in the newly constituted national
parliament, the Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat - Gotong Royong, the Mutual Help
People's Representative Council, and in the provisional People's Consultative
Assembly, the Majelis Permusyawaratan Rakyat Sementara, as well as in
provincial bodies.
The political ideology behind this was formed through an articulation of
various concepts that had been floated at the time of independence. These
were mainly the supposedly ancient Javanese principle of 'gotong royong',
mutual help and that of consensus through consultation, 'musyawarah untuk
mencapai mufakat'. [16] On the basis of these principles Sukarno intended
to form a cabinet with communist participation, but the military was able to
veto these plans, while itself was awarded 11 seats out of 37 in a cabinet that
followed.
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Over the years of Guided Democracy a plethora of institutions and ideological
formulations came into being. [Feith, 1963] The sequence of this and the
exact institutional and ideological arrangement is not of interest here. The
substance of all this, however, was the creation of a strong centralised
Presidency and an institutional and ideological arrangement excluding political
parties, but including the military, a system that has in essence survived to
this day.
The economic system that was to sustain military rule, and the rise to power
of a certain faction within the military, came into being at about the same time
as foundations were laid for the political system. After Indonesia lost a vote
at the UN towards the end of 1957 over the question of West Irian
sovereignty, held by the Dutch and claimed by Indonesia, workers started
taking over Dutch enterprises in Indonesia. In order to forestall communist
influenced trade unions from taking control of some of the largest
corporations in the country, the army moved in, acting on the basis of
martial law, and assumed control over Dutch owned enterprises in the
country. These were later formally nationalised and placed under army
supervision.
The Dutch business empire in Indonesia was huge in comparison to the local
economy, although it had faced severe difficulties for a long period of time.
The system of Guided Economy ran parallel to Guided Democracy, and was
based on control over the previously foreign owned colonial type economy
by the military and the bureaucracy, the latter being controlled by the
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President and to some extent by political parties. In effect, the
nationalisations and the policies of the Guided Economy represented the
seizure of the modern economy by the military and the bureaucracy.
The nationalisation of the colonial economy did not serve to alter its structure.
The ownership changed without there being a move towards development of
national industrial capital. The formally Dutch enterprises were managed by
the military for fund raising purposes rather than for longer term investment
in a national industrial strategy. Poor management, lack of investment and
maintenance were responsible for the decline of the nationalised enterprises
under military command and the disintegration of the economy that followed.
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ORIGINS OF AN ARMED BOURGEOISIE
The chief beneficiaries of Guided Democracy were the men who eventually
overthrew it. The military, both the institution and individuals within it
benefitted immensely during this period. Feith claimed in the early 1960s that
"an overwhelming majority of army members, from generals to privates, are
richer, more powerful, and higher in social position than before". [Feith,
1963:398]
The benefits were far from uniformly spread, however. During this period a
discernible business oriented faction within the military came into being.
These people were not recognised as a faction or a group at the time, but
in retrospect it becomes clear, that many of the individuals benefitting most
spectacularly from the increased economic involvement of the military were,
in various ways, tied together from early on. These men were later to form
the ruling group of Indonesia.
This informal group has been spoken of by Crouch as the "financial and
political generals". [Crouch, 1978] This roughly corresponds with what
Jenkins politely termed the "pragmatists", as opposed to the "principled"
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officers, the latter being military men primarily engaged in military affairs rather
than in promoting private business concerns. [Jenkins, 1984]
The business involvement of the army, as well as that of individual officers,
predated Guided Democracy. The army had to raise its own funds during the
war of independence, and due to the budgetary difficulties of the new republic
this practise continued after the war had ended. The army frequently
complained about insufficient budgetary allocations during the 1950s, and
while this became a significant political issue on one or two occasions, the
problem remained unsolved.
In the mid 1950s these budgetary constraints had lead to a decline in the
status position of military officers relative to that of civilian bureaucrats. Feith
claims that officers were being defeated at local level in status competition
with better healed, civil servants and local leaders of political parties. [Feith,
1962] This lead to much resentment within the military which in turn gave
rise to demands for increased military influence at the political centre where
funds were allocated.
At the same time the army increasingly moved into business for fund raising
purposes. These activities have not been sufficiently documented anywhere,
partly for the understandable reason that the army was from the start involved
in illegal operations, and the extent and type of business involvement remains
a matter of conjecture from very fragmented sources. It seems clear,
however, from a number of incidental and anecdotal references that when
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military commanders in Sumatra and Sulawesi started openly to organise large
scale smuggling in the 1956, this was a stepping up of widely practised
activities, rather than a new sphere of military operation.
The scale of business involvement in the early 1950s, however, was tiny in
comparison to what occurred after the nationalisations of 1957 and the onset
of Guided Democracy. This brought about what Crouch has termed "a
striking change in the army ethos". [Crouch, 1978:40]
A new image emerged alongside that of the freedom fighter, an image of a
manager and a bureaucrat, and not infrequently, an image of financial
corruption. The officers assigned to commercial activities required business
skills, and although such skills often developed very slowly in the individuals
concerned to the great detriment of the nationalised enterprises, they were
gradually acquired by a number of army officers. Such individuals tended to
put their skills to private as well as official use, and as Crouch has pointed
out, "after gaining deeper understanding of the workings of the commercial
world, it was not a big step for many to adopt the role of the businessman".
[Crouch, 1978:41]
For much of the fund raising, however, skills other than those normally
associated with business were also required. Aside from smuggling produce
out of the country, units of the army were responsible for fairly extensive
smuggling into the country, particulary into Java. Many army units also seem
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to have relied on gambling and protection rackets more than legal commercial
activity.
There seems little doubt, admittedly though from very fragmented evidence,
that among the most extensive fund raising operations of the military during
the 1950s was that of the Diponegoro division in Central Java, commanded
by the then Colonel, later General and President Suharto. The people
working with Suharto at this time were in many cases to become members
of the small group that ruled Indonesia politically, and increasingly, financially,
after 1965. This group will be discussed in some detail in a following chapter.
Colonel Suharto, along with some other army commanders, formed business
alliances with Chinese traders. Two of the individuals he went into business
with in these early days in Central Java were later to become among the very
richest people of the country. One of them, Liem Sioe Liong is by all
accounts the richest man in Indonesia, while Suharto's other Chinese partner,
Bob Hassan certainly ranks close to the top, along with the President himself,
the President's children, and a few business partners of either, or both, the
Presidential family and Liem Sioe Liong. All these fortunes had a humble
beginning in various army rackets in Central Java. The genesis of the
countries largest business empires will be briefly discussed below, and in
endnotes to a following chapter.
Business alliances between military men and members of the Chinese minority
were not unique to Central Java, or indeed to Indonesia. Similar alliances
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seem to have been formed in various areas of the country, where Chinese
capital and expertise were fused with army clout in legal and illegal business
operations. Such alliances are not peculiar to Indonesia. Army officers and
Chinese capital owners had been cooperating in Thailand for a number of
years. During the 1950s, under the Phibun regime, civilian and military
bureaucrats made extensive use of Chinese capital and business expertise for
raising funds, often for political purposes. [1] The Chinese, like in Indonesia,
were not milked dry by this exploitation, but on the contrary, flourished in
many cases and went on to form large business empires under the protection
of military officers.
The fund raising operations of the military started to draw increasing criticism
in the late 1950s, as it became evident that corruption was spreading and
individual officers were greatly enriching themselves. General Nasution had
little sympathy with business involvement for self-enrichment, and tried,
however feebly, to curb the worst excesses
Significantly, the two most powerful men to be reprimanded for corruption
were Suharto and General lbnu Sutowo, who together were later to lay the
financial groundwork for New Order Indonesia, and who arguably were its two
indispensable fathers.
For a while it looked as two promising careers had been cut short, especially
that of Suharto who was removed from military command and moved to the
Army academy. One of the most powerful figures in the army at the time,
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General Gatot Subroto, who was among other things in charge of army
promotions, however, saved Suharto from further ignominy. Gatot Subroto
was the step-father of one of Suharto's main business partners in Central
Java and since in Jakarta, Bob Hassan, who now heads one of the largest
business empires in Indonesia.
During Guided Democracy the army as an institution became seriously
involved in business on four levels, namely at national level, at the level of
regional command, on local level, and on individual level, Individuals were
often Involved in business on one or more levels on behalf of the army, while
in many cases vigorously pursuing their own private comnercial concerns.
On national level, the military was given the task of managing some of the
largest enterprises in the country. The scale of the nationalised companies
can by gauged from figures collected by Anspach. He estimates that the
nationalised companies were responsible for 90 per cent of plantation output
and 60 per cent of foreign trade. [Anspach, 1969]
Apart from this dominant role in the export sector, foreign companies were
in a dominant position in banking, shipping, insurance and various other
service sectors. A large part of the manufacturing industry and mining was
also in foreign hands. After the nationalised industries had been
reconstituted into six state corporations in 1958, these, along with two other
state owned firms, accounted for around 70 per cent of all imports, according
to estimates by Panglaykim and Thomas. [3]
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On regional level, military commanders set up formal and informal business
structures to raise funds for divisional units, particularly to augment pay and
benefits. Among these were construction companies that gained contracts
from the state and state companies. On local level, military officers were
engaged in various business activities, from smuggling and protection
racketeering to licence peddling and commercial use of military transport.
Those engaged in business on behalf of the military were, according to
Crouch, expected to rake of some proportion of turnover for their own use
and that of their men, so long as they did not overstep informal limits.
[Crouch, 1978:275] Procuring of material and services 'and contracting of
work was one of the chief ways of passing on funds from the publicly owned
companies to private or military concerns.
The nationalised enterprises were milked of funds in these and other ways,
both for private and military purposes to the extent that most of them went
into serious decline for lack of investment and maintenance, contributing
greatly to the gathering economic crisis of the late Old Order period.
Compounding the situation was Sukarno's increasingly assertive foreign
policy, which called for increased military spending. His confrontation with
Britain and Malaysia over the foundation of the latter, and his West Irian
campaign put further strain on military budgets at the time of a general
economic downturn and state revenue crisis.
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No reliable figures exist to illustrate the extent of the army's fund raising at
this time. In the 1960s, however, the military was known to rely on regular
state budgetary allocations for only half its funds. Crouch quotes estimates
from the army newspaper, Angkatan Bersenjata, showing that only slightly
more than half of the military budget at the end of the 1960s was coming
from the state. Other newspapers, Pedoman and Indonesia Raya, claimed
the state's share of the military budget to be only around 40 per cent at this
time. [Crouch, 1978]
The fund raising of the military was gradually organised into several large
corporations and "welfare foundations". The ownership strUcture of these was
complex and involved both military divisions, veterans organisations, serving
officers and retired generals. Among the best known of these were the
Siliwangi company, Propelat, the army company Inkopad, the navy company
inkopal, the veterans foundation's Kosgoro, the Kostrad foundation, Yayasan
Dharma Putra, set up by Suharto, and the Ministry of Defence related
umbrella company, Tn Usaha Bakti.
Much of the vast system of military commercial patronage which was to
sustain and characterise the New Order was already in place before 1965.
This was from the start organised, run, and privately milked by a group of
business oriented generals who were to assume political power once the two
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CHAPTER 7
ESTABLISHMENT OF THE NEW ORDER STATE
The crisis facing the Old Order state towards the end was unusual only in its
political and economic intensity, not in its nature. There are certain similarities
to be found in the crisis resolved by the Sarit coup in Thailand in 1959, that
of Brazil in 1964, and several other countries of Latin America in the 1960a
and 1970s. Certain important parallels can also be drawn with the Philippines
in the mid to late 1960s, although both the manifestation and resolution of the
crisis there was quite different. The problem in all cases was an economic
and political crisis with roots in problems of industrialisation, changing
patterns of international trade, and in the political mobilisation of societies of
mass poverty.
There were, of course, some highly important features unique to the
Indonesian crisis, and these dictated the specific course of events, and the
details of the outcome. On the whole, however, the economic crisis was
caused by failure of the government to either accept the logic of the
international economy, or to change this logic as Sukarno had vowed to do.
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Successive governments failed to alter the structure of the economy, except
the ownership structure through nationalisation. The country continued to be
dependent on a colonial type export economy, but failed, at the same time,
to sustain this economy. Sukarno vowed to dismantle the colonial economy
while continuing to rely on it for foreign exchange. The export sectors and
much of the modern economy fell into decay through mismanagement, drain
of resources, corruption and lack of investment.
At the same time, the contradictions within the "competitive alliance", as it has
often been termed, of PKI, the army and Sukarno became steadily less
reconcilable. Other potential political coalitions were not in clear evidence.
The demise of the indigenous bourgeoisie, the political impotence of the
Chinese bourgeoisie, unresolved divisions within Islam, and more importantly
between Islam and the army, all limited severely options for a creation of a
sustainable political coalition.
The dramatic sequence of events in Indonesia in 1965 and 1966 has been
extensively documented and analyzed, both from economic and political
vantage points. Politically, the focus has most often been on the events
themselves, particulary on the 30th of September affair and a few other crucial
events such as the transfer of power to General Suharto, the "Supersemar".
The analysis has centred mostly on the main actors, Sukarno, Suharto, a
dozen or so other figures, mainly from the military and the PKI, and to a
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lesser extent on a few institutions, such as the army, the PKI and the political
parties.
It is not the intention here to minimise the importance of such analysis of
events and actors. The concern here, however, is with longer term structures
and trends, and from this vantage point the exact sequence of events is of
less importance than the broad contours of the situation giving rise to these
events.
The roots of the crisis that took on such a dramatic manifestation in 1965 to
1966 were, as pointed out earlier, neither unique to Indonesia, nor are they
ultimately to be found in the institutions of politics or with the individuals
prevailing within them. The roots of the crisis were in the longer term
economic structures of the country, the structures of the prevailing colonial
enclave production, and of peripheral capitalism which dictated the framework
for industrialisation and modernisation of the economy and its increasingly
important relations to the world economy.
The economy had failed to grow under Guided Democracy and Guided
Economy, and had registered a fall in per capita terms between 1958 and
1965. The total value of exports had also fallen from a peak of US dollars 1
billion in 1956, the year before the nationalisations, down to US dollars 700
million in 1965. Foreign reserves had fallen from over US dollars 300 million
in 1960 down to the insignificant sum of US dollars 8 million in early 1966. [1]
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Industrial production had fallen sharply and one estimate indicates that only
20 per cent of industrial capacity was being employed in 1965. [21 This
extremely low figure was due to lack of imports of machinery, spare parts and
raw material, as well as problems of maintenance and management. Inflation
had been on the increase for some years and reached 600 per cent per
annum at the end of the Old Order. One of the main reasons for this was
an enormous budget deficit, which had reached the incredible figure of 174
per cent of government revenue in 1965. [Mas'oed, 1983:62]
Like in Latin America at much the same time, and in the neighbouring
Philippines, the crisis in Indonesia in the mid 1960s could only be solved
through one of two chief means. One was to open up the economy to
foreign capital and technology, the other, more difficult, uncertain and less
travelled road was to aim at changing the overall economic and political
organisation of society.
The former road was taken in the Philippines, Indonesia and in much of Latin
America at a similar time in history. As well as sharing roots, the crises in
these countries had a similar outcome, namely right wing, undemocratic
regimes committed to depoliticising their societies to facilitate the opening up
of these economies to foreign capital, technology and trade.
Although Latin America had progressed much further in industrialisation than
Indonesia, or for that matter, the Philippines, its experience is instructive for
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the nature of the crisis in Indonesia and for its outcome. Compared to
Europe, Latin America was a late industrialiser and much of its political crisis
in the 1960s and 1970s can be viewed through problems created by this
relative position, in the same way as the Indonesian crisis can only be
understood by reference to the position the country had in the world
economy.
Alexander Gerschenkron in his writings on industrialisation in Russia had
pointed out the effect of late industrialisation on the accumulation of capital
for industrialisation and the need for foreign capital rooted in this relative
position. [3] In the context of Latin America this link wasfurther established
and analyzed by Alfred Hirschman. [4] The problem centres on capital
accumulation. In the case of the original industrialising country, England, only
a small amount of capital was needed to start the industrialisation process.
Capital goods were simple and inexpensive at this initial stage and sufficient
funds could be mobilised by individual entrepreneurs, many of whom had
access to land capital. Profits from these primitive industries could then be
re-invested in improved technology and expansion.
In the case of the late industrialisers, and this category encompasses the
entire world outside England, more capital was needed as capital goods had
come more complex and expensive. At the same time, demand had been
created by foreign production. To enter industrialisation at this stage in a
competitive position was therefor less commonly possible for individual
entrepreneurs. The industrialisation of England has in this way been
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described as laissez-faire in comparison to the more forced and planned
industrialisation of the other European countries.
This distinction, however, may not be very neat, and in any case analytically
not very important, as the industrialisation of almost all late-late industrialisers
like Indonesia can be described as "forced" in this terminology. [5] What this
points out, however, is the general need for the state, large enterprises and
foreign technology at this stage of industrialisation, which may explain to an
important extent the different role the state and foreign capital has had in the
politics of late-late industrialisers from that of the earlier industrialising
countries.
The road taken by most Latin American countries after the collapse of
demand for their agricultural produce in the Great Depression, was import
substitution industrialisation. This policy shaped to a large extent political
conditions in Latin America in the 1950s and into the 1960s.
For the purposes of this discussion a few features of this policy need to be
mentioned. One is the uncompetitive nature of the industries created behind
trade barriers and through monopolistic positions. Another is the way
production tends to increase very fast to start with, while already exisfng
demand for now banned imports is satisfied, but then tends to stagnate once
this demand is reached.
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The third point, and the politically most immediately relevant, is that in the
absence of foreign competition and access to foreign markets, the way to
increase demand for local industrial production is not to make industry more
competitive and thus take a higher market share or increase exports, but to
increase purchasing power of the urbanised customers for the protected
industries.
These features along with a bloated bureaucracy peddling import licenses,
cheap credit and monopolistic positions to favoured businessmen, created
conditions for political mobilisation among the public and for alliances between
client capitalists, state bureaucrats and the urban workforce. Such populist
alliances, however, and the economic policy behind them, proved
unsustainable. [7]
Some of this has parallels in the experience of India with monopolistic and
oligopolistic industry and license peddling bureaucracy. The politically most
important difference may be that in India landowners, who deliver the rural
vote, form a far more important political constituency than urban workers and
consumers. This dominant feature of Indian politics may be gradually
changing through processes of middle class formation that have certain
paraUels in Indonesia.
In the Philippines the main difference from Latin America may be seen in the
greater power of the landlord class and a weaker bureaucracy, on the one
hand, and in a lesser scope for monopolistic positions and oligopolistic capital
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in industry, on the other. The latter feature was caused by the access to
Philippine markets and industrial investment enjoyed by American companies
under special arrangements successfully demanded by the departing colonial
power.
In order to move out of the crisis of uncompetitive and stagnant industries,
unsustainable industrial wages and rapid inflation, these economies had to be
opened up to foreign capital and foreign technology. The conditions required
by foreign capital were the opposite of the general characteristics of populism
which accompanied the import substitution phase of industrialisation in Latin
America, and those prevailing in Indonesia without much industrialisation.
These conditions were political stability and low industrial wages. Low wages
became necessary because international competitiveness became more
important than domestic purchasing power. Political stability was required by
foreign companies risking capital and expensive technology. The returns
demanded on these foreign investments were directly related to the assumed
levels of political stability, as nationalisation, strikes and political upheavals
could easily wipe out costly investments. Political demobilisation was essential
to meet both conditions, and became the chief common characteristic of
authoritarian, industrialising regimes on two different continents.
Out of this came what Peter Evans termed, in the context of Latin America,
the "Triple Alliance" of domestic, largely oligopolistic capital, the military and
civilian bureaucracy and international capital. [8]
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At this stage, a few important parallels with Indonesia may be pointed out.
One is that, notwithstanding differences, equally unsustainable economic
policies had been followed by regimes appealing to popular support in
politicised societies of mass poverty. Another is the creation of large
bureaucracies dealing in Ucenses and concessions valuable to political clients
and businessmen. In Indonesia as well as in some of the Latin American
countries, this centred on political parties in a system not unlike the
"lottizzazione" of post-war Italy, as well as on strong charismatic political
figures. A third parallel is the political mobilisation of society, which occurred
in Indonesia in the 1950s and early 60s like in several Latin American
countries. Likewise the policy of political demobilisation followed after military
coups in these countries forms a parallel. Another parallel in crisis outcome
was the opening up of the economy to foreign capital, made possible by the
political stabilisation. A final parallel is in the alliances created after the
military coups between domestic oligopolistic capital, the bureaucracy, the
military, and international capital.
Highly important features of domestic capital in Indonesia were, however,
qualitatively different from what prevailed in Latin America or in the Philippines.
The main difference in this respect, between Indonesia most other countries,
including Latin America was the absence of an indigenous bourgeoisie in
Indonesia. Domestic capital was mainly represented by the politically weak
Chinese minority and by the military, which in turn made the military element
in this triple alliance all the. more strong.	 This feature also opened up
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possibilities for the formation of a political group within the military, which then
turned itself into the foremost component of indigenous capital.
In this respect Indonesia after the mid 1960s may have a much closer
comparison to Bangladesh, where indigenous bourgeoisie was hardly in
evidence in the 1970s, and modern industry was in its infancy. Control over
the state, like in Indonesia, became the chief source of revenue and economic
opportunity. The state, in turn, reaped most of its income and much of its
strong economic position from controlling inflow of money, in the case of
Bangladesh mainly from foreign aid, while oil, gas, wood, foreign aid and
foreign lending secured a stream of revenue for state and regime in
Indonesia. [9]
The regimes formed in Latin America in the wake of the military overthrow of
the populist democracies were termed Bureaucratic Authoritarian Regimes by
O'Donnel. [10] This concept has been used by a few scholars in the context
of Indonesia. [] The origins of this concept and theorisation can be traced
to a study by Juan Linz of the Francoist regime in Spain. [12] Its
development has primarily been in the context of Latin America, but it has
influenced studies of several Asian States to varying degrees.
Drawing mostly on O'Donnel, the characteristics of the BA regimes can be
most briefly summed up as follows:
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1. The regime emerges out a crisis of industrialisation. [O'Donnel, 1973,
Hirschman, 1971]
2. Power rests not with an individual dictator, but with the military as an
institution, which governs in collaboration 	 with civilian technocrats.
[O'Donnel, 1973]
3. Policy making is technocratic in nature, rather than political, and fairly
predictable and consensual. [O'Donnel, 1973 and 1979] [13]
4. The regime works in alliance with oligopolistic capitalists, who together
with the state collaborate with international capital. [O'Donnel, 1973 and 1979]
5. The mass of people is politically demobilised and repressive measures are
used to deal with potential opposition. At the same time, the regime
cultivates a limited form of pluralism, which it controls through cooptation of
individuals and through corporatist structures. [0' Donnel, 1973]
It is of little importance wether the Indonesian experience can, or can not, be
neatly classified and labled according to this criteria. What is of interest is a
certain reality that scholars of different societies have tried to conceptualL e
and analyze in this way. The comparison, even with very different societies,
may offer valuable insights, as suggested by the discussion above.
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The discussion on the criteria for BA states that follows is based on this
interest. It is not an attempt at precise classification on the basis of the
concepts and the selection of aspects guiding a regime-type theorisation on
bureaucratic authoritarian theories.
Taking this criteria in reverse order, the final distinguishing point, that of a
limited form of pluralism through cooptation of individuals and corporatist
structures is especially stressed by Dwight King writing on Indonesia. He
offers support for the view that such limfted pluralism "is the most distinctive
feature of bureaucratic authoritarian regimes and research and analysis of this
aspect is likely to be most revealing about how the bureaucratic authoritarian
pattern of domination is maintained and about emergent sources of political
change." [14] Recent events in Latin America have shown the value of this
insight. The limited form of pluralism practised, e.g. in Chile and Brazil,
characterised these otherwise harsh regimes and was probably not only a
crucial aspect of economic management, but also a vital feature when it came
to crossing the bridge from military government to electoral democracy.
In Indonesia a somewhat different form of limited pluralism has no less been
a characteristic of the otherwise highly authoritarian New Order regime.
Cooptation of individuals outside the military has from the start been a
hallmark of the regime, which has for instance been reflected in the cabinet
where usually well over half of the cabinet ministers have come from civilian
ranks. Almost all political and religious organisation in the country has also
been tied, mostly informally, to the regime through a system of patronage,
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while more freedom of expression has been maintained than in some
ostensibly more democratic countries.
It should be noted, however, that the practise of cooptation of individuals and
organisations and the use of patronage to placate religious and secular
organisations was no less a prominent practise during Guided Democracy.
It is worth noting that while Dwight King sees this criterion of limited pluralism
as the most important feature for understanding bureaucratic authoritarian
regimes, Mochtar Mas'oed, who has applied the BA model more
systematically to Indonesia than any other scholar, does not mention this
criterion in his thesis.{15]
No systematic analysis has been made of this aspect of the New Order but
a wealth of descriptive writing suggests the relevance of this point. It has
been frequently asserted by scholars and journalists that Indonesia has not
only maintained a more free press than the supposedly democratic Singapore,
but has generally, notwithstanding some highly important exceptions, shown
more flexibility in dealing with milder forms of dissent than a number of Asian
and Latin American countries. The exceptions from this, however, are of such
gravity as to make the generalisation of a dubious value.
The important point may be that the precise form of a limited pluralism
practised can give an important indication with regard to the future
development of regime base and its democratic potential. This question will
be returned to in the final chapter of the thesis.
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The first half of the final distinguishing point, namely the point on political
demobilisation, certainly has a descriptive value for Indonesia. Old Order
Indonesia was characterised by massive political mobilisation and the
thorough depoliticisation of the New Order represented the sharpest break
between the two regimes. Much the same could be said of Brazil, Chile and
some other Latin American countries, while a similar attempt by the Marcos
regime in the Philippines was somewhat less successful in political
demobilisation, and an utter failure if only compared to Indonesia. This point
will be returned to in a later chapter.
The fourth point of the criteria was on the alliance between the regime, the
military and the bureaucracy, domestic oligopotistic capital and international
capital, the 'triple alliance' in the terminology of Peter Evans. [Evans, 1979]
Again the fit with New Order Indonesia is clear, but the important caveat of
the Chinese, as opposed to Pribumi ownership of most of the private
domestic capital must be added. In Latin America much of the domestic
capital allied with the BA regimes tended to be derived from protected or
monopolistic positions in industry.
In Indonesia private capital, only partly derived from privileged positions in the
mid 1960s, was, however, far more limited at this time than was the case in
Brazil, or even in the Philippines of the early Marcos Presidency. This is one
of the points that distinguishes Indonesia from most other countries. A
stronger parallel in this respect would be with newly independent Bangladesh
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in the 1970s. This Jack of capital, and the immense political implications of
this will be discussed in subsequent chapters.
Most importantly, however, as already indicated, in distinguishing Indonesia
from all other comparable countries is the nature of main capital owning
group, the Chinese, as a pofltically powerless minority. The position of the
Chinese minorities in the Philippines, Malaysia and Thailand is in many was
very different from what obtains in Indonesia. In Thailand, the Chinese
minority is far more closely integrated with the political elite of the country.
In the Philippines this is also true, particularly of the earlier arrivals who form
an important part of the political elite as well as being dominant in commerce.
In Malaysia the size of the Chinese minority and its active, if subdued,
participation in politics makes it a politically different proposition from the
Indonesian Chinese minority.
The third criterion for a BA regime, technocratic, ostensibly non-political, and
consensual policy making is, again, descriptive for Indonesia under the New
Order. One of its slogans, "development, not politics", typifies the ideology
of non-ideology put forward by the regime as one of the central features of
its search for legitimacy.
The idea of non-political development or "progress" has been used in this
fashion by various regimes in Asia and Latin America. Technocrats, usually
educated in America, have often been given much leeway in policy making
within a political framework laid down by the regime. In Indonesia a band of
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technocrats employed by the New Order was termed "the Berkeley Mafia",
while a similarly constituted team in Chile was called "the Chicago Boys", both
terms referring to the American universities where some of the leading
members of these teams received their education. Similar phenomenon was
to be found in several other Latin American and Asian countries in the 1960s
and 1970s. Policy making during the New Order and the changing position
of technocrats will be discussed in a following chapter.
The second criterion, namely the assertion that power does not rest with an
individual but with the military as an institution which governs in collaboration
with civilian technocrats has not infrequently been taken to be true for
Indonesia. Here, it will be argued that power has not rested with the military
in Indonesia since the late 1960s but with the Presidency. In his systematic
application of BA theories to Indonesia, Mochtar Mas'oed comes to a similar
conclusion in this respect. [16] He argues that the office of the President
gained such power during the first years of the New Order as to eventually
make it more powerful than the military as an institution. Mas'oed points
mainly to institutional arrangements and budgetary powers in this respect.
An important caveat to this, however, must be added. Few would doubt that
the military has remained the party with the final say in Indonesian politics,
even if such a final say has not be called on for a long time. Precisely how
the military is likely, or indeed able, to influence political transition in Indonesia
is a question quite apart from the one on its influence over day to day politics
or even its ability to influence the larger issues in the medium term.
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The conclusion that the Presidency prevails over the military in Indonesian
politics, highly important as it is, therefore gives only a limited indication of the
relative role of the two institutions in matters seriously affecting the survival of
the political system itself. There, most would suspect, the army as an
institution would prevail over any civilian structures, even if those are manned
by military men, although, again this may be changing with the rapidly
changing configuration of economic power in Indonesia. These points will be
returned to in a following chapter.
The first criterion of BA regimes, that they emerge' out of crisis of
industrialisation is in some ways rather inapt for Indonesia in 1965. There
is no doubt that Indonesia was at that time at a very different stage of
industrialisation from what was true of Latin America. As pointed out in the
discussion on criteria for BA regimes above, however, there are a number of
striking similarities between the political crisis, and in some ways also the
economic crisis that unfolded in Latin America and parts of Southeast Asia
during the 1960s and 1970s. Even more striking is the similarity in outcome
of these crises, which further points to the essentially similar roots of the
problems.
In Indonesia and in much of Latin America, unsustainable economic policies,
characterised by economic nationalism, domestic favouritism and bureaucratic
control lead to rapid inflation and deteriorating ability to finance vital imports.
Related to these policies was political populism characterised by a large scale
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political mobilisation, partly outside well established political parties and largely
outside representative structures.
The outcome of the crisis was in Indonesia and in large parts of Latin
America was the establishment of military dominated authoritarian regimes that
followed a policy of opening the economy to foreign trade, capital and
technology, while brutally clamping down on popular political activity. In the
Philippines, the access granted to American capital and trade from the
foundation of the republic made several aspects of the economic crisis
different. The solution to the problems, however, particularly after 1972, was
largely similar as those adopted in early New Order Indonesia, 1966-1973 and
in much of Latin America, 1964-1978, coupled with the same political
characteristics.
What was uppermost in the mind of those taking power in Indonesia in 1965-
1966, however, was most probably not the economic crisis, let alone any
systematic solutions to it.
It is a matter of conjecture, whether anything that could be termed a political
or economic project existed in the mind of Suharto and his entourage during
the their first few months or even years of power, but this seems doubtful,
beyond the immediate conflicts of army and Jakarta politics, and a wish for
a climate for continued private business opportunities.
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Their eventual political project, which came to totally transform the Indonesian
economy and restructure both the class configuration of society and the
political forces thrown up by society, was shaped, on the one hand by
externally rooted economic structural imperatives, and on the other, the class
configuration of society and the nature of the group that came to dominate
politics.
Before looking at the nature of this dominant group and the regime it formed,
it is necessary to look briefly at some of the political forces that came into
play at the creation of the New Order, and either thwarted its creation or
facilitated what transpired.
That the establishment of the New Order was supported by powerful and
popular elements in Indonesian society is beyond doubt. It would be
misleading, however, to speak of a political coalition coming to power in the
wake of Sukarno's downfall. The role of the civilian supporters of the New
Order was that of supporters, not partners in government.
The popular forces of students and muslim activists on the streets of Jakarta
never gained any direct representation in government. Their views may at
times have been represented by individuals, but such persons would have
enjoyed power on the basis of a cooption by the military rather than through
representation of popular sentiments. That the military was firmly in charge is
also beyond doubt. To what extent the military as an institution, however,
wielded power is debatable. It will be argued in this chapter that soon after
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the establishment of the New Order regime the military ceased to be in power
in any meaningful sense, except as an instrument wielded by an identifiable
group, and as a final arbiter. In the sense of superimposing its institutional
hierarchy on the political system and imposing its will, as defined by the
institution itself, as opposed to policy determined by the ruling group, a body
of men not answerable to the military hierarchy as such, the military was only
briefly in power in Indonesia, if at all.
Initially, however, the military men that came to exercise the greatest power
in Indonesia were a heterogenous mix. They owed their positions to three
different sources. Some, and initially probably the largest group, owed their
power to their rank within the military, or their influence within military
institutions. Another group of people came to exercise power through political
commitment and involvement beyond what could be expected from their
military rank. These were people of ideological commitment to the claimed
goals of the New Order. A third group was Suharto's circle of finance and
intelligence officers. Members of this informal group had worked with Suharto
in a financial or intelligence capacity, often in fact in both capacities, for years
during the Old Order. This group of people was to ease all others out of
serious contention for power.
Suharto initially assumed control in Jakarta on the first of October 1965 as
one of the two or three most senior officers in the capital after the
assassination of several of the highest ranking army generals. The first
moves against the rebellion of military officers on the 30th of September were
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made by General Umar Wirahadikusuma, who could equally well have
assumed command of the armed forces. General Umar, later Suharto's Vice-
President, is thought to have been relieved that Suharto took the initiative.
General Mursjid, a Sukarnoist, and a ranking officer on the army general staff
was perhaps the clearest alternative to Suharto, but this would certainly have
been opposed by Nasution, the Minister of Defence, and long time leading
adversary of Sukarno.
Suharto's initial key to success in establishing command over the army were
the long standing rivalries within the army and the mutual suspicion between
President Sukarno and Nasution with roots in events briefly mentioned in
earlier chapters. Nasution was, of course, the most senior of all officers and
many would have expected him to assume control over the military in the
wake of the coup attempt. Nasution had come close to staging a coup
himself in the early 1950s and he was the chief architect of the prevailing
doctrine of military political responsibilities. On the night of October 1st,
Nasution had come very close to being assassinated himself and his daughter
had been fatally wounded. Because of this and perhaps for other personal
reasons, Nasution eliminated himself from the leading role. For Sukarno, an
enhanced political role for Nasution was also unacceptable. For Nasution, in
turn, a Sukarno stooge such as General Pranoto, at the army command was
also unacceptable. He therefor sided with Suharto in opposing Pranoto as
successor to the assassinated General Yani and opened the way for
Suharto's continued leading role in the army.
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In view of what was to follow, it is interesting to note that aside from politics
of the day Suharto and Pranoto represented two widely different types of
military officers. They had clashed before. Pranoto was for a time Suharto's
chief of staff at the Diponegoro command. Pranoto is thought to have
opposed some of Suharto's business activities, such as black market trading
in cloves, which Suharto apparently organised with one of his long time
business associate. After Suharto had been reprimanded for corruption and
removed from the Diponegoro command he was succeeded by Pranoto.
Pranoto who had a high reputation for honesty abolished Finek, the business
division of the military command which had been Suharto's first vehicle for
major business dealings. [17]
Once installed as army commander Suharto was in a position to elevate
several of his own people to influential positions, as the assassination of the
Generals had left a certain vacuum at the central command. Already on the
army general staff was one of Suharto's entourage of business generals and
a member of his inner circle, Lt. Gen. Alamsyah Ratu Prawiranegra.
Over the months that followed an intense power struggle took place at
various levels. None of the details, carefully documented by Crouch [Crouch,
1978], will be entered into here. For the purposes of this thesis it suffices
to discuss briefly at this point some of forces that represented hurdles in the
establishment of the New Order regime of President Suharto.
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It is perhaps possible and helpful to speak of five types of opposition to the
establishment of the regime that came to rule Indonesia. Two of these types
consisted of people whose fortunes were tied up with the Old Order. One
was President Sukarno and his associates. Sukarno commanded significant
support in various quarters, including influential people in the military for some
months after the October coup. Another was the PKI and other left wing
forces that had been mobilised over the years that preceded. These two
forces of potential opposition, the forces of the Old Order, were effectively
eliminated, except for pockets within the military, by March 1967, some six
months after Suharto's counter coup.
The political basis of the Old Order collapsed with its economy, once the
economically powerful military had withdrawn from its coalition of forces, and
the well organised and popular PKI had been eliminated by one of the
bloodiest massacres in human history. Sukarno's basis for power was this
short lived coalition. His real basis of power was politically fragile and
essentially weak as it had no firm roots, within Sukarno's control, in a viable
economic system.
Unlike in Latin America, Sukarno's populism was not grounded in import
substitution industrialisation capable of providing a windfall profit and a
temporary increase in worker's purchasing power. His economic base was
weak from the start, and such as it was, it was controlled by the military that
turned against him. With the elimination of the PKl what was left of his
political basis was the PNI, a party with its economic base in a disintegrating
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economy and in a world of bureaucratic license peddling, increasingly outside
its control.
A third type of opponents to the Suharto regime that were also associated
with the Old Order took somewhat longer to deal with, a group of party
politicians. These will be returned to later in this chapter. The other two
types of opponents, potential or real, only emerged as such after Sukarno
and the PKI had been dealt with. These were the people that had fought
hardest for the New Order. One was an informal group of military men who
came to exercise power far beyond their rank during the purges of Sukarno
and PKI elements. These, the so called New Order radicals, were prominent
in the purges of Sukarno supporters and some of them enthusiastically
organised the elimination of the PKI by massacre. Suharto's purges of the
army and the emergence of his own group as a ruling entity will be discussed
below.
The fifth type of opposition to the Suharto regime came from another
enthusiastic group of New Order supporters, the religious organisations and
the student organisations that took to the streets in 1965 and 1966
demanding the overthrow of the Old Order. These will be briefly discussed
below in the same instance as the group of party politicians. Both groups
tried to gain institutional representation in the New Order structure, but both
failed, neither of them commanding sufficient resources or sound material
basis for the power politics of the early New Order era.
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Before briefly looking at the way in which the Suharto group emerged as the
ruling group of Indonesia, and in a more substantive way discussing its
evolving basis of power, it is instructive to look at the options and constraints
facing the Indonesian military at the onset of the New Order in both an
abstract and comparative fashion.
A body of theoretical literature exists, along with numerous studies of
individual countries, where the resolution of similar basic dilemmas as faced
the Indonesian military is studied, It is not the intention here to engage in a
lengthy exposition of either theories or case studies, but only briefly look at
essential issues at this juncture in a wider context.
Any military regime will face at least three basic dilemmas. One has to do with
the cohesion of the military itself and its ability to superimpose its own
command structure on the political system. [18] In the case of Indonesia this
has evolved in an exceedingly complex fashion. One the one hand, the
military is to an unusual extent, compared to almost any type of military
regime in the world, in command over society through the system of territorial
command, the karyawan system of military secondment of ofticers to
ministries, utilities and companies. On the other hand, the military as an
institution does not command the all important Executive branch of
government at the highest level, but, conversely, is under the control of the
civilian President.
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Another universal dilemma is the attainment of some measure of acceptance
from civilians without endangering military control over the regime, or indeed,
regime control over the military. This, again, has evolved in a highly complex
way in Indonesia, but mostly through a system of patronage and through
ideological articulation that has been successful to an unusual extent.
The third general dilemma is the related problem of institutional arrangement
through which effective administration and control can be reconciled with
efforts at political settlement within society. This, while an ongoing problem
with some unique attempts at solutions in Indonesia, has become a matter
of increasing urgency with a looming end of the Suharto'regime.
The first point about all this is, of course, the fact that military regimes are
inherently unstable and normally short lived. Erik Nordlinger, in is influential
study of soldiers in politics, pointed out that only very few military regimes
survived for anything as long as dozens of civilian regimes in the same parts
of the world. [19]
It is interesting to note that most of the long lasting military regimes were
dominated by a single strong leader. In most cases, although this is not the
conclusion of Nordlinger or most other attempts at classification of military
regimes, these regimes, such as that of Suharto in Indonesia, Somoza in
Nicaragua or Mobutu in Zaire, the power of the dominant leader has been
such as to render the classification "military rule" almost devoid of meaning,
except where the military has been the instrument of repressive rule. These
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strongmen have ruled through the military, but it seems dubious for analytical
purposes to speak of the military as if it ruled.
On the basis of several variables that are crucial to the way such basic
dilemmas, as those listed above, are worked out, it is possible to construct
a typology of regimes. Although the dilemmas listed are not drawn directly
from the studies of Samuel Huntingdon, but from a synthesis of several
different studies, the influential typologies of Huntingdon may serve to
organise the discussion on these dilemmas. [20] Huntingdon classifies four
different types of military regimes, namely "veto regimes", "factional regimes",
"guardian regimes" and "breakthrough regimes". The only published
comparative study of the Indonesian military specifically located within a
framework of such typologies, a paper by Ulf Sundhausen, classifies the New
Order regime as a "veto regime". [21]
A veto regime is characterised, according to Clapham and Philip, mainly by
five features. [Clapham and Philip, 1985] These are;
1. A high degree of unity within the military.
2. A fairly high degree of differentiation of the military from civil society.
3. A high degree of perceived threat from civil society.
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4. A medium to high degree of autonomous political organisation in society
prior to military intervention.
5. A most systematic and repressive kind of military rule following
intervention.
The reason for the final characteristic is that the military in a veto regime
situation is pitted against strongly organised civilian political structures, as
happened in Chile and Argentina, and then presumably, according to
Sundhausen, in Indonesia.
It will be briefly argued here, that much of Sundhausen's theorisation in this
regard is mistaken. With one exception, the qualifying criteria for a veto
regime has not been in much evidence in Indonesia or with its military. It
will also be argued that typologies of this kind, in spite of their general usage
and obvious advantages, are unlikely to be very helpful in understanding the
situation that evolved in Indonesia, although a comparative study of the basic
dilemmas facing the military in Indonesia and other countries may be
profitable, approached in a different fashion.
Regarding the first criterion, the miliary in Indonesia can hardly be said a
have displayed a high degree of unity until after Suharto's assumption of
power. The army's record in this respect has already been discussed in the
context of the rebellions and rivalries of the 1950s. Only after massive purges
in the mid to late 1960s did the military achieve high degree of unity. The
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unity of the military was therefor neither responsible for bringing it to power,
nor for maintaining a position of military control over the Executive.
The reverse would, in fact, be more true. The coup attempt and the
successful counter coup of 1965 was essentially a struggle within the military.
[] The supremacy of the Executive over the military is also acknowledged
by Sundhausen who claims that "practically all decision making power, inside
and outside the military, rests with one man, the President, regardless of the
fact that Suharto has officially retired from military service. There are senior
officers who have influence, in that they have the ear of the President and
may at times be able to affect policies, but they neither pressurise him nor
make decisions independently of the President or against his will."
[Sundhausen, 1985] Sundhausen goes on to say that the President picks his
own chief executives from inside and outside the military singlehandedly and
without much consultation. Among evidence mentioned for this is the
selection of the last two armed forces commanders (up to 1985), neither of
whom, by prevailing standards guiding military promotion and assignments
had been eligible for the post. [Sundhausen, 1985] None of this seems to
suggest that the military is actually in power.
The classification of the Indonesian case as one displaying a fairly high
degree of differentiation of the military from civil society seems no more true,
at least not for the period in question.
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In the preceding chapters it has been shown, and this is hardly a matter of
much contention, that the Indonesian military was from the start a politically
motivated entity, and that the army, or parts of it, continued to be involved in
politics from independence onwards. In the late 1950s, as has been shown,
the economic interests of the military as an institution, and those of many of
its commanders, were hardly likely to construct what Clapham and Philip call
"impermeable boundaries between the military and civilian politics", the criteria
for military differentiation from civil society. [Clapham & Philip, 1985:6] Such
a boundary has, of course, never existed in Indonesia. The military has at
most times been centre stage in politics and its economic interests, and that
of its commanders, at the core of the economy.
The third criterion, that of a high degree of threat perception from civil society,
on the other hand, is certainly true for Indonesia. The fourth criterion, that
of high degree of autonomous political organisation is also partly true by the
same token. The army did perceive a threat from the PKI and from Muslim
organisations, although the latter were its allies in eliminating the former.
It would, however, be misleading to speak of Indonesia in 1965 as
characterised by a high degree of autonomous political organisation.
Although several political parties continued to operate during Guided
Democracy, their autonomy from the state decreased as they became more
dependent on state patronage than mass support in the country.
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Studies of party poUtics in Indonesia, particularly for the period after the 1955
elections, suggest a growing isolation of the Jakarta based party elites from
popular support, while most were engaged in competition for state patronage.
The PKI with its well organised mass base was at least a partial exception
from this. The difference is clear, however, between Indonesia in 1965 and
classical cases of military regimes emerging out of a situation characterised
by competition between well organised and autonomous mass political parties,
such as the case of Chile in 1973, Turkey in 1980 or Argentina in the late
1970s.
This difference may be of some pertinence for understanding why the Suharto
regime found it relatively easy to deal with the political parties in the late
1960s and remould the political system. In the case of regimes such as
those of Chile and Argentina in the 1970s, the party system they repressed
re-emerged almost in tact after years of suppression, and in Turkey much the
same forces as had been dominant before emerged under new labels.
With respect to Huntingdon's categories, it is of interest to note that Indonesia
bears more important resemblances to the radical restructuring "breakthrough
regimes" than the right wing "veto regimes" it has been classified with.
Breakthrough regimes usually result from coups by relatively junior officers,
where the military is characterised by relatively low degree of unity, low
degree of differentiation from civil society and low degree of autonomous
political organisation in society, all of which is arguably a more fitting
description of Indonesia in 1965 than the reverse classification of Sundhausen.
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The best know of such regimes are those that toppled absolute monarchies
in Thailand in 1932, Egypt in 1952 and Libya in the 1960s, and the left wing
regimes of Peru in the 1960s and Ethiopia since the mid 1970s.
Indonesia, of course, sits very uneasily in a category of revolutionary regimes
that moved against the existing social order, and it is not being suggested
here that such resemblances as noted should be the basis for such
classification. Their nature is such, however, as to point decisively away from
studying Indonesia through the framework of a veto regime.
More promising in this respect, but not at all wholly sufficient, is the category
of "factional regimes". Such regimes are often based on racial, religious or
ethnic affinity between a section of the military and a group in civil society.
A large number of studies on Indonesia have, of course, highlighted the
Javanese background and mystical-syncretist religious outlook of Suharto
and most of his inner circle. Such regimes are also frequently personalistic
in character and the group of leading military officers are often deeply
involved in commerce and politics.
Examples of this type of regime include Somoza's Nicaragua, Mobutu's Zaire.
Both of these are, or were, very long lasting regimes lead by the richest man
in the respective country, a parallel with Indonesia. This model of a
personalistic regime of an immensely rich individual, based on selective
patronage, religious and ethnic affinity with a powerful group, originating in a
factional military characterised by economic involvement of its officers, may
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at least have some descriptive value for Indonesia. Such typologies,
however, are something of a blind alley for theorisation on the dynamics of
the system and prospects for change.
Turning again to the Bureaucratic Authoritarian approach, by comparison, it
seems to offer a far more sophisticated theorisation than the military regime
typologies of the structure-functionalist ilk. It does, however, fail to do much
more than offer a way of arranging a description of the New Order regime.
Neither the origin of the regime, nor its nature can be adequately explained
through this approach.
What is, however, possible through such a theorisation, is to identify the main
features of the regime, and more specifically, to identify the structures that set
the New Order regime apart from the BA regimes of Latin America and Asia.
Among these features, specific to Indonesia in this context, are, as should be
clear from the preceding discussion, the absence of a domestic indigenous
bourgeoisie and the presence of business oriented faction within the military
which managed to assume state power through its hold on the increasingly
powerful and independent office of the President. Other pertinent features
that should also have been made clear in the preceding discussion were the
absence of political parties grounded in viable economic structures and
presence of regional and religious fault lines in society that the regime could
manipulate.
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The economic and political structures that sustained the early New Order,
however, changed greatly over time. In analyzing these changes the
theoretical frameworks discussed in this chapter are, on their own, even less
adequate than in providing a more static analysis.
In briefest possible terms, the way proposed here towards a more adequate
understanding of these structures and their evolution is threefold.
Firstly a more adequate, if rather abstract, conception of the state from what
is most often used in analysis of the Indonesian state is needed. In the
theoretical discussion in the earlier part of the thesis various approaches to
this were discussed. A way was pointed out there for drawing on both the
instrumentalist conception of the state and the more abstract structuralist
understanding of it. This discussion will not be repeated here, as it suffices
to point to the first chapter, which guides the approach to the state in the
subsequent chapters, and in particular the effort at analysis in the final
chapters.
At this stage it may be most helpful, simply to point out three elements of
this. Firstly that the state needs to be seen as both the site of a struggle
between various factions of the dominant classes, and at the same time as
the integrating principle, which condenses, reconciles, represents, upholds,
and importantly for Indonesia, sometimes structures the overall interests of the
classes in dominance.
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Secondly, and following from the first, for understanding the evolution of the
state and the changing basis of the regime, the separate nature of the two
needs to be understood, something that is most often missing in literature on
Indonesia. This is a factor almost entirely bypassed by the paradigms
specifically discussed in this chapter, but a dimension of great importance
with regard to the nature of regime succession within the state.
In briefest terms, the state will be seen as consisting of the permanent
institutions of government and the ensemble of class relations rooted in these
institutions. These institutions include the institutions of coercion, such as the
military and the judiciary, and the institutions of executive and legislative
branches of the government, such as the ministries, the President's Office, the
cabinet and Parliament. The class relations rooted in these institutions are
generated not within the state as such, but in the overall economic
organisation of society, which necessitates analysis of class for understanding
of the state.
The state responds to imperatives generated by these class relations, and
generated from the position of the economy in the wider world economy, as
well as, at times, structuring such relations through its own longer term
structures, which may partially, and particularly in the shorter term and with
regard to specific manifestations, be understood through analysis of culture
as well as through economically rooted analysis.
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The executive of the state, on the other hand, is the regime, which refers to
the individuals occupying the most powerful positions within the state, and
may also refer to the overall political and economic strategy jointly followed
by these individuals. The state, in a sense, forms a set of constraints and
opportunities that face the regime. The state, in this sense, does not dictate
the policy of the regime. The structures of the state, on the other hand, and
the imperatives generated by them, dictate the outcome of regime policy.
Of importance to the focus of the thesis two further points may be noted at
this point. One is that changes in the configuration of dominant classes and
economic organisation are likely to prompt changes to theregime. The other
point is that such changes to the configuration of power between classes and
within the regime may not necessarily bring about similar changes to the
nature of the state. It is therefor conceivable, that changing economic
realities, altering the balance between groups or classes may prompt the
democratisation of the regime, while such a change may not have much
effect on the overall undemocratic nature of the state.
This point is linked to the last of the three theoretical points to be made at
this conclusion to this chapter. The different economic and political interests
of the various factions that make up the dominant classes in Indonesia need
to be mapped out. The conflict between these interests, their interplay with
the structural imperatives of the state and of the economic system, partly
integrated as it is into a wider economic order, provides the dynamic for
changes in the basis of the regime. This may facilitate an understanding of
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the nature of the likely phenomenon of limited, but increased, pluralism in
Indonesian politics.
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CHAPTER 8
EARLY NEW ORDER POLITICS 1966-1973
It is, as pointed out before, doubtful that a political project, apart from the
immediate and the expedient, existed in the minds of Suharto and his political
entourage during the very first years of the New Order. The policy followed,
however, amounted to a project of political and economic transformation, with
powerful groups and large sections of society ending up as either winners or
losers in a restructuring of the economic and political system.
This transformation had at least three more or less distinctive phases. The
first phase, approximately from 1966 and into the early 1970s, will be
discussed in this chapter and the next. The second phase, lasting from the
early 1970s and into the early 1980s will be analyzed in a following chapter,
while the third phase, from the early to mid 1980s to the present will be
discussed in the two final chapters of the thesis. In this present chapter
early New Order politics will be briefly discussed in order to provide the
necessary framework for a more focused discussion that follows on the
regime that came to power and on its basis in the economy.
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Among the winners were those who held power and position in the rural
areas. The communist challenge to the rural order was broken. Landowners,
better off peasants, middlemen and those enjoying status and power on the
basis of property and religion formed an important constituency for the New
Order. This highly important dimension to Indonesian politics falls largely
outside the limited scope of the thesis and hence, discussion of this will be
brief and confined to its immediate impact on the structure of power at the
centre.
The fusion of the religious with the social and the political in rural areas
means that the regime's Islamic policy and its emasculation of political parties
has to be seen in the light of its essential preservation of the rural power
structure. Islamic organisations were highly important in bringing Suharto to
power and in sustaining him there for the first crucial months. Suharto's
ability to move against the political and even religious interests of these
organisations without the interests they represented moving massively against
his regime has to be seen in the light of the rural power structures that the
regime, at the same time, preserved.
At a later stage, this rural power structure was further reinforced, and further
integrated as a political power base for the regime through military control at
local level and through the vast system of Presidential development
patronage, made possible to a large extent by inflow of concessionary funds
from abroad, as well as by the rapidly increasing oil revenue.
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A second group of beneficiaries was the military. The military was already in
charge of much of the modern economy but with the revival of the economy
during the early New Order and a vastly improved political position of the
military, opportunities for patronage and enhanced economic and social status
were abundant for the officer corps, which made vigorous use of these
opportunities.
A third group was the Chinese business community which quickly seized new
economic opportunities under military patronage. 	 This group will be
discussed at various junctures below.
S
A fourth group was a small band of technocrats brought into government and
highly level policy making, and a fifth group formed the higher ranks of the
bureaucracy. The technocrats and their position will be discussed in a
chapter that follows.
Among the losers, in the short and medium term at least, the landless
peasants, of course, formed by far the largest group. Closer to the centre
of state power, other losers included many of the party politicians and those
with political connections to the old regime, both those ideologically
committed to it and those who had cashed in on their connections. Among
the latter group were several businessmen of some substance who saw their
fortunes disappear or go into a decline and many smaller businessmen who
in many cases were unable to establish new contacts and continue profitable
trading.
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Among the losers were also a number of individuals in the military, both
people with leftist or Sukarnoist sentiments, and peopTe of different political
persuasions who for one reason or another crossed swords with Suharto and
his group. Many of these rose to some power or prominence during the
earliest part of the New Order, only to be pushed aside as differences came
to the fore.
The list of winners and losers changed to a certain extent with time but for
the present it is important to look at these groups for understanding the way
in which Suharto was able to establish himself and his uling group in the
face of opposition from within the military and from the political parties. For
the most, the genesis of economic and political fortunes, as well as
misfortunes, is to be found in the initial configuration of gainers and losers.
To start with, however, it is important to bear in mind that neither the military,
nor the civilian politicians admitted to a military take-over of power in 1965 or
since. The gradual assumption of power by Suharto was described as a
defensive action, where the integrity of the Sukarno Presidency, the armed
forces and the constitution was to be protected against an unconstitutional
challenge from the left. The civilian politicians did not at this time, nor indeed
for some years, effectively accept military supremacy in politics, and the
military, except for individual radicals, did not claim anything more than a
position to defend the state.
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The civilian politicians were willing to go along with the ouster of Sukarno,
some with enthusiasm, other less so, and with his temporary replacement, by
General Suharto. They were, however, not willing to legitimise a substantially
incased political role for the military as an institution. The initial political
coalition behind Suharto was basically one against the PKI and not for
anything in particular.
The key to Suharto's success in establishing a ruling group is to be found in
two phenomena. One was the potential existence of a majority coalition
against all clear cut political options. The other was the absence of a viable
economic base behind any potential rival forces, while Suharto and his
entourage had both the business wherewithal and a position within the state
to create a large economic base, dispensing political patronage to potential
opponents.
The political options favoured by the New Order constituency ranged from the
establishment of an Islamic state, through a western oriented party based
democracy with vaguely socialist leanings to a radical right wing political
programme hostile to both Islam and liberal democracy. Suharto did not for
a long time come down in favour of any political system while he concerned
himself with gaining firmer control over the armed forces and the rescue of
the economy through opening it up to western capital. The route taken in
rescuing the economy, the opening up to foreign capital and re-integration
into the world trading system, however, while not initially favoured for any
political reason, served to structure political options.
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As Suharto consolidated his power base in the military and successfully
oversaw the revival of the economy, the political debate at party level became
increasingly irrelevant. The talk continued for a long time to be over whether
Suharto would form an alliance with the PM, the NU or with radicals within
the military. Meanwhile Suharto's powers grew to the point of making all
three options expendable.
Suharto and his supporters, such as Murtopo and the technocrats, such as
Widjodjo, who had been brought into economic policy making were all of one
voice in asserting the necessity of dealing with the pressing economic
problems before longer term political questions could be addressed. [1] While
first seen as a response to the desperate economic situation prevailing at the
time, this general thinking was later to emerge as a central feature of the
ideology of the New Order. [2]
Within the military, the most dangerous potential opposition to Suharto did not
come from people who wanted the military to withdraw from politics once
order was restored, but from the right wing radicals who wanted to use the
army's political position to effect a transition to a new political system. The
difference in opinion may be illustrated by the fact that some of the people
who wanted the army to restructure the political system in a radical fashion
were later, and logically, to be found among those who argued for a less
political role for the army in the 1970s and 1980. The policy of this group
was for a creation of a new political order, essentially run by civilians, but with
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the military as a.guarantor of the system, rather than for a perpetuation of a
day to day military involvement in politics. [3
Although generally agreeing on the precedence of the economic over the
political this group wanted to follow the destruction of the PKI with a move
against the PNI and the NU and to restructure the political system without
much delay. The hallmark of the new system was to be the absence of
ideology from politics. It was never made very clear, how what amounted to
a political system without politics should operate, although this is quite
arguably what eventually came into being in Indonesia. The keywords in this
respect were "programmes" instead of ideologies, but it was never made clear
how the various programmes might diverge without such a divergence being
grounded in prohibited ideologies. Some of the radicals called for the
formation of a mass based political organisation, while others favoured some
sort of an alliance between non-party politicians and the military. [4]
What seems to have been the favoured option among most of the radicals
was a forcible elimination of all political parties to be followed with the creation
of a new system, probably of only two parties, where political articulation
would have been heavily circumscribed by the fixed system and by a
commitment to non-ideological politics. Democratisation of society was
frequently cited as the raison d'etre of the New Order, and this was echoed
by some of the radicals who favoured this circumscribed political system. [5]
As it turned out, however, the radicals were not in a position to push through
their views. Their programmes, such as they were, remain of some interests,
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however, for their similarity to what the ruling group was later to impose as
a political system in its own good time. There is a striking resemblance, with
a two or three important qualifications, between these proposals, rejected by
Suharto in the early days of the New Order, and what he was later to create.
The reasons why Suharto rejected the radicals' proposals were probably
twofold. On the one hand, the radicals would have become a powerful group
in their own right if they had been given a free hand in forming a mass
political party, possibly along the lines of Golkar, and on the other, a decisive
move against the existing political parties in these early days carried some
risks. It seems quite possible that if Suharto had gone along with the
formation of a mass party of New Order supporters in these early days, the
radicals would have gained a position of political patronage that would have
made them a serious countervailing force to Suharto's own ruling group.
This would most probably have greatly changed the nature of the regime.
For a while it seemed as if this was to happen. The important army seminar
in Bandung in 1966 called for a simplification of the party system and single
member constituencies, which was opposed by the parties but supported by
most of the radicals. The seminar also called for the victory of the New
Order forces in any forthcoming elections, which would presumably have
entailed the formation of some political structure.
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The political parties had grown some roots in Indonesian society over
decades of existence and could have been expected to carry more weight
than they came to do. During the 1950s the parties and their network of
associated organisations had seemed very powerful representations of
allegiances and cleavages in Indonesian society, as can be seen from much
scholarly literature from that time. The question of the reality of these
ideological streams will be briefly returned to in a chapter on the religious
and ideological dimension to Indonesian politics.
When it came to the crunch, however, the parties had little real power against
the might of the regime. The most important reason for, this was their lack
of a base independent of the state. Over the years the political leaders had
come to depend more on Presidential favours and bureaucratic position than
on a strength derived from mass membership. [7] The leaders of all political
parties, with the possible exception of the then defunct PKI, had such a
record of opportunism, as to form a guarantee against the formation of an
effective and united party based opposition to the regime. [8] None of the
parties had a decisive economic base outside the state which made them
open to manipulation by whoever controlled the state.
An alliance between the radicals and the party leaders was unlikely, as the
radicals opposed the very system the party leaders stood for. Suharto was
in the middle and able to deal with both. Most importantly, though, he alone
controlled large sources of patronage. Suharto was able to move against
both elements and remove opposition within the military and to make the
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political parties impotent and dependent entities. The emasculation of the
political parties occurred in several stages and at times through complex
exercises. For the purposes of the thesis, only the broadest contours of the
government strategy in this respect are needed. [9]
The policy was geared towards overcoming two contradictory objectives. On
the one hand the regime wanted the major socio-cultural groups that formed
constituencies for the various parties to feel represented and included in the
political system. This called fQr the perpetuation of existing parties. The
parties, in spite of the alienation of their leadership from their respective
constituencies, had grown roots and represented to some extent communal
identities. At the same time the regime was resolute in avoiding a return to
power of the political parties. The parties had therefore to be continued in
a recognisable form while their potential power was minimised. These
contradictory objectives were achieved to an acceptable extent through
gradual stepping up of government intervention in the internal affairs of the
parties.
On the muslim side, the Nandlatul Ulama, posed only a limited problem. The
organisation had before displayed a great capacity for adjusting itself to
changing political winds and sources of patronage. NU had been almost
continuously involved in cabinets since the days of parliamentary democracy,
frequently adjusting its position to come down on the winning side. This
phenomenon, which has been frequently attributed to blatant opportunism
may have deeper reasons, as the organisation, while also a political party, is
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ultimately a moral and social movement concerned with matters outside the
political system. [10] NU's participation in the political system and its lack of
a political programme has to be seen in this context.
The fate of Masjumi under Sukarno has already been discussed. The Suharto
regime decided not to allow the Masjumi to operate again, probably both
because of its role in the rebellions of the 1950s and also because of its
representation of a potentially vocal constituency. Instead a new party,
Parmusi came into being. Former leaders of Masjumi were banned by the
government from holding office in the new party. Such people were
nevertheless elected to the leadership which resulted in a drawn out conflict
with the regime, ending in government imposition of a new leadership on the
party. Similar interference in the internal affairs of the PNI, where the.
government used both the army and Murtopo's intelligence unit, secured a
pro-government leadership in the party.
At the same time the government established Sekber Golkar (Sekretariat
Bersama Golongan Karya - The Joint Secretariat of Functional Groups) as a
political organisation contesting the 1971 elections. Golkar had come into
being in the early 1960s as an umbrella for the various functional groups
established by the army in a bid for institutionalised political power and, at the
same time, as a countervailing force against the communists in trade unions.
(11) More will be said on Golkar at a later stage as the organisation came to
be one of the pillars of the New Order patronage system.
157
The political parties were put out of contention for power through this
manipulation, and through the organisation of the DPR and MPR into
powerless bodies of government appointees. It remains debatable and
immeasurable, to what extent the government was able to secure at the same
time, a second objective, namely the feeling among the country's major socio-
cultural groups that they were included in the New Order and represented at
highest level. Discontent, in any event, was containable.
In dealing with opposition and potential opposition within the military Suharto
used carrots more than sticks. His purges of the military took three years to
complete and were effectively over by 1969. Several senior figures were sent
abroad as ambassadors, such as General Mursjid, who had perhaps been the
clearest alternative as an army leader to Suharto in October 1965. Mursjid
was made ambassador to the Philippines but later arrested. The commander
of the powerful Siliwangi division, General Adjie, was made ambassador to
Britain. The commander of the equally prestigious Diponogoro division was
transferred to an innocuous post in Jakarta, while General Mokoginta, the
inter-regional commander for Sumatra was made ambassador to Egypt.
Mokoginta was later to return as one of Suharto's most prominent critic within
the military.
Nasution, who was initially to share powers with Suharto was made chairman
of the MPR, the supposedly supreme political organ in the country, but as it
turned out, a political irrelevance. It has been suggested by Harold Crouch
that Nastution's strong stand on corruption, which lead him to reprimand
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Suharto and lbnu Sutowo in the late 1950s, to criticise several other officers,
had made many officers reluctant to see Nasution return to real powers.
[Crouch, 1978:231-232]
While the highest ranking officers were eased out in this agreeable manner,
the lower ranks suffered real hardship from the purges. There are no reliable
figures to illustrate the extent and severity of the purges for Indonesia as a
whole, but research done in Central Java may give some indication.
According to Peter Briton, almost 1900 members of the armed forces were
still in detention in Central Java in 1971, while further 2600 had been
dishonourably discharged or prematurely pensioned off in 1965-1966. [12]
The navy suffered large scale purges organised by Admiral Sudomo, a
member of Suharto's innermost circle and a businessman of some substance.
Like in the army, the most important commanders were given comfortable but
non-political position, the navy commander Admiral Muijadi was made
ambassador to the Soviet Union and the commando corps commander,
General Hartono was made ambassador to North Korea, while thousands of
the rank and file were imprisoned or dishonourably discharged.
In this way Suharto was able to deal with three separate groups of potential
opponents in the military, the left leaning officers, the high ranking officers
who enjoyed power bases independent of Suharto, and, later, the right wing
radicals in the officer corps, who for a while had enjoyed power beyond what
their rank provided.
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This last named of these groups carried out much of the purges of the rank
and files before being dismissed. This was not a cohesive group, as pointed
out before, but a potential threat to Suharto's order nevertheless. It may, in
fact, be questionable to speak of a group if this is taken to mean a body
aware of its corporate existence. These men hardly formed such a
recognisable entity. They, however, shared certain ideals or principles which
set them apart from Suharto and his group. Many, but not all, shared a
disdain for the corrupt business practises of Suharto's group. Most shared
the same sort of disdain for the party politicians, and all shared a vague
vision of a New Order characterised by fast econqmic development,
modernisation, political stability and a sustainable, principled, political system.
Among the most prominent individuals associated with this informal grouping
were Lt. Gen. Sarwo Edhie [13], Lt. Gen. Kemal ldris [14], Gen. Dharsono [15],
Adm. All Sadikin [16], Lt. Gen. Mohammad Jasin [17] and Gen. Hugeng [18].
All of these were either removed from command or posted far away from
Jakarta politics.
Apart from the Java based radicals who had been prominent in overthrowing
Sukarno and establishing the New Order, these general sentiments were
shared by many of the regional commanders, many of whom enjoyed power
bases independent of Suharto and the central army command. Many of
these were removed from sensitive command early on. Among these were
the military commanders of South-Sulawesi, South Sumatra, West Kalimantan
and Ache
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Several of these people, although by no means all, and others of a similar
ideological ilk, such as General Sumitro, were deeply involved in business
themselves, particularly after falling from power. [19] Judging from the way
several individuals in this general group of Suharto critics drew on their army
contacts to expand their private businesses, it would seem dubious to classify
them as puritanical ideologues, a simplification sometimes used. Judging
from their conduct while enjoying power it would seem even less apt to
classify them as a group of democrats fighting for civil liberties. Suharto's
own supporters have insisted that the division was over personalities, access
to power and spoils.
Although representing a certain alternative to the order that came to prevail
it seems very doubtful that these critics would have instituted a more
democratic system. In any event they were decisively beaten by Suharto and
his group, which had far greater sources of patronage, a position that
proved decisive.
By the time Suharto called a session of the MPR to elect a new president in
1968, he was able to dismiss, or recall, the term used for this procedure then
and subsequently, MPR members belonging to this group. He had
previously sided with the political parties in the DPR against the radical military
appointees over the question of elections and electoral system. [Mas'oed,
1983] This parliamentary debate was a long drawn out affair which suited
Suharto well as he was consolidating his rule.
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When Suharto had himself elected President of Indonesia at a session of the
MPR in 1968 he still felt it necessary to engage in a show of strength and
blatant manipulation of the process. At the time of the session there was still
a widely held hope for an enhanced role for the assembly after the long
history of Sukarno's manipulations. Suharto quickly dispelled this. After
recalling many of the radical appointees in the MPR he enlarged the assembly
by 50 per cent to 900 members. The new appointees were carefully
scrutinised by Suharto's own people. [Mas'oed, 1983]
Just before the session several civilian radicals, who had demonstrated
against Sukarno and for the creation of the New Order were arrested. More
than 30 army battalions were posted in and around the buildings housing the
MPR session, and armoured cars were stationed all around the area in an
unmistakable show of force. Inside, army officers were reported to have
engaged in "coercive tactics" to smother any opposition within the already
heavily purged body of appointees. [Mas'oed, 1983]
What this amounted to, along with Suharto's reorganisation of the party
system over the years that followed, and his successful centralisation of
powers in the Presidency, as discussed in the following chapter, was to
make the DPR and the MPR little more than an ideological justification of the
President's rule.
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The role of the military as an institution in the political process steadily
weakened at the same time. A year after being elected President Suharto
was able to bring all the armed forces under a single command, thus
reducing greatly the potential for opposition to emerge within the services.
He was in a position to place officers loyal to himself in most important
position within the forces. Sundhausen has pointed out that in this
reorganisation "former service commands had been reduced to purely
administrative units, with no power base of their own and unable to dictate
national or defense policies". [20] This reorganisation effectively transferred
all political power in the military to the minister of defence, a position
occupied by Suharto himself at the time, and to the commander-in-chief of the
armed forces, an appointee of the president.
At the same time Suharto reduced military presence in his cabinet itself, while
throughout the bureaucracy, from the ministries down to local government,
and throughout the public sector enterprises, military officers were put in
charge under the so-called karyawan system. This policy of engaging military
officers in civilian duties was not new, and formed a part of the prevailing
army ideology of dual function, dwifungsi, and the doctrine of territorial
warfare. [21] The scale, however, was different, as thousands of military
officers moved into the civilian sphere.
Within the army there was, and still is, a division of opinions on the desirability
of the karyawan system as a permanent feature. Nasution and many of the
radicals saw the interests of the army better served by vigorous
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representation in the MPR and less widespread dispersion of military officers
to civilian duties. This standpoint was shared by Suharto's critics within the
military in the late 1970s and early 1980s. [Jenkins, 1983]
Suharto and his group saw things differently. They wanted active involvement
of military officers at all levels of government and public enterprise and
defended their position by pointing to the uniqueness of the army as a
national organisation, possessing discipline and legitimacy. [Mas'oed, 1983]
Most importantly for the structure of power, the karyawan system was a
patronage system controlled by Suharto appointees and ultimately by the
President himself. Instead of a political role for the army as an institution,
through representation in a powerful parliament, as argued for by those who
lost out, came a system of individually dispensed patronage, a patron-client
system of individual cooptation to the power structure.
The extensive karyawan system has given the impression of a direct military
rule in Indonesia. The many thousands of military men who work in civilian
capacity are placed in such a way as to put military men in control of the
whole state apparatus from the President's office down to village level. In his
two studies of the military penetration of the higher central bureaucracy in
Indonesia, John McDougal concluded that in the 1980s, around 40 per cent
of these key positions (163 posts by his estimation in 1986) were occupied
by military men. [] In 1986 this included the President, 64 per cent of the
President's 25 principal aids, 2 of 3 Coordinating Ministers, 3 out of 10
Ministers of State, 38 per cent of the 21 department ministers, 67 per cent of
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the Ministry Secretary-Generalships and 65 per cent of the Inspector-
Generalships. The figures for 1981 were in most cases similar, with the same
overall picture of military control. On the whole, military penetration of the
cabinet and bureaucracy seems to have been at its lowest in the early 1970s,
although differences between periods have not been very substantial.
The system is even more complete than the figure of 40 per cent of the
central higher bureaucracy might suggest. To start with, the politically most
sensitive ministries show a much higher military penetration, while the less
politically important ministries show lower figures. No less importantly, almost
all the ministries where a military man is not the minister have a military
Secretary-General and Inspector-General, giving military men an almost total
coverage with regard to the highest level in the ministries. Also, as has been
already discussed, and will be taken up again in the following chapter, military
men were in control of a very large parts of the modern economy during the
early New Order.
Apart from the central bureaucracy, and the nationalised industries, military
men have dominated the highest regional offices. In the early 1970s, more
than 90 per cent of regional governors were military men, and so were 60 per
cent of the lower bupati level. [Mas'oed, 1983] Before 1966, only few military
men occupied these positions. At the lowest level of government, the village
headmen have been to a great extent drawn from the ranks of retired army
men.
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The view, however, that the military, as an independent institution is in political
control through this pervasive system is mistaken, as the system is ultimately
controlled by the President through his appointees. The military as such does
not possess a cohesive control over the system, nor does it have effective
policy guidelines imposed on the individuals taking up appointments. The
military does not have a policy on the issues the karyawan officers have to
deal with on a ministerial level, but the government does. These individuals
take their orders, not from the military, but from the government.
The financial and political rewards for individuals in this system can be
considerable. While no one would get rich on army pay alone, karyawan
officers have in general been able to make far more money out of their
position than from their paypackets. Some positions have been particularly
lucrative and these have been reserved for political purposes, while in many
cases it has been up to the individual, his business acumen and his morals,
how much he makes out of his position.
The karyawan system has in this way created a hierarchy, partly separate
from, and parallel to, the military hierarchy itself, where individual officers have
been appointed to posts carrying opportunities for enrichment or
advancement in different degrees.
In one sense this system resembles a system of one party rule, such as that
of the communist countries or the Kuomitang government of Taiwan, more
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than a military government. In this case the "party" leadership would be
Suharto and his inner group, and the "kommisars" the military officers.
The karyawan strategy was in two ways a key to Suharto's success in
imposing his control on Indonesia. On the one hand it enabled him to buy
the loyalty of the military and to create within the military the illusion that the
military as such was in control.
At the same time, the karywan system ensured a more responsive and more
tightly controlled bureaucracy in the same manner as in communist states
where party cadres are put into strategic positions as kommisars. In this way
the military worked as an instrument of the regime.
If the military as such, however, had been in charge of the karyawan system,
either through appointments or through the pursuit of military policy, the
system would have worked in the opposite way for the regime, by creating
a mechanism for controlling government. No such thing happened, and at
no time has the military sought collectively to influence the regime, either from
an external position, nor through its penetration of the central bureaucracy.
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communism was thought to be untainted by financial corruption. He was later
sent to Irian Jaya, then made governor at the Abri Academy, and later made
ambassador to North Korea and an inspector at the Foreign Office before
surfacing again in Jakarta politics in the late 1980s as a critic of the
government and corruption, however, avoiding direct criticism of Suharto. He
died shortly after making this limited come-back.
14. Kemal ldris, chief of staff at Kostrad in 1965, succeeded Suharto as
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15. Dharsono, the commander of the West Java Siliwangi division and one
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18. Hugeng was the commander of the national police force until 1971. He
then discovered the involvement of Mrs. Suharto in smuggling and other
questionable activities. He was removed from office after moving against
highly placed smugglers and after allegedly complaining directly to the
President of the first lady's extra-legal commercial activities.
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CHAPTER 9
THE PRESIDENCY, THE RULING GROUP
AND THE PATRONAGE SYSTEM
At the centre of the New Order system of government has been the
centralisation of power in the hands of the President. This centralisation has
been such that other potential centres of power, such as the military, the
bureaucracy, the parliament, Golkar and the political parties have all been
virtually neutralised by dependency on the President for power and patronage.
The constitutional basis for this system is to be found in the 1945 constitution
which locates paramount powers in the Presidency. This constitution was
suspended at the time of negotiated independence and was not in operation
during the Parliamentary democracy of the 1950s, but was re-introduced by
Sukarno as the basis for his Guided Democracy. The constitution can, of
course, be interpreted in different ways and could equally well support a far
more democratic system of government, but both Sukarno and Suharto could
claim certain legitimacy for authoritarian governments on the basis of this
constitution.
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The legitimacy of the Suharto Presidency was, however, in considerable doubt
at the onset. The transfer of power through Supersemar, the letter signed by
Sukarno, under duress, in March 1966, investing General Suharto with wide
governmental powers, was questionable to say the least, and was much
debated at the time. Suharto's subsequent actions were all based on this
dubious instrument. The purges of the MPR, the recall of the radical army
representatives and the addition to it of hundreds of Suharto appointees was
equally questionable from constitutional and legal standpoint.
Apart from the constitutional violations, the new regime engaged in activities
that were questionable, if not directly in breach of the constitution, such as
manipulation of the political parties and individual MPR members, through
threats and bribes, in the run up to the session that elected Suharto
President of Indonesia in 1968. However important, this chain of events, it
largely falls outside the limited scope of the thesis.
What is of concern here are the material foundations of the rapidly growing
powers of the Presidency in the early New Order, as opposed to its dubious
constitutional formulations, or the various manifestations of the accumulation
and exercise of this power. This power lies in a system of patronage, as
already pointed out. There are three important features of this system which
have made it a firm basis for regime power during the New Order.
One is its vast size in comparison to resources in the economy. Another is
its centralisation in the President's office. The third is the lack of alternative
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sources of capital and patronage in a society dominated by a strong,
ubiquitous state, independent of class forces generated outside its own
perimeters.
Through building up this system and by exercising a centralised command
over it, Suharto was able to bypass and eventually control aU alternative
centres of power. Before the New Order and in its early days the political
parties, the bureaucracy, the military and members of the cabinet all enjoyed
access to patronage that was to a certain extent, at least, independent of the
Presidency. The Sukarno Presidency while increasingly centralising political
power had done so without totally undermining such independent sources of
patronage. The military had been running vast corporations and the separate
services, as well as the regional commands, enjoyed much independence in
this respect. The bureaucracy dealt in licenses, contracting and concessions
of various sorts and looked to the parties no less than the President for
sponsorship and command.
Instead of going through the established institutions of the military, the
bureaucracy and the parties, Suharto bypassed these and came to control
them by undermining their independence of the Presidency. This he did by
building up vast resources for patronage within the Presidency and by
dispensing this patronage through an informal network that did not rely on
existing hierarchy in the military, the bureaucracy or in the political system.
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For building up these resources and for their dispersion the President relied
on his own circle of like minded military officers. The formal establishment of
a group of assistants, the SPRI, which bypassed the cabinet and the military
hierarchy in policy making and policy implementing, lead to such resentment
within and outside the military that Suharto disbanded this organ in 1968.
The group was, however, far from disbanded. Over the months and years
that followed, an informal group of perhaps around ten individuals came to
exercise such power in Indonesia, as to warrant being termed the ruling
group of the country. These men formed the heart of the regime, bypassing
the formal cabinet and individual ministers, let alone the representative
institutions, the DPR, the MPR and the political parties. Their power derived
from their control over the patronage system as well as control over a
network of formal and ad-hoc intelligence and security organs that in some
cases operated without being answerable to either political or institutional
military accountability.
A certain focus on individuals in this group is necessary for an understanding
of the nature of the New Order regime. Information on the individuals
concerned, however is mostly confined to endnotes to this chapter.
As can be seen from these notes, almost all these men shared Suharto's
interest in business, and many had a long background in questionable
enterprises, within and outside military finance. Many had a background in
intelligence and most had served with Suharto or worked with him in
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business. This group was neither representative for the Indonesian military
as a whole, nor did it come to power through position in the military
hierarchy. It was characterised only by ts shared interests in business, the
prominence of intelligence men and the close relationship each of the
individuals had to Suharto.
Few of the Generals that came to rule Indonesia would have been included
in government, if the army had ruled as an institution in the fashion of some
Latin American militaries. The military careers of the group members were,
with one or two notable exception, less than outstanding. Although Suharto
himself was highly placed in the military hierarchy after the murder of six of
his most senior colleagues, the group as a whole formed an unlikely junta
from a military point of view.
One of its key members, Lt. General Alamsyah Ratu Prawiranegara [1], a long
time business associate, was charged with building up the State Secretariat,
which came to be the President's most powerful organ in implementing policy
and dispensing patronage. Another, General Yoga Sugama Suharto's
intelligence officer, was made head of the central intelligence agency, BAKIN,
and various other intelligence bodies. At the same time a smaller group,
renamed ASPRI, was formed with three other key Generals from Suharto's
inner circle, Lt. Gen Ali Murtopo [3] , who throughout his career followed
Suharto as an operational intelligence man, Lt. Gen. Sudjono Humardhani [4],
a long time business partner and spiritual colleague and Lt. Gen. Suryo
Wirjohadiputro [5], who had worked with Suharto in finance for many years.
175
Lt. Gen. Sudharmono, [6] another member of this inner circle was given the
State Secretariat to manage in the early 1970s, while Admiral Sudomo [7] and
General Benny Murdani [8] later became parts of this informal inner group.
The tenth member of this informal group of that came to rule Indonesia was
Lt. Gen. dr. lbnu Sutowo [9], head of Pertamina, who arguably was its only
indispensable member apart from Suharto himself, as his role in financing the
New Order's political operations was central from the very start. In addition,
a few trusted individuals with particularly important roles to play, were at
various times parts of this innermost circle, such as General Pangabean, the
commander-in-chief of the military, and the heads of Bulog, the rice
procurement agency, the second greatest source of patronage funds after
Pertamina, Lt.Gen. Tirtosudiro and Lt. Gen. Bustanil Arifin. [10]
As pointed out earlier, this group constituted a somewhat unlikely junta from
a military point of view, but their role, particularly in the period 1967-1974 was,
however, similar to that of an army junta operating both inside and outside
the normal channels of government, an entity superimposed on the
government and the military hierarchy.
The whole system was based on the same carrot and stick strategy that had
served Suharto well in gaining control over the military. On the one hand the
authoritarian and highly exclusive system of government was underpinned by
threat of military coercion. In spite of divisions within it, the military was
committed not to hand over power to civilians and as already discussed, by
1969 Suharto was reasonably firmly in control of the forces.
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More importantly for the long term development of Indonesian politics and at
the heart of the regime was a rapidly growing system of extra-budgetary
revenue which could be channelled to individuals and groups for political
ends, and a vast system of commercial operations that relied on government
sponsorship through monopoly positions, licenses or subsidised finance.
The largest single operation of this kind was the national oil company that
came to be known as Pertamina. The extent of the business dealings under
direct control of the ruling group can be gauged from the fact that at the time
of the collapse of Pertamina, and this followed years' of unprecedented
earnings, its debts ran into billions of dollars and were greater than the
external government debt. Bulog's turnover was less than that of Pertamina,
at least after the increase in the price of oil in 1973, but it was often more
directly used for individual patronage and for the enrichment of the ruling
group itself.
Both Pertamina and Bulog were effectively outside the control of technocrats
in the bureaucracy or individual ministers and reported directly to the
President. [11] These two firms formed the largest components of a vast
system of business networks where state capital, Chinese capital and foreign
capital linked together under the supervision of a few military officers who
enormously enriched themselves in the process as well as buying the political
loyalty of a large number of colleagues.
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Aside from the directly commercial operations of the state the ruling group
also commanded vast resources of money from regular state revenue and
from irregular contributions. There were at least two other general types of
revenue raised and spent outside regular bureaucratic control. One was a
system of "non-budgetary" funds raised from additional levies on top of
regular taxes. These included a special levy on forestry products, levies on
copra and clove and a levy on pilgrims going on the haj to Mecca, as well
as the cess tax levied on stronger commodities, such as coffee and rubber.
All these funds were earmarked for research, export promotion, rehabilitation
of industries and the like, but in reality they were subject to Presidential
control and discretion. The magnitude of these funds is a matter of
conjecture but will have been considerable. [12]
A second and probably more important source of funding was the payment
made by businesses in return for monopoly positions. Such arrangements
were made by the President for the import of clove and gold and for logging,
flour milling and several other sectors. In many cases the recipients of the
monopolies were firms owned in part by the President's family, or by other
highly placed generals, and by Chinese businessmen involved in commerce
with the President, such as Liem Sieo Uong and Bob Hassan. In some
cases politically important military men, outside the innermost circle were
rewarded with concessions. Parts of the profit, however, were channelled
through the Presidents office to pay for political patronage. [13]
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It has been pointed out by Kuntjoro-Jakti [1982] that the immense proportions
of these regime resources outside the formal state budget overwhelmed the
formal budget and reduced the role of the technocrats to the limited and
slower growing sphere of development programmes. Ukewise, the control of
the technocrats over the financial system through the state banks and
through investment regulation failed to reach its goals as it was overwhelmed
by the conglomerates, Pertamina, Bulog and the Chinese owned firms
collaborating with the ruling group. [Kuntjoro-Jakti, 1982]
This money was directed at political targets in various ways. The political
parties benefitted from direct grants and from support in the form of cars,
equipment and the covering of the cost of transport, meetings and
conferences. Uttle of this is documented but was widely known in political
circles. [14] Golkar benefitted greatly from these discretionary funds for its
election campaigns since 1971. Apart from this, large amounts of resources
have been channelled through Golkar to political constituencies, much of
these funds coming directly to Golkar from business conglomerates.['5]
Other constItuencies included the Muslim community. Before the elections of
1971, and also at subsequent elections, a programme of building mosques
and Islamic schools was funded directly from the so called BANPRES
(Presidential Assistance) programme.
In addition to all this, the President was able to allocate at his discretion large
amounts taken from the regular state budget. These funds were earmarked
as "budget item 16" and as the "Presidential tactical fund". [Kuntjoro Jakti,
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1982, Mas'oed, 1983] The official reason for these items was the alleged
need for the President to be able to intervene in favour of high-priority
projects. This, as pointed out by Kuntjoro-Jakti, was a continuation of a
practise established by Sukarno with his "Revolutionary Fund".
This money, like the extra-budgetary funds, was entirely at the Presidents
discretion and managed by the State Secretariat under Lt. Gen. Sudharmono.
The money was mostly used for development projects of various sorts but by
being channelled in this way, bureaucratic scrutiny of the projects themselves
and the spending was avoided. Project feasibility was left to the discretion
of the State Secretariat. According to Kuntjoro-Jakti, 'in the mid 1970s
between 48 per cent and 56 per cent of the total budgetary ceiling of the
National Development Budget was allocated under this extraordinary
procedure. [Kuntjoro Jakti, 1982]
Yet another instrument of this kind was the INPRES, Presidential Instruction
Project, programme. Projects under this programme bypassed Bappenas,
the national planning authority, which was the main bastion of the
technocrats. The programme was in essence a discretionary support to the
regional governments, channelled through various projects at provincial,
district or village level. The programme was designed to create a mass
constituency at local level for the President, and support for his own men who
controlled the projects on the ground. The INPRES programme was greatly
expanded after the regime had been challenged by the unrest of 1973-1974.
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However important in keeping the regime in power and creating an
institutionalised system of patronage and corruption from national to village
level, more importantly for the future political landscape of Indonesia was the
second leg of the patronage system, the creation of privately owned
conglomerates.
Two of the state owned conglomerates, Pertamina and Bulog have already
been briefly mentioned. Some of their operations are also briefly discussed
in endnotes to this chapter. In addition to these, several large companies
were under military control as discussed earlier. In the early New Order, this
was supplemented by a unique system of partly private, partly public or
military owned entities, often established as charitable foundations. Through
state patronage and a fusion of these foundations with Chinese capital and
the private capital of a few military businessmen, the structure of the
economy and the structure of the dominant classes in the country were
transformed.
As discussed earlier, branches of the armed services from national, through
divisional and down to local level had involved itself in various business
activities prior to the New Order. After 1966 this business involvement greatly
increased as most of the important financial operators within the army
became members of the new ruling group in the country, commanding almost
unlimited access to expanding financial resources in the country. It has been
pointed out before that the military had for all its time been forced to raise a
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large part of its own budget. Estimates of how much of its expenditure was
paid for by the state and how much by fund various fund raising activities
vary but widely quoted figures point to a roughly half and half division in this
respect in the late 1960s and early 1970s.
A second reason given for military involvement in business was the need to
use military "idle capacity" [Crouch, 1978, Kuntjoro-Jakti, 1982]. Under the
slogan of "civic mission" the army moved into many business activities where
it was supposedly able to use its idle capacity of organisational manpower
and equipment.
In addition to the nationalised companies managed by the military since the
late 1960s, military men were charged with running a number of companies
seized from Sukarno's followers after his downfall. The largest of these, the
companies of Yusuf Muda Dalam, who had benefitted from a particularly close
relationship with the palace in Sukarno's days, were managed, broken up and
distributed by General Soeryo from Suharto's ruling group.
A further source of patronage given to military enterprises and individuals
were forestry concessions, previously managed by a state enterprise. These
proved to be enormously lucrative and particularly important for paying off
and rewarding individuals, as well as for raking off quick profits for the ruling
group itself. By controlling these concessions, the ruling group effectively
became a landowner of some of the greatest and most profitable forests on
earth. In general, the forestry concessions, wether given over to military
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companies or to individuals, were exploited by chinese or foreign companies.
The Indonesian owners of the concessions were in most cases paid
handsome rents without much direct involvement in forestry, repeating the
pattern typified by the Benteng programme in the 1950s and the various
license and concession schemes during Sukarno's reign.
In addition to military control over state companies there were also military
owned companies and military controlled foundations. The origin of these
companies has already been discussed and some of the larger ones have
been mentioned. In the late 1960s and early 1970s these companies and
foundations were in many cases to grow rapidly before moving into a serious
decline in the 1980s. One of the largest of these companies, Tn Usaha
Bhakti, which was run by the army central command and the defence ministry
included by 1973 29 companies in areas as diverse as forestry, construction,
agricultural estates and vehicle assembly. [Kuntjoro-Jakti, 1982, Robison,
1986] TUB, in a tradition established earlier by military linked companies
entered into cooperation with several Chinese owned companies, such as
those of Liem Sioe Liong and his close associate and founder of the Uppo
conglomerate, Mochtar Riady. It has been pointed out by Robision that the
low levels of capitalization and lack of investment in TUB companies indicated
a greater interest in exhausting inherited capital than in long term
accumulation. [Robison, 1986:261] Whatever the intention, TUB saw its best
days in its first few years of operation.
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Like with the karyawan system, the extensive business involvement of the
military is deceptive with regard to the power of the military institution,
particularly for the period after the mid 1970s. Not only did the President
manage to centralise most of this system under his own control, but the firms
themselves went into serious decline after a few good years under the early
New Order.
This failure of the military to capitalise in the longer run on the vast business
opportunities handed to it from the late 1950s to the early 1970s was
decisive in shifting the balance of power out of the military into the hands of
Suharto's ruling group. Had the military as an institution? and maybe more
importantly given the President's ability to manipulate things at the centre, its
various branches, been able to build up viable concerns out of the vast
amalgam of companies that passed through its hands, not only economic
power, but also more indirectly, legitimate economic concerns, would have
been firmly entrenched within the military organisation.
The ownership structure instituted by Suharto, both at the Diponogoro division
and later at Kostrad became a wider pattern in early New Order Indonesia.
The companies were owned by the military organisation as well as by private
individuals who were usually either serving officers or former officers of the
division. In the case of the Diponegoro companies, General Gatot Subroto,
an ex-commander of the division was among shareholders in shipping
companies run by General Humardhani, a member of Suharto's ruling group,
on behalf of the military division. Subroto had been credited with saving
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Suharto in the late 1950s from being destroyed by a smuggling scandal. It
is also worth noting, as indicative of the tight integration of these military
business activities into relatively few hands, that Subroto's stepson, the
Chinese entrepreneur Bob Hassan, was the main manager of Diponegororo
business interests. Hassan later came to dominate the Indonesian timber and
forestry industry and through joint venture companies, in many cases linked
to the Suharto family, such as Suharto's own tea company, and several of his
sons' business ventures, became one of the foremost entrepreneur in the
country.
Suharto himself had more important association with the Kostrad group of
companies, the Yayasan Dharma Putra and Trikora. Again, the main business
contacts of these companies were Bob Hassan and Liem Sieo Liong. These
companies were managed by two close allies of Suharto, Lt. Gen. Sofjar and
Lt. Gen. Soerjo. For a time these companies generated wealth for Suharto,
for some other generals in his ruling group and funds for patronage within the
military. Some of these companies were involved in serious scandals in the
early 1970s, such as the Suharto family related companies CV Waringin, Bank
Ramayana and Coopa Trading, were openly criticised in the press at the time
for corruption and irregularfties. Like many other military enterprises, and
military related companies, these seem to have outlived their usefulness, or
exhausted their capital, in the mid 1970s, and went into decline. Even larger
corruption scandals surrounded Bulog, managed by Lt. Gen. Bustanil Arifin,
who is married into the Suharto family, and Pertamina, managed then by Lt.
lbnu Sutowo, as briefly related elsewhere.
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Among other large companies were the Siliwangi companies established by
General Dharsono and partly owned by him and other officers. Again, these
companies went into decline in the mid 1970s. Each of the service branches
also ran cooperatives, known respectively as INKOPAD (army), INKOPAL
(navy), INKOPAU (air force) and INKOPAK (police) that formed umbrellas for
various business activities and procurement. Individual fortunes were also
made through these cooperatives.
It is beyond the scope of the thesis to go deep into the structure of these
companies and their operations. Additional information on some of the
business practises and the linkages these companies had with the ruling
group are to be found in endnotes to this chapter on some of the individuals
in Suharto's ruling circle, as well as in the final chapter of the thesis.
Exhaustive research and analysis is to be found in Robison, [1976, 1986] and
in Kuntjoro-Jakti, [1982].
A few points need to be made, however. First, the military, and the army in
particular, was handed vast opportunities for building an economic power
base. This, as pointed out, was not effectively used. During the crucial first
few years of the New Order while Suharto was consolidating his powers,
however, the various organs of the military, from the central command down
to district level, were very much involved in reaping economic and political
benefits from the New Order. During these first few years the military seemed
to be gaining great economic powers and consequently, there was only
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limited resentment over the financial excesses of the ruling group. Not only
were there opportunities for individuals, but also for the institutions, placating
those who were deeply concerned with the military as an institution of power.
As the military failed to build on these opportunities its enterprises went into
decline after the mid 1970s. These enterprises declined not only in relative
terms as the conglomerates of Suharto and his Chinese business allies rose,
but also in real term as the inherited capital was eroded and not replaced
with investment. By the time this became evident, however, Suharto had long
since gained firm control over the military and the political system had been
restructured in the fashion that suited him and his group.
Another important point to make at this stage is that the genesis of the
present day conglomerates is very much in the military business
arrangements instigated by Suharto in the 1950s and widely practised in the
late 1960s and in the 1970s. After 1965, of course, there was a vastly
increased scope for this with the fusion of military power and state power,
and the opening up of the economy to foreign trade.
Several of the largest conglomerates have their roots in Suharto's own
business dealings and those of the companies he founded in his days as
commander of Diponegoro and later Kostrad. The business empires of Uem
Sioe Liong, Mochtar Riady, Bob Hassan and Sofjan Wanandi all have
important roots in business alliances with military companies under Suharto's
control. Most of the other conglomerates in present day Indonesia have their
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roots, either in such dealings in the late 1960s, organised by members of
Suharto's ruling group, or in joint ventures with one of the major
conglomerates owned by the Suharto family or its closest Chinese business
allies. Those that predated this period owe no less to these arrangements,
as contacts with military companies and the ruling group became close to
being an absolute necessity at the time, and very few of the companies that
made no alliance with any of the major business generals at that time were
to survive, and hardly any to prosper. It should be pointed out, though, that
some of the most prosperous Chinese conglomerates, and a few of the more
sizeable Pribumi enterprises of 1990, have come into being after this period.
These companies, however, have in almost all cases prospered under the
wings of one of the major Chinese or Suharto conglomerates.
The military companies in these alliances, and the participation of individual
officers outside the ruling group, became steadily less important during the
1970s and since, while the Chinese owned conglomerates along with the
companies of Suharto's family and his closest associates rose to ever greater
prominence. In the 1980s, as discussed in the final chapter, this core of
conglomerates was joined by a rapidly increasing number of sizeable, mainly
Chinese companies, and surrounded by a fast growing class of professional
managers and other groups constftuting a politically and socially important
class of private sector salaried middle class.
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Notes
The information on individuals contained in notes 1-10 below is pieced
together from diverse sources. Bibliographical data is chiefly taken from H.
Bachtiar (1988), Siapa Dia? For information on business activities a large
number of sources were consulted. These included H. Crouch (1975,1978),
R. Robison (1977,1986), I. Chalmers (1989) and magazines such as 1988-
1991 issues of Warta Ekonomi, Prospek, Tempo and Swa Sembada. In
addition, a number of academics and journalists in Indonesia were consulted.
1. Lt. Gen. Alamsjah and Suharto served in Jakarta after both had been
transferred to the capital from provincial postings at the same time, in the late
1950s. A shared interest in business dealings brought them quickly together,
as well as a certain similarity in circumstances. Alamsjah was, along with
Suharto, one of the best known of the military entrepreneurs, and his
extensive business interests date back to the 1950s. In 1963, Alams]ah was
given responsibility for financial operations at the army central command.
Persistent rumour credits the general with financing the initial operations of
Suharto and the forces insisting on Sukarno's removal in late 1965 and early
1966. Similar rumours also give credit for this to Lt. Gen. lbnu Sutowo. The
funds are said to have originated from abroad and from smUggling and were
to be used in South Sumatra where Alamsyah was serving in intelligence
capacity for Sutowo at the end of the regional rebellions, but were instead
stashed away. In 1966, Alamsjah became one of Suharto's closest
collaborators, and while retaining responsibility for army finance, he became
the head of Suharto's personal staff, the SPRI. SPRI was regarded as the
real but invisible cabinet where th•e main policy decisions were taken.
Alamsjah's powers peaked early on in the New Order period. He is said to
have given Suharto a mistaken advice with regard to possible Japanese aid,
which seriously embarrassed the President on his visit to Tokyo. He is also
said to have mismanaged important financial operations at this time. In 1970-
1971, he was openly accused of large scale corruption in the Indonesian
press. In early 1972 he was sent abroad as ambassador to the Netherlands,
but returned to politics in the mid 1970s and was elevated to the cabinet in
1978 as the Minister for Religion, at a time when Islamic affairs were causing
increased concern. In 1983 Alamsjah was further elevated to the position of
Coordinating Minister for People's Welfare. In 1989 Alamsjah managed,
through his contacts within Islamic organisation to secure the signature of a
large number of leading muslims to a document supporting President Suharto
for a sixth term of office, starting in 1993. This letter, published in 1990, was
intended to have a snow-balling effect, prompting similar support from various
quarters in a fashion established by Murtopo and others in earlier times.
Alamsjah's business interests include printing works which have received
much government patronage. Among other things, Alamsjah has printed
most of the election material for the government in past elections.
2. General Yoga Sugama served in the Japanese imperial army in Manchuria
during the war, after education at the Tokyo Military Academy. On his return
to Indonesia in the late 1940s, Sugama became one of Suharto's intelligence
officers in Central Java. In 1965-1966 he served as Suharto's intelligence
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assistant at Kostrad, and after that as the head, or deputy head, of various
military intelligence bodies. He was made head of Bakin, the intelligence
coordinating body, in 1968, and head of intelligence at army headquarters in
1970. After a short stint as ambassador to the United Nations, Sugama
returned to Indonesia after Malari and was made head of Bakin again only
days after the riots. For some time he was simultaneously chief of staff at
Kopkamtib, the most directly operational arm of the security apparatus.
Sugama has held his post as the head of Bakin since 1974, in an
extraordinary exception from military convention with regard to tenure of such
offices. Sugama claims not to have any private business interests, but has
claimed in an interview that his friends have provided well for him. By all
account his friends have helped generously. Sugama's son, Bambang, is a
businessman, with Japanese connections, and claims in magazine interviews
to receive advice, and "push" from his father.
3. Lt. Gen. Au Murtopo was of a Javanese small town lower priyayi
background, like many of the New Order generals. Unlike many of them, he
came from a more orthodox Islamic community in the Pasisir area of northern
Java, and joined the Hizbullah, the Islamic force sponsored by the Japanese
occupiers. His first military exploit of significance was against alleged
sympathiser of Darul Islam in his own home area. There he worked in an
intelligence capacity for Suharto, as he continued to do for the rest of his life.
Murtopo became the deputy chief of the political division of Suharto's
Diponegoro command, and increasingly acted as Suharto's chief intelligence
coordinator. He followed Suharto to Jakarta where he was engaged in army
intelligence. In the Irian Mandala campaign and the Konfrontasi campaign
against Malaysia, Murtopo acted as Suharto's chief intelligence man, in the
latter case working to subvert Indonesian government policy. During the
Malaysia campaign he also organised smuggling operations on a vast scale,
which not only made money, but also subverted Indonesian efforts against
Malaysia. After Suharto came to power, Murtopo spent some time abroad,
particularly in Singapore, Taiwan and Hong Kong, where he raised funds from
businessmen interested in investing in the soon to be opened Indonesian
economy. He became deputy chief of Bakin, but continued to mount
operations outside the formal perimeter of such organisations. Typically, his
intelligence unit, Opsus, was both a shady outfit for intelligence operations,
particularly aimed at political parties and organisations, and a business
concern. Murtopo built alliances with various elements, most notably a group
of Chinese businessmen and intellectuals, many of who were catholics. One
of the most influential of these was Yusuf Wanandi, alias Liam Bian Kie, who
became Murtopo's aid. Murtopo's allies were not only staunchly anti
communist, but equally suspicious of political Islam, and many of his
operations were designed to thwart Islamic political aspirations. His political
operations were crucial both in the run up to Suharto's election as President
in 1968, and in the 1971 election campaign when Murtopo became notorious
for his liberal use of intimidation, "dirty tricks" and promise of patronage.
This reputation grew over the years, and so much so, in fact, that Murtopo
was probably often wrongly accused of being behind sinister and unexplained
incidents. In 1974 he was one of two main protagonists in a showdown of
forces within the government, when he called General Sumftro's bluff by
organising street demonstrations in Jakarta, which lead to Sumitro's downfall.
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He	 established with his Chinese allies the Centre of Strategic and
International Studies, the CSIS, a well funded think tank of mainly right wing
Chinese intellectuals. Murtopo's formal role in government was that of
Minister of Information, a post he held until 1983, when his powers had gone
into decline. He died shortly after leaving government. His business interests
were varied and extensive.
4. Lt. Gen. Sudjono Humardhani was a business partner of Suharto almost
from the start as the financial director of the Diponegoro division during
Suharto's time of command. Humardhani followed Suharto to Jakarta and
continued to work in army finance. He became the director of Tn Usaha
Bakti, the largest military business group. He worked closely with Au Murtopo
on political, intelligence and financial matters, both within CSIS, where he was
an honourary president, and in Opsus, Murtopo's intelligence and business
outht. Humardhani was closely allied with Japanese capital and facilitated
much of the initial Japanese investment in Indonesia. He became a target of
student demonstrations, the Malari, in 1974, for his connections to Japanese
capital. He had also been openly accused of corruption in the press in 1970-
1971. The direct involvement of Humardhani in large business dealings was
most importantly in facilitating tn-lateral business alliances between the
Japanese, Indonesian Chinese and Pribumi military connected businessmen.
In this set-up, Japan provided much of the capital and all of the technology,
while the Chinese provided some capital and most of the local management,
and the military connected Pribumi businessmen provided licenses and
government backed credit. In an incident in 1972, indicative of the
configuration of power in Indonesia, Humardhani came into serious conflict
with the senior technocrat in the government, the influential Minister of Trade,
Dr. Sumitro Djodjohadikusumo. The conflict was over Japanese investment,
which Humardhani was in effect representing. He won the day and Sumitro
was forced to resign as Minister of Trade. Sumitro was at that time seen as
one of the linchpins of the technocratic structure that supposedly guided
Indonesia's economic policy and kept foreign confidence in the regime, a fact
acknowledged by him being retained in the cabinet in a different capacity, but
much reduced authority. Humardhani's close relationship to Suharto was not
only cemented by decades of intimate financial dealings, but also through a
shared interest in Javanese mysticism. Humardhani was always seen as
Suharto's superior in these matters, and even as the President's spiritual
guru. In his 1989 biography Suharto felt it necessary to counter this belief
by claiming that the relationship had been the other way around, that
Humdardhani had been the junior partner in their mutual spiritual quest.
Humardhani died in 1986.
5. Lt. Gen. Suryo was for a time a director of finance at Suharto's
Diponegoro division. He later became the director of Suharto's Kostrad
business concern, the Yayasan Dharma Putra, and a financial director of the
army central staff. Suryo became a financial adviser to the President in his
inner circle of advisers, the SPRI and ASPRI, and remained as such until
1974. His influence, however, quickly waned. This is said to have been
because of bad business advice given by him to Suharto in the late 1960s,
and through mistakes in running the various business entrusted to him. He
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has, however, retained some business clout and has continued to manage
Hotel Indonesia.
6. Lt. Gen. Sudharmono who has in later years emerged as Suharto's
closest and most powerful collaborator has a background different from that
of others in the group. He was neither an intelligence man, nor a notable
businessman before 1965, but an army prosecutor. He was made Cabinet
Secretary in 1966 and a personal assistant to the President a year later. He
became a minister at the State Secretariat in 1973 the State Secretary in
1978, Chairman of Golkar in 1983 and the Vice-President in 1988.
Sudharmono whose organisational abiflties are almost legendary in Indonesia,
emerged in the late 1970s as the central figure in the government patronage
system, which he went on to centralise even further during the early 1980s.
He is in many ways the odd man out in the President's entourage and enjoys
far more trust and following the bureaucracy than in the army. Sudharmono's
value to Suharto has primarily been provide an efficient administration of the
patronage system, to centralise the system in the Presidency, for building up
Golkar as a part of this same system, and to extend the constituency of the
ruling group into the civilian bureaucracy. Although Sudharmono himself, and
his immediate family are rumoured to have various personal business
interests, he is far less tinted by corruption than almost any other member
of the ruling group.
7. Adm. Sudomo is the only naval officer to have risen to great political
power during the New Order. He received Dutch military training and served
what seems to have been an undistinguished career in the navy. He has
often been blamed for one of the worst military disasters of the Irian
campaign. In the navy he was given responsibility for Inkopal, the navy
cooperative. He was soon removed from this position under allegations of
serious financial irregularities. He was then sent to the Ministry for Sea
Communications, a ministry that was said at the time to offer only the
slimmest of pickings and no opportunities for serious self-enrichment. There,
however, Sudomo was said to have turned the situation to his advantage and
by 1965 he was rumoured to have amassed what was then considered a
small fortune. Sudomo had worked with Suharto in the Irian campaign and
their business interests are thought to have coincided at times after that.
After Suharto's assumption of power, Sudomo was given the task of purging
the navy which stood up to Suharto longer than other branches of the
military. Over a few years Sudomo dismissed some 1500 officers, and in
Jakarta concern was voiced over his enthusiastic approach to his task, as a
serious dearth of trained navy officers came apparent. After this, Sudomo
was made Chief of Staff at Kopkamtib. There he served as General Sumitro's
deputy until the latter's downfall in the wake of Malari. Although the
President himself assumed the command of Kopkamtib, Sudomo was put in
day to day charge. From 1974 and into the early 1980s Sudomo liberally
used his enormous powers as head of Kopkamtib which were further
augmented by his appointment as the deputy commander of the armed
forces. In 1983 his fortunes went into some decline as he was removed
from Kopkamtib and made the Minister of Labour. There he forcefully
safeguarded industrial peace and promoted Pancasila. In 1988, when many
had expected Sudomo, who is known for extravagant lifestyle, to retire from
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politics to nurture his considerable private wealth and extensive business
interests, he was made Coordinating Minister for Political and Security Affairs,
a potentially very powerful portfolio.
8. Along with his political nemesis, Sudharmono, General Benny Murdani has
escaped reputation for serious financial corruption. His background, however,
is less of an oddity in the ruling group than Sudharmono's, as he spent much
of his military career in intelligence capacity. He took part in the Irian
campaign and later served under Suharto in Kostrad, and served with
Murtopo in intelligence operations. He later served at Kopkamtib and in
intelligence capacity at the Ministry of Defence. He was made deputy head
of Bakin, under Yoga Sugama, in 1977 and Chief of Staff at Kopkamtib in
1978, where he served under Sudomo. In 1983 he was made Commander
of the Armed Forces and later Commander of Kopkamtib. From 1983 to
1988 he was widely seen as the second most powerful man in the country
after Suharto, and so much so, that his status as a non-muslim was seen as
the chief obstacle on an otherwise clear route to the Presidency. Murdani,
who is known to keep close contact with military men on the ground, is said
to have raised with Suharto, in 1987, the issue of the President's family's
rapidly expanding business empires, much to Suharto's anger. Murdani's
divided loyalties in this respect, to the increasingly critical army and to the
President, are thought to have cost him his job in 1988, when he was
demoted to be the Minister of Defence, a position Murdani had done much
to undermine with his reorganisation of the military. In spite of this, Murdani
remained a key player in Indonesian politics, keeping in close contact with
a number of senior officers that had been promoted over the years under his
wing as Abri commander.
9. Lt. Gen. dr. lbnu Sutowo was born to a considerably higher social position
than most of his peers in the ruling group, as well as being the only one of
them with a University education. Sutowo, a medical doctor, became a
medial and a staff officer of the republican army in Palembang in Sumatra in
1945. Along with these duties he organised the smuggling of tea, coffee and
peppers to Singapore to pay for arms and expenses. This operation
continued long after hostilities ceased, and was rumoured to be extremely
lucrative, as South Sumatra was at the time perhaps the richest area of the
country in terms of exportable resources. Sutowo married into one of the
business families of the region and was made the commander of the Sriwijaya
division of South Sumatra. After a short commission he was called to
Jakarta to take charge of army logistics. He returned briefly to Sumatra in
1958 to talk his troops out of joining the regional rebellion. After this Sutowo
was given responsibility for the national oil company, Permina, which he
gradually built into the largest concern in Indonesia. He was temporarily hurt
when he was singled out with Suharto in General Nasution's anti-corruption
drive in the late 1950s. Sutowo was said to have been one of the chief
culprits in a spectacular smuggling scandal in Tanjung Priok, Jakarta's port.
Sutowo and Suharto met in the 1950s but little is known about their dealings
until the early 1960s. It has been claimed, however, that they shared
business interests in the late 1950s when Suharto's interests included oil
products, and shortly afterwards they shared the dubious honour of being
singled out as the most corrupt military men of the day. It is beyond doubt
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that Sutowo was highly influential in the creation of the New Order regime.
Some go as far as claiming that it was Sutowo rather than Suharto who was
the inial architect of the New Order. It is said that it was he who persuaded
Suharto to move more decisively in 1966 by offering to finance extensive
political operations and patronage within the army that was required to
consolidate Suharto's rule. The budget of Pertamina came to rival that of the
government itself, and a vast network of patronage to individuals, groups,
regions, parties and religious groups was created to sustain the New Order
regime. Sutowo was given a free hand to run the company in return for
providing this extensive patronage and for providing the government with a
large part of its operating funds. Sutowo's strong position in this regard
became clear already in 1966 when the then minister of mining, Slamet
Bratanat, tried to exercise his legitimate authority over the oil company.
Suharto responded by removing the company from ministerial control.
Sutowo, like Murtopo and Humardhani, made much use of Japanese capital
for expansion. The main windfall, however, came with the increase in oil
prices in the mid 1970s. The extent of Pertamina's operations at this time
can be gauged from the fact that oil accounted from 75 per cent of exports
and a similar proportion of government revenue. In spite of this vastly
increased income, Pertamina was found to have debts of around US $ 10
billion in 1976, a figure approaching the entire foreign debt of the government.
The Pertamina affair will be discussed briefly in the main body of the text.
After being dismissed from Pertamina, Sutowo's political clout sharply
decreased but this did not finish him off in business. He has remained one
of the richest businessmen in Indonesia and is quite unapologetic for his
management of Pertamina, or indeed over his own personal enrichment while
in office, a topic he has discussed in magazine interviews where he has
boasted of his fortune. His interests include the large Adiguna shipyard, the
Hilton hotel in Jakarta and two large adjoining apartment blocks. His son,
Ponco, is increasingly active in the Jakarta business world and a member of
Golkar's central committee.
10. Lt. Gen. Bustanil Arifin has been a business entrepreneur throughout his
military career, almost all of which was spent in logistics. He married into the
President's family and has enjoyed close connections to Suharto since before
the New Order. Arifin's name has been linked to numerous business
dealings, some of highly questionable legality. He was made head of Bulog
in 1967, which became one of the largest concerns in Indonesia with its
centralised purchasing of rice and logistics operations. Bulog was extensively
used as a source of funds for patronage, and, apart from the various
government budgetary devices, probably came second only to Pertamina in
this respect. Bulog has allegedly been the centre of some of the New
Order's most spectacular corruption scandals. Arifin's business dealings and
those of his wife, as well as the connection of these to the Suharto and Uem
Sioe Liong company empires, is discussed in endnotes to chapter 12 and in
the main body of the text of that same chapter.
11. The formal arrangement varied from time to time. Pertamina was initially
under the control of the minister for mining and energy but a confrontation
between the sitting minister and Sutowo lead to Pertamina being removed
from ministerial control.
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Bulog, on the other hand, was from its inception in 1967 put under direct
supervision of the President and was put under control of officers from
Kostrad and Murtopo's extra-legal intelligence outfit, Opsus.
12. For a discussion on these funds see D. Kuntjoro Jakti, 1982.
13. On this see Robison, 1977 and 1986.
14. Grants to political parties are mentioned by Kuntjoro Jakti, 1982, and
Mass'oed, 1983. By all accounts Presidential funding of the political parties
has been generally known and widely accepted by party politicians who have
continued to rely on discretionary funding from the President and from the
military for important part of their operations. Part of this funding for the
parties was legalised in 1975.
15. There are no published accounts of this practise, but this claim was made
by several academics and journalists interviewed in Indonesia. One informant




STATE AND REGIME IN THE 1970s
In the briefest and highly simplified terms, the structural basis for Suharto's
assumption of power, and its exercise over the first few years of the New
Order has been found to consist of three interconnected pillars, namely the
absence of cohesive class forces at the top of Indonesian society, the pivotal
economic role of the military, and the Suharto group's central position within
the state patronage system. It was shown that the dominant class in native
society did not enjoy ownership of capital at independence. State sponsored
attempts at building up an entrepreneurial class met with almost total failure
as concessions and capital benefitted a politically connected class of middle
men rather than sustainable enterprises. At the same time the relative
strength of Chinese capital, and later military controlled capital, grew, while the
largely modernist muslim and outer island based class of indigenous
entrepreneurs saw its economic and political fortunes dwindle. The reasons
for this were quite simple. There was no cohesive class at the heart of the
state, exercising influence on the regime for it own class rooted economic and
political interests. The state was in the hands of a group of bureaucrats and
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politicians who used their positions as benefices and sources of patronage.
This point is of great importance, not only for an understanding of the Old
Order but no less for an understanding of the New Order, as the same
situation prevailed long after the change of regimes. The state was essentially
the same, it had no cohesive class at its heart, but was controlled and
exploited by a group of individuals for their own ends.
Following the discussion in the preceding chapter on the composition of
Suharto's ruling group and his paramount command over crucial patronage
system, this chapter will attempt to show how the military, and other potential
sources of power, continued to give way and lose ground to the ruling group
during the 1970s.
As in previous chapters, the sequence of the most relevant events and
developments will be related as briefly as possible, while an attempt will be
made to gain understanding of the basic structures of the evolving regime
through focus on their abstract nature.
First, very briefly, the background to the regime's relationship to the military.
It was shown before that as a result of the economic policies followed under
the Old Order, culminating in the desperate economic situation prevailing in
the mid 1960s, a dominant role in the national economy was gradually
accorded to the military which gained an even more dominant political role by
197
the collapses of Sukarno's Old Order coalition. Even before the aborted
Untung coup attempt, the military was in a potentially paramount economic
and political position. After the coup attempt, group of individuals within the
military, already well versed in questionable business dealings and under the
firm leadership of Suharto, was able to assume a dominant role within the
military. This was through the somewhat coincidental position of Suharto after
the massacre of much of the military high command, coupled with unrivalled
access to sources of patronage from state corporations and military
companies. Through dominant access to sources of patronage, in a political
and economic system lacking alternative currency, Suharto and his small
group of business generals were able to further centralie such sources in
their own hands. They gained control over the military and later over the
institutions of state and over the political parties through extensive use of
patronage, financed through the state budget, extra budgetary revenue, state
corporations and military companies.
While military men were put in control of the state bureaucracy, the state
corporations and the political system, the military institution gradually lost
power to the Presidency. This erosion of military power in favour of the
Presidency occurred gradually over the 1970s and the 1980s. Along with the
vast increase in oil revenue in the early to mid-1970s, this forms the backdrop
to the politics of the decade. It has already been related, how Suharto was
able vastly to increase the powers of the Presidency through budgetary
devices and various other means that gave the President himself vast
discretionary powers he could use for patronage. It has also been pointed
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out, how the President was able to gain a fairly firm control over the military
through the use of patronage, purges and institutional changes. Furthermore,
it was shown how the President came to control the state bureaucracy, in the
widest sense, through the military karyawan system, while this system
accorded no central control to the military itself, but was based on individual
co-optation to the scheme and individual reward through sanctioned or
tolerated corruption. The power of the President and his entourage was firmly
based on the control of patronage. This was not a new phenomenon in
Indonesia. As discussed before, the political parties, the bureaucracy, the
military and the Presidency had all been deeply involved in the gaining and
dispensation of patronage since the days of parliamentary democracy. In
this sense, the President and his group managed to exercise control over a
system that had previously been shared between political parties, various
factions and branches of the military, the bureaucracy and the Presidency.
What was new was the centralisation of the system and the vastly increased
liquidity that came as a result of an influx of foreign money, first through aid,
later more through the exploitation and export of oil, gas and timber. With the
benefit of hindsight it seems that the economic fortunes of the military started
to go into a slow and long decline in the early 1970s. Partly this was due to
the same factors that had characterised military management of state
companies since the late 1950s, namely mismanagement, insufficient
investment, corruption and to intensive exploitation of the companies to
bolster military funds. The vast economic opportunities of the early New
Order that were seized by military companies and by foundations linked to the
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military continued to be present, but these were increasingly taken up by
Chinese owned conglomerates acting in cahoots with the President and his
closest colleagues.
The change was neither rapid nor uniform in the 1970s. Writing on the
period up to 1976 and 1978, respectively, Robison and Kuntjoro-Jakti focus
mainly on companies with direct military links, such as Tn Usaha Bhakti, the
Kostrad Yayasan Dharma Putra and Propelat, state owned companies such
as Pertamina and Bulog and on only very few Chinese owned conglomerates,
such as the Salim group of Liem Sloe Liong and the Astra group of the
Soeryajaya family. [Robison, 1976, Kuntjoro-Jakti, 1982]' Judging from
observations of those two eminent scholars and others writing on Indonesia
in the late 1970s, the decline in the economic fortunes of the military was
not evident at that time. In these writings, and other more casual
commentary from this period, and even later, the military owned and managed
companies are portrayed as the mainstay of the modern economy, a situation
that had clearly prevailed in the early 1970s, but probably obtained to a
significantly lesser extent by the time the key studies of Kuntjoro-Jakti and
Robison became available.
Looking at the history of military involvement in business in Indonesia, it
becomes clear that growth in enterprises controlled by the military always
came from windfall opportunities and never from investment. The rapid
growth in military business groups in the early New Order came from
enhanced opportunities for exploiting monopolies and concessions awarded
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by the government. The decline in the mid to late 1970s can only be
ascribed to a dearth of new opportunities handed to the military, particulary
since far more money was circulating in the economic system during the
decline of these enterprises, than during their heyday.
What had changed was that economic opportunities were being taken, to a
far greater extent than before, by individual military men, particularly by
Suharto and his group, rather than by the military linked companies or
foundations. At this time the Chinese owned conglomerates that came to
dominate Indonesia in the later 1980s were puffing down roots and striking
deals with the individuals of greatest power in the regime
This shift was crucial for creating a class of capital owners and managers in
civil society, outside the perimeter of state linked enterprises, and eventually
outside the perimeter of military influence. While this facilitated the birth of a
capitalist class, another change, seemingly in an opposite direction,
determined the peculiar shape this class was to take. Whereas in the 1950s
and 1960s, individual military commanders were in a position to strike
business deals, this no longer obtained in the mid to late 1970s, as the
system of economic patronage had been centralised in the early 1970s.
Military commanders were therefor not in the same relatively independent
position as before and were far more dependent on the centralised patronage
structure put in place and administered by Suharto and his small group. This
led to an almost total concentration of economic opportunities in the hands
of President Suharto and his tiny entourage of financial generals, and
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gradually more importantly, his Chinese business allies, as returned to in the
final chapter. It seems quite conceivable, that if Suharto had not been able
to centralise patronage to the extent he and his ruling group did, the structure
of the capital owning and managerial classes would have developed
differently, with wide ramifications for Indonesian politics and society.
Suharto's rule was far from being unchallenged at this time. Criticism of
corruption was particularly vocal in the early 1970s. Most of the members of
Suharto's ruling group were named in the press, at one time or another
during the most relaxed period of the New Order as far as censorship was
concerned, as being responsible for corruption of various kind. Scandals
involving the President's wife were widely discussed in society and sometimes
openly among students who were vocal in their criticism of corruption, of the
growing gap beeen social classes and of the increasing penetration of
Japanese investment in the economy. Within the military Suharto also faced
opposition, in spite of the successful purges of the previous years and the
extensive patronage system which was already well in place. The criticism
within the military, however, was more directed at the ruling group than at the
President himself. The same could, in fact, be said of the open criticism in
the press and from the students.
The only showdown that came close to change the configuration of power in
the country occurred in January 1974. This incident, the Malari, which has
been extensively discussed by several academics,. served to strengthen
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Suharto's own grip on power, but at the same time, its outcome narrowed
the power base of the regime within the military. [1]
This seemingly contradictory outcome proved to be all in Suharto's favour, at
least for more than the next ten years, but served to deepen the divide
between the Presidency and the institution of the military, a feature of great
importance as Suharto's rule draws to an end.
On the political level the incident removed from power in the military General
Soemitro, Lt. General Sutopo Juwono and some others, who were of what
has been cafled a "principled" cast of mind in this context,' as opposed to the
more "pragmatic" members of the ruling group. Soemitro, and others like
him, were not exactly champions of civilian democracy or of a puritanical
inclination when it came to business involvement of the military, but they were
critics of the capriciousness and excesses of the ruling group, and wanted the
military to retain ultimate power without superimposing itself through the
karywan system and through business involvement on every level of society.
The Soemitro faction formed a very informal alliance with students and
intellectuals in the run up to the Malari incident. There was, however, little,
if any, commitment to a political alliance on either side. The students and
intellectuals, many of whom had marched against Sukarno and helped to
usher in the New Order, were utterly disillusioned with the New Order as it
had turned out under Suharto and sought in Soemitro a temporary alliance
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for a move against the corruption of the ruling group. Soemitro, while not
usually seen as one of the New Order radicals, played on similar sentiments.
The main danger for Suharto was a possible widening of this alliance into a
larger and even more incongruent group of critics. There were mainly three
elements to look for in this respect.
One was the small indigenous middle class of traders and petty
manufacturers, who complained, as often before, of Chinese encroachment
into their business sectors. Resentment against the Chinese was particularly
strong in Bandung, where the indigenous textile industry had been in a
decline for a long time, while Chinese firms had increasingly prospered.
The resentment of these people was directed at the Chinese rather than at
the government and this resulted in anti-Chinese riots at the time.
This element formed a potentially serious challenge to the regime and among
the responses to the Malari incident were several policy initiatives designed
to enhance the position of indigenous capital at the expense of both Chinese
and international capital. Although this is most often seen as the main
outcome of Malari, it must be pointed out that the people most concerned,
the Pribumi middle classes, had no part in the Malari protest.
More importantly, it will be pointed out later, the initiatives around the time of
Malari were made both possible and sensible, from the point of view of the
ruling group, by the transformation in the economic fortunes of Indonesia in
204
the wake of the oil price rises that occurred at much the same time as Malari.
The initiatives, however, also served to placate the students, who had
protested against the strength of international capital in the Indonesian
economy. The initiatives, their links to the structures of the economy, the
state and the ruling group, and their outcome will be discussed at a later
stage.
A second group were the urban poor who had not seen much improvement
in their living standards while conspicuous consumption by the rich had grown
very markedly. The students failed to link up with workers or representatives
of the urban poor while Ali Murtopo, working through his shadowy intelligence
outhts, was able to make use of this group by encouraging demonstrations
that served to bring down his main rivals, Soemitro and Juwono.
A third group was organised Islam. There had been numerous grievances
between Muslims and the regime in the months and years before and
organised Islam was likely to back the indigenous petty bourgeoisie. By
placating the indigenous entrepreneurs and drawing them into the patronage
system the regime was also likely to placate to some extent possible
opposition under the banner of Islam. Any overt Islamic demonstration
against the regime, however, would must certainly have resulted in a
showdown that would have united the military under Suharto. The position
of Islam as a potential political force will be discussed in the chapter that
follows.
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Suharto had been under a great deal of pressure to reduce the powers of his
ruling group, a group without formal powers but partly formalised with the
system of Presidential Assistants, the ASPRI. The changes he made after
Malari in this respect were cosmetic and of no substance. The Malari incident
has commonly been seen as the trigger for important changes in the
economic policy, a move away from rapid foreign investment and integration
into the emerging global division of labour and towards a more nationalistic
economic policy of import substitution, import restrictions, restrictions on
foreign ownership and a national industrial strategy. [21
There are two important points to be made about this connection. The first,
as pointed out a little earlier, is that the elements favoured by the policy
changes, namely the indigenous entrepreneurs, had not protested against the
government or formed an alliance with its critics. Those who protested were
mainly students and workers who had no direct stake in this matter.
The second point is that the greatest beneficiaries of the policy changes were
not at all the Pribumi entrepreneurs the initiative was ostensibly targeted at,
but the emerging conglomerates controlled by Chinese capital and a handful
of army generals.
There is no evidence to suggest a surge in Pribumi entrepreneurship or
ownership of capital in the 1970s, or indeed well into the 1980s, if a few
families connected to Suharto and his group are excluded, Indigenous
partners, now required, acted as fronts rather than as real partners to
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Chinese and foreign capital. Japanese and Australian studies, as well as a
mass of anecdotal evidence points to the continued prevalence of this
arrangement. [3] The supposed change away from a rentier state, exploited
by whatever group was in control, towards a state with an emerging class
of entrepreneurs at its heart may not have been very substantial, unless the
handful of entrepreneurs in the President's family and in his immediate
entourage are seen as constituting an entrepreneurial class.
The new arrangements made license peddling and monopoly positions no
less central to the system. What changed was the scale of profits to be
made from these arrangements and this served both to create larger fortunes
than previously imaginable, and also to include a somewhat larger group of
people. These people, however, were included as clients, not as independent
entrepreneurs, a crucial difference with regard to the development of state,
class and regime.
The third point is that Malari occurred at exactly the same time as the most
important post-war structural change in the Indonesian economy was effected
by event external to Indonesia. [] The policy change would have been quite
impossible without a major increase in oil prices at this time. The huge
increase in oil revenue in 1973-1974 not only enabled the government to
embark on a new strategy, but made such a strategy logical for the ruling
group.
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It is, of course, conceivable that the government would have embarked on
some form of protected industrialisation in the absence of the increased oil
revenue. It seems likely, however, that this would have lead to an economic
outcome not to dissimilar to what occurred during the last years of the Old
Order, with the addition of greater external indebtedness, as experienced
under comparable circumstances in Latin America, where such industrialisation
was carried out without the benefit of windfall foreign earnings.
The political effects of Malari, on the other hand, were very marked. Several
newspapers that had been critical of the regime for a long time were closed
down and through this, and the imprisonment and intimidation of a number
of intellectuals the regime introduced a far harsher political climate than had
prevailed for most of the New Order period. A little more will be said about
this later in this chapter.
The main significance of the windfall profits from the oil industry were to
enable the government to spend vastly increased amount of money without
having to tax the public to pay for it. It was pointed out by Mandavy, in the
context of the Persian Gulf states, already before the oil price rises of the
1970s, that oil producing countries could support large-scale public
expenditure programmes without taxation and without balance of payments
difficulties. Mandavy also pointed out that since oil revenues were rising
faster than the GNP of the oil producing countries, the public sector of these
countries was expanding rapidly. This, Mandavy, claimed, "need not result
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in some kind of socialism, but may turn into what can be considered a
fortuitous etatisme". [5]
This notion of fortuitous etatism rooted in the economic organisation of
society and in a windfall economic profit for the state, independent of society,
may be added to Anderson's state-qua-state thesis. With this addition the
thesis could offer a more powerful and a far more dynamic analysis of the
triumph of the state.
To illustrate the extent on the reliance on oil in the 1970s, it may be pointed
out that income tax in Indonesia amounted to something to the order of 2-5
per cent of the total amount raised by oil tax in the years 1974-1985. As will
be pointed out later, the fall in oil revenue in the late 1980's was
accompanied by a rapid rise in income tax revenue, transforming this ratio to
something like 40-50 per cent by 1988. Taken together, oil and development
aid accounted for 60-75 per cent of government revenue every year from
1974 to 1984. Since then it has fallen to a close to half of government
revenue with various political implications that are discussed in a following
chapter. [6]
Based on the windfall profits from oil, the Indonesian state could pursue a
policy from 1974 and well into the 1980s that put it in the enviable position
of providing expanding services and patronage without the need for taxing
society.
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The political implications of this are vast and probably grossly underestimated
in political literature on Indonesia. Much of political analysis of the country,
as pointed out in the first chapter has been implicitly or explicitly focused on
the question of government legitimacy. It is most often asserted that cultural
peculiarities and ideological articulation accounts for much of the assumed
legitimacy of the Indonesian regime. The fact that the government had
enormous resources at its disposal to buy loyalty and support without having
to place onerous burdens on business or any section of the community, is
often overlooked.
Paradoxically, the changes in oil prices served simultaneously to preserve the
fundamental structures of the Indonesian state for a long time, while at the
same time transforming the economy and eventually the class system in such
a way as to eventually alter the nature of the state. This paradox deserves
some attention.
As pointed out earlier, since independence, at least, the Indonesian state has
never been controlled by cohesive class forces. Jt is often asserted, and still
more often implicitly assumed, that the state in Indonesia has been
autonomous of class forces to the extent of leading a life of its own and
possessing its own will. This view is not only implicit in most culture based
paradigms but has also been explicitly elaborated in the "state-qua-state
theory", most convincingly articulated by Ben Anderson, as briefly discussed
earlier. [7] Ruth McVeys' observations on the "Beamtenstaat are also
noteworthy in this respect. [8] More recently, Jeffrey Winters has criticised
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Robison's society-based theorisation of the Indonesian state and has argued
for a state-centred approach instead. [Winters, 1988 The theoretical
difference in these approaches to the state and their various implications have
already been discussed in the first chapters and will not be repeated here.
There is, of course, a very good case for a state-centred approach to the
study of the Indonesian state. The state is strong and ubiquitous in
Indonesia, while no cohesive class forces can be seen to hold much sway
over it. It has already been shown in the first chapter and in subsequent
discussion that a class-based approach to the state, at least on its own and
in the most established tradition, is not likely to yield a very accurate picture
of the state.
The problem with most state-centred approaches is in the most general sense
the attribution of an autonomous will and general self-interests to the state as
an entity. In the first chapter it was shown that the state may in a sense
posers such a will and self-interest in two senses.
Firstly, at the individual level, each official of the state has a stake in its
preservation and expansion, particularly in a patrimonial state system where
offices are routinely treated as appanages and are appropriated by the
officers concerned for their own personal benefit or for the benefit of an
institution such as a political party or the military. Secondly, on a structural
level, the state as an entity, if it can be treated as such in the same way as
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a commercial enterprise, will tend to maintain itself as a going concern by
raising revenue and to expand in response to opportunities.
A paradox is often seen to exist between this tendency of the state to
maintain itself through taxation and the interests of the dominant class which
will in most cases be the class that is most able to pay taxes to the state,
and in some cases the only class with significant means to do so.
In Indonesia no such problem arose. As shown a little earlier, the state could
expand rapidly throughout the 1970s without resorting to taxation. This
problem, on the other hand, has arisen in the 1980s and will be discussed
in that context in a following chapter.
For viewing this crucial point, others related to it, and the various paradoxes
generated by the change of conditions, an elaboration of some theoretical
positions on the foundations developed in the earlier chapters is necessary
at this point.
First, a separation between the concept of regime and the concept of state
needs to be established. The theoretical basis for this was elaborated in
chapter 7. This point is routinely ignored in general literature on the state in
most countries, but is of importance in Indonesia, particularly with regard to
possible regime change in the near future.
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Much of the literature on the Indonesian state has, in fact, been writings on
the Indonesian regime and not the state. The same can be said of much
theorisation on the state elsewhere. 	 Most of the literature on the
"Bureaucratic Authoritarian State" is on regimes rather than on states, this
sometimes explicitly so, and sometimes not.
The confusion is understandable as the difference between a state and a
regime is not as obvious as it might seem. It is very difficult to establish a
cohesive general definition of either concept. Some of these difficulties are
discussed in chapter 1, 3 and 7.
In the most basic sense, as indicated in chapters 1 and 7, the concept of
state refers to the more or less permanent institutions of government as well
as to the power relations at the heart of the economic and political system.
It may be a characteristic of a state that certain classes dominate it. A
regime, on the other hand, might be characterised by a particular, and
changeable, configuration of such power arrangements.
To take a concrete example, one might argue that two of the most basic and
intimately related features of the state in the Philippines are the political and
economic domination of the landowning class, and the enclave export
production system based on landless peasantry. At the same time one might
argue that the post-Marcos regime in the Philippines has been a coalition of
divergent forces. One of these has sought to radically reform , these chief
features of the state, while others have sought to preserve the essence of the
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state through a diversification of the economy with essentially unaltered
relations of power. The former has lost out to the latter. As a consequence
it is possible to speak of a change in the Aquino regime over the past few
years. The main point is, however, that the Philippine state is essentially
unaltered and displays the same basic features as it did under the Marcos
regime. The change in the regime has made its composition and policy more
representative of the state. The daily realities of power and powerlessness
for the vast majority of people, and the position of the state as a framework
for these relations, remain unchanged by the comings and goings of
governments or even changes to the regime itself.
The problem of separating the state and the regime in Indonesia seems more
difficult than in a number of other countries. To take another example from
Asia, it seems evident that the state in India is shaped by a competitive
alliance between landlords, who form a large majority in Parliament, the
bureaucracy and politicians, who are in control of the vast state machinery,
and the oligopolistic bourgeoisie, which is of great importance to the state as
a class, but on individual level needs to buy favours from the bureaucrats and
the politicians, who in turn are in a complex relationship to the landlords who
control parliament and politics at local level. The regime of the Congress
Party can be viewed in this context. Changing alliances between these three
dominant forces will be reflected in regime composition and policy, but the
fundamentals of the state stay the same.
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In Indonesia there is no such diversity of powerful forces. Little political
power is derived from ownership of land or, at least until recently, from private
ownership of commercial enterprises. Power firmly rests within the state.
Hence, focus has been on the state itself and on the institutions within it,
particularly the bureaucracy and the military.
The representative institutions of the state, namely the parliamentary
assemblies, have often been bypassed in such analysis, and for a good
reason. The formal structures of the state, the supposedly sovereign body
of the MPR, and the Parliament, the DPR, as well as the supposedly
independent judiciary, have been notoriously lacking in substance and are of
very limited interest to long term political analysis, as opposed to a descriptive
account of political events.
Neither of the two most powerful institutions of the state in Indonesia, the
military and the bureaucracy, however, can be said to have directed state
policy in any meaningful sense. It has been shown that contrary to a
popular image, the military as an institution has not wielded much power in
Indonesia since the end of the 1960s. The bureaucracy has not directed
state policy either, and contrary to another popular image, it can be shown,
and will be discussed in the final chapter, that state policy has not greatly
profited the vast majority of Indonesian bureaucrats who live on very low
salaries and form no part of a lucrative patronage network. Even the
technocrats operating at cabinet level have been unable to force through
basic policy changes which they have been known to strongly advocate.
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Examples of this have been given and a more recent history in this respect
will be discussed later in this chapter and in the one that follows.
Power is therefor located neither in the formal structures of the state, except
for the President's office, nor in the two main pillars of the state, the military
and the bureaucracy. The state can not be spoken of as an entity
responsible for the general thrust of policies, nor as an instrument in the
hands of a social class in Indonesia.
In the simplest possible terms, the Indonesian state can be said to be the
complex of institutional arrangements for governing, including the coercive
forces of the judiciary and the military, and including the executive and the
administrative institutions, as well as the power relations generated by these
arrangements, and more fundamentally, the relations of power rooted in the
economic organisation of society, which form a framework of opportunities,
constraints and imperatives for government.
Viewed in this way, the state changed remarkably little from independence
until quite recently. The real break did not come with the political
transformation of the mid 1960s. The regime changed but the state did not
change in a fundamental way. The state has changed more notably in the
1980s than it did in the turbulent 1960s.
Although the economy was opened up in the mid to late 1960s for foreign
investment, this did not change the essential nature of the state. The state
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continued to be central to the accumulation process. Access to the state and
position within it continued to determine success and failure in economic
ventures to a greater degree than any other factor.
The state continued to be, what for a want of a better term might be called
a "gatekeeper", controlling and capriciously taxing both access to society in
the form of imports, investment and aid, and society's access to the outside
in the form of exports, particularly oil, which formed much of the state's
revenue. The state also continued to accord only limited freedom to society,
preserving its paramount political position through use of its vast funds, use
of its monopoly on force and through ideological articulation aimed at
legitimising this state of affairs.
The state, however, did not act as an entity in its own interests in all of this.
It was directed, controlled and used by Suharto's ruling group. The ruling
group acted from within the state structure and exploited the chief features
of the Indonesian state, its patrimonial, capricious, authoritarian character, and
its "gatekeeper" role, which accorded the ruling group vast funds and
patronage, which in turn formed the liquidity within the state and ensured the
perpetuation of its function and character.
In this sense the manifold increase in oil revenue in the mid 1970s served not
to transform the state, as often assumed and argued, but to perpetuate its
established functions and character. Increased liquidity kept it going and
enormously increased the scope for political patronage which served both to
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enrich the ruling group and to keep it in power. The chief interests of this
group were to maintain their control over a state that continued to be source
of private wealth for its rulers, and hence to perpetuate the patrimonial,
capricious and authoritarian character of the state.
Eventually these vast new sources of wealth served to change the state.
This, however, did not come about through a direct alteration of its functions
or character, but through development of the class system, a point certain to
be missed by a purely state centred approach, and a point of such
importance as to make this a fatal flaw in a purely state centred approach.
The development of new class forces at the heart of the state, first through
the huge inflow of money, and then, paradoxically, through the changes
demanded by the drying up of these easy sources, is finally changing the
nature of the state. This paradox will be elaborated in the following chapter.
The implications of this analytical approach are highly important. Through this
is it possible to trace and understand, not only the rise to power of the ruling
group, its corporate interests and its management of the state, as well as the
changing interests of the ruling group, its eventual demise as a group, and
the replacement, to a certain extent of these group interests with another set
of interest served by the regime, but also the. fact that all this occurred within
the framework of an essentially unchanged state, while finally leading to a
basic change in its structures.
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To elaborate a little further on this it may be revealing to draw on an analogy
with a hypothetical private company rather than with a state structure. Seen
in this way, the Indonesian state would parallel a company taken over by a
new institutionalised group of management (the military). The director in
effective control (Suharto) would have recruited his own managers (the ruling
group) and his advisers (the technocrats, the cabinet). Through control over
personnel, the management hierarchy, salaries and benefits the director and
his group would have incorporated individuals from the new institutionalised
management (the military) but at the same time rendered it powerless as a
cohesive institution. The company would have operated without the benefit
of a shareholders' meeting (the public) and without the daily pressure of a
dominant shareholding institution (the bourgeoisie). The constraints on the
director and his management group would, however, have been great. In
order to yield profits for his group and funds for securing continued control
through patronage of managers and personnel, and through attributing at
least minimal profits to the shareholders (the public and particularly potential
interests groups or classes) the company would have to expand and remain
profitable. To achieve this and to be able to raise funds (from aid, foreign
investment and foreign banks) a certain standard of management and
accountability would need to be sustained.
Similarly, the regime in Indonesia, operating within 	 structures of the state
needed to raise revenue and to attribute part of this to the public through
services, and in the form of patronage to a wide variety of potential
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ooponents, useful allies, staff and personnel, while it could also engage in
greatly enriching its own members.
It is instructive to look at a certain parallel in another Asian country with a
similarly undeveloped class structure, namely Bangladesh. The class structure
in Bangladesh is different from that of Indonesia with regard to the rural
areas. There, landowners are in firm control of local society through various
mechanisms that have to do with widespread landlessness among the
peasantry, the rural credit system, control over water inputs and the sale of
produce. The crucial difference with regard to other countries of the sub-
continent is that landlords, powerful on local level in spite of relatively small
holdings, do not have power at the political centre to anything like the same
extent as prevails in India and Pakistan.
The modern economy and state budget is dominated by foreign aid, to an
extent that parallels Indonesia's reliance on oil, gas and aid. Through this
and through control over import and export trade and nationalised industries
the state is as central in the modern economy as the state in Indonesia in the
1970s. Control over the state has passed between various groups that have
in some cases enjoyed remarkably limited power bases.
Once in power, however, such groups inherit the reins of the large patronage
system of the state. The group in power need not have any specific relation
to the class structure in the country, at lest not in the short term. This is
because the aid financed state enjoys the same autonomy from forces
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generated by the domestic economy as the oil and aid financed Indonesian
state, although, paradoxically it is at the centre of the modern economy. The
group in power, forming the regime, may or may not try to alter the structures
of the state, but it could quite conceivably simply act in a managing role of
the externally financed patronage system without enjoying any power base
outside whatever it could buy for itself within the state.
In practice, like in Indonesia at the onset of the New Order, those fortuitously
in control of strong army units at opportune moments have prevailed. Unlike
Indonesia in the 1970s, however, the patronage system in Bangladesh suffers
from perennial lack of finance. With windfall oil incorrie of the sort that
occurred in Indonesia, it is far from inconceivable that one or other of the
narrowly based Bangladeshi regimes might have enjoyed a longer life and an
opportunity to create elaborate ideological structures for acquiring and
maintaining legitimacy.
In contrast to this, the states and regimes of the Philippines, Pakistan and
India may be observed, and such a comparison has to an extent already
been made. In simplest terms, the difference in this respect is that in
societies with relatively well developed class forces, new regimes tend to
reflect either a finer tuning, or realignment of the configuration of power
among the dominant classes, usually reflecting some alteration in the overall
economic organisation of society.
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This class configuration, its basis in the economic organisation and the power
relations this generates, while not a part of the state in any formal or
institutional sense, shapes its nature to the extent that the state can not be
spoken of in any meaningful sense as an entity independent of these
structural factors.
Hence, the state can best be seen to consist of both the institutional
arrangements for governing and the underlying structural reality that forms a
framework of imperatives, power relations and possibiUties and constraints on
the institutional arrangement, or the reality behind it.
At the same time, as made clear in the first chapter, the state may enjoy
considerable autonomy from any one or all the dominant classes, at least in
the short run, while the imperatives of the overall structure will determine the
outcome, and often the course, of any conflict between the dominant classes
or between them and the state.
The change in economic policy in the mid 1970s can probably be far better
explained by looking at the imperatives of the state, in this wider sense, and
the interests of the ruling group, than through looking at the Malari incident
and its immediate protagonists as a creating a watershed in economic policy
and political power.
Before looking a little closer at these imperatives it may be instructive to look
briefly at the other big crisis of the mid 1970s, the Pertamina affair.
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Pertamina, and its forerunner Permina, played a crucial part in the
establishment of Suharto's ruling group from the start, and its director,
General Ibnu Sutowo has been seen by many as the only indispensable
person, apart from Suharto, to the formation of the ruling group and its
strategy. [9] It has been claimed, for instance, that Sutowo's finance through
Permina was crucial to Suharto's decision to move against Sukarno. [10]
The oil industry gradually came to be dominated by Permina, which previously
had not been the most important player. Sutowo was, in effect, given almost
total control over Indonesia's by far the most important irdustry and source
of finance. Early on, Sutowo clashed with the minister responsible for oil, and
later repeatedly with technocrats and the bureaucracy, but the President
ensured Sutowo's almost unlimited control over the industry. After Sutowo's
clashes with the minister for mining, Slamet Bratanata, Suharto removed
responsibility for the national oil company from the ministry to the President's
office.
Monetary and fiscal control by the technocrats was repeatedly thwarted by
Pertamina which had grown to such a size after the explosion in earnings
from oil that its independence made a mockery of any claim to a cohesive
economic policy in the hands of technocrats. This had become so
pronounced even before the increase in oil prices that the IMF, the IGGI (the
inter-governmental group of aid donors to Indonesia), the World Bank and the
US government all attempted to pressure the Indonesian government into
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bringing Pertamina under government control. The US temporarily suspended
aid to Indonesia over this issue. [11]
The corruption at Pertamina and the way the ruling group blatantly used the
company as a source of patronage and private wealth generation was hard'y
a secret at the time. Newspapers made serious allegations about irregularities
at the same time as they were publishing stories of corruption around
Suharto's wife and around several key members of the ruling group. Suharto
was forced to appoint a committee to inquire into the affairs of Pertamina at
a similar time as he was forced to appoint a commission to look in a more
general way at corruption in government. Like the commision on corruption
in government, referred to earlier, the Pertamina inquiry came up with stinging
criticism of corruption, illegalities, irregularities of various sorts and the
absence of auditing and comprehensive accounting procedures. Again, like
the criticism and recommendations from the investigation into corruption in the
government, the results of the Pertamina inquiry were suppressed and not
acted on.
Soon the increase in oil prices gave Pertamina such a staggering income, in
the context of Indonesia, that the scope for regime patronage to large
constituencies in society was vastly widened. The price of Indonesian oil
went from US $ 1.70 per barrel in 1970 to US $ 12.60 in 1974. Foreign
earnings from oil increased from less than US $ 1 billion to well over US $ 5
billion from 1972 to 1974. At the same time, foreign investment in the oil
industry increased also fivefold to a figure of US $ 1 billion a year in the mid
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1970s. Most of these funds flowed through Pertamina's notoriously leaky
financial pipelines. The funds were spent on an array of activities, from the
building of mosques, schools, hospitals and football stadia, to the topping
up of salaries to various key bureaucrats and military officers. Pertamina also
invested in various companies, such as shipping companies, hotels and
airlines, and more importantly, poured funds into industrial investment,
particularly the Krakatau steel works. Krakataua was probably the largest
single undertaking, apart from an ill fated venture into the oil tanker business
just before its spectacular collapse. It was later shown that Krakatau was
costing three times as much to build as a similar venture in Taiwan, probably
reflecting the way such ventures were used for patrdnage and private
enrichment at least as much as bad management or intrinsically higher
building costs in Indonesia.
In spite of the windfall profits and manyfold increase in income Pertamina
found itself unable to meet its obligations in 1975 and defaulted on short term
loans from American banks. The results of the enquiry that followed not only
surprised the general public, but probably also Suharto himself. The
company was found to have liabilities of US $ 10 billion, an amount larger
than the entire foreign debt of the Indonesian government. The inquiry also
revealed a series of illegalities and irregularities as well a limited indication of
the vast corruption prevailing in the company during Sutowo's reign. Sutowo,
however, was dismissed "with honour", as he turned his attention to a number
of companies he had privately acquired during his time as head of Pertamina.
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The way Pertamina was run illustrates how and to what extent the ruling
group operated outside the formal structures of the state. It has been
pointed out before, how a large part of the state budget came under
discretionary spending of the President's office. The amounts involved with
Pertamina during its heyday were even larger. Taken together, this private
financial control of the President and one key member of his ruling group, put
a very large part of public spending and Indonesia's foreign earnings outside
both bureaucratic and institutionalised political control. In this way, a vast
slice, and in many ways the most important part, of the modern economy of
Indonesia was in a very real sense handled by the rung group without
bureaucratic or political accountability, which placed this vast operations
outside the formal perimeters of the state.
It is instructive to note that Sutowo claimed in newspaper interviews at the
time to be engaged in deliberately creating an indigenous business class.
Some of the excesses, to the extent they were semi-publicly acknowledged,
were excused by the necessity of cutting corners in the all important venture
of creating a pribumi entrepreneurial class. It is not clear to what extent other
members of the ruling group shared Sutowo's vision in this respect. Most of
them were deeply involved with Chinese businessmen in their own business
dealings. Apart from involving family and friends, few of the business
generals could be seen to be directly engaged in such a venture, although
this formed a part of the various plans for an integrated national economy
discussed at the time by among others, Lt. Gen. Murtopo and Lt. Gen
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Humardhani. Much of such discussion, however, was in the forum these two
generals shared with mainly Chinese intellectuals, and where the creation of
a "national" economy, meaning the inclusion of Chinese owned conglomerates
in places of prominence, took very clear precedence over the Pribumi
question.
Indirectly, however, a large number of people were very significantly enriched
by the patronage dispensed by the ruling group. Exact numbers are, of
course, impossible to arrive at. A very large number of people benefitted to
some small extent, or indirectly from the various types of patronage extended
for political purposes from a small top to the broad bottom of a pyramid,
although such numbers will look small in the context of the population of
Indonesia. More significantly for the development of the state and the
dominant classes, a few thousand people, military men, bureaucrats and
individuals of various other background were very greatly enriched by the
patronage dispensed by the ruling group.
These people certainly formed a group of beneficiaries and a potential
nucleus for a new class. It is, however, a matter of debate, which will be
entered into in the following chapter, whether this group can in any
meaningful sense be spoken of as an indigenous bourgeoisie, or as an
independent class, or even as a group of any description that would profit
analysis of Indonesian politics.
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TRANSFORMATION OF STATE, CLASS AND REGIME - THE 1980s
Three events are most often seen as watersheds in the development of the
Indonesian state, namely independence, Guided Democracy with
nationalisation of foreign enterprises and thirdly, the creation of the New
Order. It will be argued here, on the basis of the preceding discussion, that
these events, important as they were, did not, in themselves, form watersheds
in the development of the Indonesian state.
It has been argued, directly and more often implicitly in this thesis, that
independence did not transform the structures of state, class and regime in
Indonesia. Without repeating earlier discussion here it may be pointed out
that this was mainly because there was no class that could, in a sustainable
way, capitalise on independence. Due to the colonial economic organisation
and the nature of the priyayi class, as well as political and religious realities
at independence, those who came to dominate the state lacked roots in the
economic organisation of society and failed to gain such roots in spite of
some effort to use the state for these purposes. The most important change
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was probably not brought about by independence as such, but by the way
fighting for independence was organised. This produced a new political force,
the Indonesian which army came into being as a force enjoying much
autonomy from the political leadership of the state.
The second watershed event, the onset of Guided Democracy and the
subsequent nationalisation of foreign enterprises gave the military a strong
economic basis. As much as this was to change political structures, this did
not transform the economy. Profits were no longer repatriated, but neither
were they re-invested in a productive way. Profits were skimmed of for
institutional and private consumption of the military and its ersonnel. Instead
of the development of an indigenously controlled economy came economic
collapse. The immediate effect of Guided Democracy, the centralisation of
power in the hands of Sukarno, proved to be of a temporary importance as
Sukarno failed to create a viable economy, a vital requirement for sustaining
his attempts at changing the structures of the state.
The third watershed event was the creation of the New Order regime. Initially
this was to a great extent simply backtracking by re-opening the economy to
foreign capital. Political changes in the country and economic changes
outside, however, made the impact of foreign capital very different from what
occurred in colonial and immediately post-independence time, It has been
argued above that in spite of this, the Indonesian state was not transformed
by these changes. Its long term structures were not immediately altered in
any major way, although it would be equally misleading, as argued earlier, to
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see the events of the mid 1960s in terms of a triumph of the "old state" over
society.
The regime that came to power was different, however, and seeds were sown
for a very different class configuration from earlier times. The difference that
mattered was not the regime's outlook on politics or its military connection,
although this latter factor kept it in power. What produced changes of lasting
importance was the connection the new regime had to the economy. The
ruling group that came to power was not simply a group of military politicians
dealing in favours for support, but a group of military business men. Many
of these, however, failed to capitalise greatly on their position through creating
sustainable enterprises, but some did, most notably Suharto. The key to the
early success was in the way foreign capital was in effect taxed by
requirements for domestic partners and political favours, a system not
obtaining in colonial times.
Many analysts have looked to the Malari riots of 1974 as the fourth
watershed. Economic policy did indeed change at that time in ways highly
significant for class formation. As pointed out earlier, however, these changes
were not brought about by the Malari incident, but by a transformation of
state finances in the wake of a manifold increase in oil income. The increase
in oil prices also provided liquidity for the political system, vastly reinforcing
the effect of the regime on class development.
The Indonesian economy, however, was still chiefly an extraction economy for
much of the New Order period, with oil and gas largely replacing the
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plantation economy of colonial times. When oil came to be supplemented,
this was by forestry industries that share many economic and political
characteristics with plantation and mineral extraction. The state continued to
be a rentier state, a toll gate state, generating profits for favoured groups
and individuals capitalising on political position.
This changed, slowly at first, accelerated by the oil boom in the mid 1970s,
but not strongly, and not with political consequences until in the 1980s. By
the early 1980s a transformation of some of the main structures of the
Indonesian state was finally under way. At the same time, the regime was
also being transformed. These processes, though interconnected, were not
the same. To analyze as an entity what has been termed "The New Order
State", which usually incorporates, explicitly or implicitly, cultural structures,
administrative arrangements, the institutions of the military, the bureaucracy,
the Presidency, and the chief brokers of power of the day, is likely to cloud
the different dynamics and different imperatives causing, and resulting from,
these changes.
The second oil boom, 1979-1980, increased government revenue from oil
almost fourfold, in rupiah terms, in three years. [1] Overall foreign earnings
from oil and gas leapt by almost 160 per cent in dollar terms between
1978/1979 and 1981/1982, from US $ bn. 7.4 to US $ bn. 19.0 [Robison,
1986:376]
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Oil revenue, as a share of government income, rose from 54 per cent in 1978
to 71 per cent in 1981. That year the combined state revenue from all
income tax and all taxes on domestic consumption amounted to one eight
of the oil tax, giving the regime virtual financial autonomy from society. [2]
This independence from raising revenue from society gave the regime a
continued and rapidly growing scope for its rapacious self-enrichment and
capricious ways of governing, characterised by the emergence of the
Presidential family as by far the most important private Pribumi element in the
economy.
The capriciousness of the vast patronage system and the personalised rule,
came under serious criticism from several of the most respected military
figures in the country, and as mentioned in the preceding chapter, from
various other quarters. In spite of this, and far more importantly for longer
term structures of politics, the rapacity of the President and his closest
allies, came to be, along with the longer term diminishing of military politico-
economic power, responsible for a growing fracture between the regime and
the military in the late 1980s.
While the powers of the President were growing, if anything, the importance
of the ruling group steadily diminished during the 1980s. Some of its
members had already fallen by the wayside in the 1970s. Lt. General
Alamsjah, one of the key fixers in the early years, and one of the people most
persistently accused of illegalities and corruption had seen his powers decline
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early on. He was sent abroad as an ambassador in the early 1970s, and
although he returned to the cabinet in 1978 to serve for another ten years in
the somewhat unlikely capacities as minister for religion and minister for
people's welfare, he was not a key player in the politics of the 1980s. Lt.
General Suryo, one of Suharto's closest financial collaborators, likewise, saw
his powers wane in the early years, although he continued to manage state
assets as well as his own fortune.
More importantly, the chief financier of the New Order regime, and for some
years probably its second most powerful member, Lt. General lbnu Sutowo
had left in some ignominy in the mid 1970s, although continuing to operate
as one of the richest pribumi businessman in the country. Two generals who
had played important part in the financial operations of the group and its
members, but who were politically probably more on the sidelines, Brig.
General Sjarnobi Said and Lt. General Achmad Tirtosudiro, also retreated from
the centre stage in the 1970s. Said had been a particularly close collaborator
of lbnu Sutowo and shared his downfall at Pertamina. Said continued to
manage his own extensive business interests, some of which he owned jointly
with Sutowo. As the owner of Krama Yudah, one of the companies
dominating the Indonesian car market, he has continued to be among the
most important pribumi businessmen in the country. Tirtosudiro, an ASPRI
member, who managed Bulog in the early years was thought to be
particularly close to the President and to Lt. Gen. Suryo, was sent abroad as
an ambassador in 1973 and although he returned to active service in
Indonesia in the late 1970s, he no longer played a key role in the regime.
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In the mid 1980s, two of Suharto's closest colleagues, Lt. Gen. Sudjono
Humardhani and Lt. Gen. Ali Murtopo died, further decimating the already
reduced group. Humardhani, Suharto's most long standing military business
partner, and allegedly a spiritual adviser, is often credited with facilitating the
pattern of business alliances between Japanese capital and Indonesian
Chinese capital with well connected pribumis as junior partners fixing licenses
and credit and reaping profits out of all proportions to their equity
contribution. In pioneering the way for tri-latteral alliances of this sort,
Humardhani may have been instrumental in creating a pattern of accumulation
that proved very important for the emerging business comrhunity in Indonesia.
Probably no less important in this respect, and far more important in the
overall development of the regime was Au Murtopo, who had fallen out of
favour with the President shortly before his death. Murtopo played a crucial
part in establishing the regime and maintaining it in power through various
shady intelligence operations. Murtopo had also been highly important in
giving framework to the collaboration of foreign and Chinese capital with
pribumi military participation. Murtopo had established networks of Chinese
intellectuals and businessmen that were important, both in the accumulation
process, and in giving intellectual direction and legitimation to the regime.
As the ruling group was not a formal entity, its membership is open to
debate. Who exactly, and at what time, could be counted as a member of
this group is a matter of conjecture, as the very existence of the group itself
is a matter of analytical deduction from fragmented information. The question
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of the existence of the group has been discussed before and so has its
original membership, and this will not be repeated here.
What is important at this point, however, is that certain developments in the
late 1970s and early 1980s, as well as the wastage of the group itself, had
made it increasingly uncertain, by the early 1980s, wether it is profitable at all
to speak of a ruling group as a separate entity. That power continued to be
exercised chiefly by individuals who owed their power to their relationship to
the President and other individuals close to him, is, however, beyond doubt.
With only four or five people remaining at this very centre of power in the mid
1980s, though, and the President being in a position to splay each of them
against the others, and seek advice and help outside the group at his own
discretion, the concept of a ruling group may not retain much meaning. This
question will be returned to later along with the implications of how this is
perceived.
If a ruling group could be spoken of in the mid 19805, however, its
membership, at least as old-timers are concerned, would have been fairly
clear. What is less clear is what power the group, as a group rather than as
a collection of the President's men, wielded over the regime. The group, or
its remnants, would, by the mid 1980s, have consisted of the following six
people.
The intelligence chief, General Yoga Sugama, who, in an unusual exception
from military convention, had been chief of Bakin, the intelligence body, with
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one relatively brief interruption, since the early days of the New Order.
Sugama, while living comfortably, is the only past or present member of the
group that has not engaged significantly in private business dealings, although
his family has business interests with Japanese capital. His son, Bambang
Yogasugama, emerged in the late 1980s as one of the leading lights of
HIPMI, the young businessmens' association, and became its chairman in
1990. His companies are listed as no. 198 on the Warta Ekonomi list of the
200 largest Indonesian companies in 1991.
Admiral Sudomo, a long time trusted friend of the President, who had taken
over the daily running of Kopkamtib after Malari and enjoed vast powers in
the late 1970s and early 1980s. Sudomo left Kopkamtib in 1983 and entered
the cabinet as a minister for labour, before being elevated again in 1988 to
co-ordinate security and political affairs. His powers were thought to have
been much reduced after 1983 and he had been expected to start focusing
exclusively on his extensive personal business interests, before his re-elevation
in 1988. By 1990, however, most observers saw Sudomo as only a marginal
player in high politics, in spite of his continually high profile.
Lt. Gen. Bustanil Arifin, a business entrepreneur throughout his military career
with a significant family connection to the President. ArIfin, who had been
associated with various highly questionable business dealings before Suharto's
assumption to power was along with Sutowo a chief financier of the regime
through his position as the head of Bulog, one of the largest and leakiest of
all government enterprises. Spectacular scandals at Bulog notwithstanding,
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Arifin continued to enjoy close relations to the President while his political
importance was probably declining in the 1980s. Recently, Arifin may have
been severely damaged by the extremely expensive Bank Duta scandal that
broke in 1990, and cost two Suharto controlled 'yayasans' US $ 400 million
or more, although this loss was apparently covered by two Chinese
conglomerates, the Salim and the Prajogo companies. Arifin was forced to
step down as the chairman of the board of this bank. Arifin was probably
further damaged by another banking scandal that was breaking as this thesis
was being completed. This involved the cooperative bank, Bukopin, which
Arifin presided over as the head of its advisory board. The bank has been
losing large amounts of money in spite of a 350 billion 'rupiah ( US $ 180
million) deposit from Bufog, held at the bank at an interest rate of 6 per cent,
while prevailing market rate is close to 25 per cent. This deposit alone is said
to have given Bukopin a profit of around US $ 16 million, which was not
sufficient to cover its losses. The Indonesian Press and the FEER expected
Liem Sioe Liong to come to the banks rescue because of his profitable
Bogsari flour mill link to Bulog and Bustanil. [e.g. Tempo and FEER, Feb-
March, 19911
Lt. Gen. Sudharmono, not originally a "business general", had been moved
in from the sidelines early on .to manage the State Secretariat, a position often
likened to that of a Prime Minister. Sudharmono was the prime co-ordinator
of the patronage system through the budgetary allocations of the President's
office, through his control over all government tenders, a much used way of
placing business and commissions with favoured parties, and through his
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chairmanship of Golkar. By the mid 1980s, Sudharmono was frequently
spoken of as the second most powerful man in the country. His business
interests, and those of his family were also rumoured to have widened
significantly by that time. The strong military opposition to Sudharmono,
however, has weakened him politically and made him entirely dependent on
the President.
The fifth member, General Benny Murdani, the commander of ABRI, had
gradually entered the innermost circle, from a background in intelligence,
culminating in his appointment as Panglima ABRI in 1983. Murdani was a
protege of Murtopo and Suharto and quickly assumed powers only rivalled
by Sudharmono and Suharto himself. The three increasingly formed a troika,
with Suharto in a paramount position and the other two in a mutually
competitive positions, with Sudharmono managing the bureaucracy and
Murdani the military and security. Their spheres of influence overlapped in
Golkar, which became something of a battleground between them in the late
1980s. There Sudharmono increasingly held the sway, at least until 1988
when the military reasserted itself within Golkar by greatly increasing its
representation from the regions and by forming a more cohesive block in the
DPR/MPR. Many observers were to describe the politics of the mid to late
1980s in the terms of this competitive alliance.
Finally, there was the President, Suharto, who enjoyed seemingly unrivalled
powers for a few years in the early and mid 1980s, after a long series of
showdowns and difficulties, from the Malari in 1974, the Saiwito affair in 1976,
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the lack of unanimity in the run up to his re-election in 1978, and the stinging
criticism of several of the most respected military leaders of the country in the
late 1970s and the early 1980s. At the same time Suharto's family increased
its wealth spectacularly, not the least through highly unpopular and blatantly
corrupt import monopolies. Suharto's family business is discussed further in
the following chapter.
The extensive discussion in earlier chapters on the usefulness of looking at
the Indonesian regime in the late 1960s and for most of the 1970s as lead by
a ruling group will not be repeated here. By the early 1980s, the usefulness
of this concept is no longer evident. Suharto's positiorv had become even
stronger than before and the people closest to power at that time are better
understood as aids than as members of a ruling circle. This is best seen in
the way that the powerful men of the 1960s and 1970s fell by the wayside,
or in other cases, stayed in power clearly at the discretion of the President.
To understand the constraints on the President and the direction of state
policy from the late 1970s onwards, it is far more profitable to focus on
emerging class forces at the top of society, created by the processes
described in previous chapters. This is subject will be discussed in greatest
detail in the following chapter. The theoretical positions underpinning this
have already been extensively discussed in several earlier chapters and will
not be repeated here.
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Although larger groups and forces were taking over as the chief constraints
on executive power and as generators of economic and political dynamics,
it is useful, before discussing these emerging forces, to look very briefly at the
position of individuals and groups that have been mentioned before as
possessing power and influence. In addition to the people termed as the
ruling group, there were a few individuals in government that clearly had
much influence, while probably not having the same access to the overall
policy-making, particularly with regard to security, as the members of the old
ruling group. These people included the minister for information, Harmoko,
a civilian, who in a typical overlap of interests, managed his own private
newspapers while having ministerial responsibility for such things as
censorship and licenses to the press. Another was Brig. Gen. Murdiono, who
succeeded Sudharmono at the State Secretariat in 1988 and had for some
years been close to the President and involved in politics at the highest level.
Yet another was Lt. Gen. Soepardjo Roestam, who after spending the early
1970s as an ambassador and the late 1970s as the Governor of Central Java,
emerged as a key cabinet minister during the 1980s. Lastly, among military
figures in the government machinery were General Rudini, who emerged as
a powerful interior minister in 1988, most often seen as an ally of Murdani
and with strong links to the officer corps, and Air Vice-Marshall Ginanjar
Kartasasmita, an ally of Sudharmono, an enthusiast for national industrial
strategy, linked to high finance through his brother, a businessman involved
in a US $ 2 billion bid for a petrochemical project. Among serving military
officers, the Panglima ABRI, General Try Sutrisno, a former aid de camp of
Suharto, and General Eddy Sudrajat, connected to Murdani and Rudini, were
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clearly the most powerful. Sudrajat, who was seen as somewhat independent
of the President was made ineffective by illness in 1990. The politically vital
Kostrad command was in the hands of the President's brother in law, Maj.
Gen. Wismoyo, while the President's son in law, Lt. Gen. Prabowo
(Djodjohadikusumo), was moving up military ranks with some speed.
Among the technocrats, drs. Radius Prawiro, was thought to be very close
to the President, not the least because of a family connection. His two sons
have become business partners to Hutomo, Suharto's youngest son. Dr. AU
Wardhana was until 1988 undoubtedly highly influential in economic policy
making. Dr. Johannes Sumarlin and dr. Wijoyo Nitisastro continued to have
influence in their various capacities, and dr. Adriartus Moy became
increasingly influential in economic affairs during the 1980s. While the
technocrats held most of the high positions in economic management, such
as the chairmanship of the planning agency, Bappenas, the ministry of
finance, the co-ordinating ministry for the economy, the ministry of trade and
the governorship of the Central Bank, and as such managed day to day
economic policy of the country, there is much evidence to suggest that they
had very much less than a free hand in making economic policy. it is useful
at this juncture to examine their role.
The political and economic development of Indonesia during the New Order
era has frequently been portrayed in terms of growing technocracy. This
has most often been alleged in a very general sense rather than in the
technically more correct sense of the term. Government policy, particularly
in the economic sphere, is then seen to be increasingly shaped by people
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guided by their knowledge and expertise, rather than self interests or political
ideology. Much commentary on Indonesian economic policy and
development has been implicity or explicitly structured around the opposites
of, on the one hand vested interests, not the least those thriving on
corruption, ideologies and pre-modern ways of thinking, and on the other
hand, rationality as expressed by policy making guided by technical
competence.
The transition from the Old Order, characterised by irrational populist
economic policy, which lead to rapid inflation, external insolvency and
economic decline, and to the New Order, characterised as it was by
an economic programme designed by western trained economists and
meeting with the general approval of the international banks and monetary
agencies, was in this way portrayed in terms of modernisation and apolitical
technocracy.
The fundamental change in economic policy in the 1980s, to be discussed
below, has in a similar fashion, been seen as the triumph of technocratic
reason ', and often, although more often implicitly than explicitly it has been
seen to result from the combined advice of the government's small band of
influential technocrats, and their colleagues in the main centres of international
financial decision making.
The question of why the regime followed the economic policy it did follow in
the 1970s, and why it changed its economic policy in the 1980s is central to
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the whole thrust of arguments in this thesis. It is worth looking briefly at the
political position of the technocrats in this particular context.
The group of economists, sometimes collectively called the "Berkeley Mafia",
and more often simply "the technocrats", was drafted into government service
at the onset of the New Order. [3] At a similar time, such teams of
economists were hired by military governments in Latin America, such as the
one in Brazil in the mid 1960s, and a little later by the Pinochet government
in Chile, which recruited a group of economists many of whose members had
trained at the University of Chicago. This nucleus of influential economists
attracted attention in political analysis of Latin America, no less than in
Indonesia, and different views of their function formed parts of various
theoretical constructs. The BA theories discussed in an earlier chapter gave
much attention to this phenomenon, and so did in a different way some of
the constructs of the dependency theories. None of the earlier discussion on
the BA theories or on technocrats in that context will be repeated here.
In radical scholarship on Indonesia, particularly early on, and especially in
scholarship influenced by the dependency paradigm, the assertion was made
that the group of technocrats was dominated by American ideology,
deliberately inculcated by American universities and paid for by American
capitalist foundations. [4]
The assertion is probably true to the extent that American foundations were
interested in seeing their own ideological principles prevail abroad, and they
certainly provided scholarships for some of the more influential economists,
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and their proteges at American universities. Three of the original group, dr.
Wijojo Nitisastro, the dean of the group, dr. AU Wardhana, probably primus
inter pares in the group in the mid 1980s, and dr. Emil Salim were educated
at Berkeley, hence the name given to the group, and so were a few of their
assistants over the years that followed. Three others had studied in America,
dr. Subroto, the oil and energy minister, dr. J.B Sumarlin, the finance and
economic affairs minister and dr. Mohammad Sadli, of the investment board
and mining ministry, who completed his studies in Indonesia. Two others
were trained in Holland, drs. Radius Prawiro, finance minister and drs. Frans
Seda. The simple assertion of the dependency school, however, is
misleading on at least two important counts.
To start with, the Indonesian economists that rose to prominence with the
New Order did not, ideologically, distinguish themselves from any group of
mainstream economists to be found the world over. They believed that an
overall increase in GNP would eventually eliminate poverty, and that such an
increase was made possible by a set of policy principles, supposedly more
characterised by their rationality than by any particular view of society. If
there was an American conspiracy in this instance, it must either have been
successful on a global scale, or, more likely, that it simply ran parallel to a
very powerful trend within the subject. None of this, it should be noted,
means that the position taken by the economists was intrinsically apolitical.
The mainstream views held by these economists were relatively new to
Indonesia, at least as a government policy, and represented a view
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incompatible with the politics of the past. This made their views conspicuous
and more clearly political in Indonesia than would have been the case in
many other countries. Any other basic view than that taken by these
economists, would, in the international context, on the other hand, have been
more exceptional than the common economic and political premises they
shared.
Another point, and more important in this respect, is the fact that government
policy in Indonesia for most of the 1970s and for the first half of the 1980s,
was not a policy of openness to foreign capital, or to foreign imports, nor was
it a policy very conducive to free enterprise at home. lt did not serve well
any of the interests a western free market policy is supposed to serve. This
point, frequently overlooked, has importance beyond the present discussion
and will be returned to later.
In the context of the discussion on the technocrats it should be noted that
they are thought to have argued consistently for policy changes in this
respect. The fact that economic policy moved away from such principles
from the early 1970s, and particularly after Malari in 1974, and until the price
of oil fell in the early 1980s, goes some way to define the political importance
of the technocrats. Their independence from the President is also in much
doubt. The technocrats are not staff members at an autonomous institution,
such as the Bundesbank in Germany, or of a civil service with a tradition of
a distance from political power such as the . northern European bureaucracies.
Instead the technocrats serve at the discretion of the President, although
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within the parameters of their brief they may enjoy professional autonomy.
Two of the most important of the technocrats, drs. Radius Prawiro, who was
probably their primus inter pares by the late 1980s, and dr. Sumitro
Djodjohadikusumo, the founding father of economic studies in Indonesia, are
related to the Suharto family by marriage. The latter is businessman of
considerable substance, one of the ten or so largest pribumi businessmen in
the country according to Warta Ekonomi, while the former's family is engaged
in business with Suharto's youngest son.
There is also much anecdotal evidence to show that the interests of the ruling
group prevailed over policy arguments from the technocrats. In one of the
better known examples of this from the early days of the New Order, Lt. Gen.
Humardhani clashed with the minister of trade, dr. Sumitro Djodjohadikusumo,
who, although highly influential at times, had a position somewhat different
from that of the other economists, and is often seen as separate from them.
Sumitro, who was particularly influential at this time, and seen by many
outside observers as providing a crucial credibility to the government among
foreign bankers, wasforced to step down as minister of trade, in spite of the
damage this did to the government's standing with its foreign lenders. The
disagreement was over the question of Japanese investment, which
Hurnardhani effectively represented. The issue was important for Humardhani
as well as for Murtopo, Suharto and others, as Japanese investment was
essential to a particularly lucrative opportunities for cashing in on political
connections, as pointed out earlier. Other examples of the ruling group
resisting technocratic pressures for rationalisation include various clashes over
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Pertamina, and more recently, the import monopolies connected to the
Suharto family and other powerful parties, to be briefly discussed below.
In the early years of the New Order the influence of the technocrats seemed
even greater than it has been portrayed to be at most later times. The
explanation for this is probably quite simple. There were, quite simply, no
other options in 1966-1968 for bringing inflation under control and revitalising
economic production than the route taken, the opening up of the economy
to inflow of foreign funds. Such an opening would have counted for little, if
the economy had not been managed in such a way as to build confidence
among those foreign parties that could help with funds and'investment. Given
these considerations, and the very tight restrictions presented by them and
by the desperate state of the economy, the route taken requires no political
explanation. [5]
Over the years since the initial success in bringing inflation under control and
restoring production and external trading, the government's policy has in
important ways been at variance with what western economic thinking and
western economic interests would favour. Large parts of the economy have
continued to be operated by the state, and although great changes have
taken place in the economy with regard to the relative importance of various
sectors, the overall picture of state control over key industries and over the
financial sector has remained. The oil and gas industry has remained public,
so have utilities, large parts of the transport system, important parts of the
plantation sectors, various industrial sectors, rice marketing and until recently,
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almost the entire banking sector. Apart from this, private investment has
been subject to various controls and licences and various sectors of the
private economy are either run as monopolies or restricted by marketing or
trading arrangements imposed by the government.
This picture of state controlled economy, which lead one economist in the late
1970s' to conclude that the economy was more effectively state controlled
under the New Order than it ever was under Sukarno's Guided Economy, is
clearly at variance with what could have been expected if western trained
technocrats had been influential in forming government policy, let alone with
the notion of powerful technocrats as agents of foreigrt capital. [6] The
economic policy, on the other hand, is much in line with what to expect if
viewed from the vantage points developed in the preceding chapters.
State intervention in the economy and state management of large enterprises
was indispensable from this viewpoint. The patronage system was based on
direct control over economic resources through the state and a system of
government licences, concessions, monopolies. By far the most important
asset in this system was political clout and connections, not a capital base
or management expertise. If the economy had been run along the general
lines of a rational, predictable and open management of a fairly open and free
economy, as suggested by the mainstream economic training of the
technocrats, and by the advice of the agencies of the international financial
system, few of the pribumi fortunes made in the 1970s and early 1980s
would have been made at all, and the Chinese conglomerates would without
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doubt have taken a very different shape. To heed the advice of the
technocrats and their international colleagues would have been something of
a suicide for the ruling group, and their military and Chinese associates. The
economic landscape of the country, as far as the structure of ownership is
concerned would have been quite different with corresponding political
implications.
The role of the technocrats was to manage as efficiently as possible a system
constituted by the interests of those in power. The system was managed by
expertise, but lead by the interests of the ruling group. The emergence of
the technocrats in this capacity was therefor far less remarkable than it has
often been made out to be. Provision of such technical advice to the military
was also less new than is often assumed.
The economic faculty of the University of Indonesia had been supplying
advice and expertise to the military for several years prior to the emergence
of a formal team of advisers in 1966, which was later followed by the
elevation of much of the main advisory team to the cabinet. After the
nationalisation of the Dutch enterprises in the late 1950s, the army instituted
a teaching programme in economics, taught by economists from UI, at the
staff college in Bandung. This was at the time of Suharto's presence there.
Over the years, according to a present member of the faculty, advice was
sought by the military and by leading figures in army finance. Once these
leading figures of army finance were in government and running various parts
of the vast ensemble of state concern, advice was sought on a more formal
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and regular basis. [7] The difference between this technical advice on the
one hand, and participation in basic policy making affecting the foundations
of the system, on the other, is, of course, fundamental.
Economic policy, however, came to be changed. This was not because the
technocrats had finally, after twenty years of talking, won the argument, but
because of the fundamental changes to the ownership structure in the
economy, to be discussed in the following chapter, and more immediately,
because the most important source of liquidity in the system, oil, had sharply
fallen in price.
The changes were represented by the buzzword "de-regulation", reflecting
both the essence of the initiatives and their international character, as de-
regulation was a global concept at the time, heralding a reduction in the
regulatory role of the state the world over. The fact that this was a global
phenomenon should, however, not be pushed to far with regard to Indonesia.
The economic and political changes calling for de-regulation in North-America,
Britain and much of Europe were not necessarily the same, or were at least
not present in the same proportions as what obtained in Indonesia. The de-
regulation of the economies of the West may, however, have made such
changes more necessary in Indonesia and in other countries with comparable
niches in the world economy, but these were neither the direct cause, nor the
only dynamics of these changes in Indonesia. This can for instance be seen
from the vast differences between Asian countries in adopting de-regulatory
measures over the past five or ten years.
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The global thrust towards less regulations was, in other words, undoubtedly
of some influence, particularly by affecting the competitive position of
Indonesian firms and of Indonesia as a home to foreign investment, and
possibly more indirectly by strengthening the hand of the owners of
Indonesia's rapidly growing foreign debt, who dispensed such advice. The
causes, the constraints and the dynamics of the process were very much
shaped by domestic realities and considerations, and by the externally
determined fall in oil revenue.
Early in the 1980s, if not well before that time, something of a general
consensus existed among observers of Indonesia on the need for abolishing
certain monopolies in the economy, simplifying investment, particularly foreign
investment and for reducing licensing and red tape in general. This, however,
would clearly have cut accross the interests of large and small rent-seekers
in the bureaucracy, military and political circles. An overhaul of this system
clearly meant a challenge to the whole rentier system, one of the main
structures of the Indonesian state, and the main pillar under the regime.
Economic logic very strongly dictated a sharp break with the capricious and
cumbersome system which clearly acted to delay investment, make it more
costly, and to increase the prize of raw material and machinery imported, and
hence to increase the cost of domestic production. In spite of the obvious
benefits, the progress towards de-regulation was very slow, reflecting the vital
interests at stake.
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The collapse in oil revenues in the early 1980s forced the governments hand
in this respect. After climbing rapidly between 1978/79 and 1981/82, from
US $ 7.4 bn. to US $ 19.0 bn., oil revenue fell sharply in the following years,
and were eventually halved. As a percentage of government revenue, taxes
on oil and gas rose up to a high of 70 per cent in the financial year 1981/82.
As a proportion of total exports, oil and gas accounted for almost 82 per
cent that year. This had fallen to 75 per cent in 1984 and to less than 50 per
cent in 1988, representing both a large fall in oil earnings and a remarkable
growth in non-oil exports. A proportionally smaller, but very substantial fall
in tax revenue from oil transformed government finance in the same period,
and lead to both increased external borrowing, increased aid receipts from
Western governments and Japan, and to an increase in taxation. Although
this increase was small in real terms, it was proportionally very high, as it
started from a low base. In 1989, only 780.000 individuals, 0.4 per cent of
the population, paid income tax, and most businesses successfully avoided
heavy tax bills. [8] The increase in 1989 and 1990 was, however, politically
significant out of proportion to the revenue raised, as the New Order
government was for the first time in a significant way resorting to taxation on
society to finance its spending.
The ability of the regime to finance both the patronage system and the
industrial development taking place under the auspices of the state and
Chinese conglomerates using government credit was sharply reduced. This
could only be sustained by far higher taxation, which would have been an
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entirely different proposition, politically, from the previous financing of this
system from taxes on oil exports.
It is in this fact that the key to Indonesia's industrial policy in the 1980s is to
be found, and at the same time the key to the process of class formation at
the top of Indonesian society. There are, however, two alternative theories,
both of which are rejected here, but deserving attention.
One is Robison's claim that the growing capitalist class in Indonesia, including
the pribumi business class, had began to have an interest in the dismantling
of the patrimonial state in favour of a more preditable, regularised
environment. This is one of the central claims of Robison's influential book.
[Robison :1986] This conclusion seems unwarranted. As will be made clear
in the chapter that follows, privileged access to the state has continued to be
the overwhelmingly important factor in the growth of the largest pribumi
enterprises, as well as in the continued expansion of several of the largest
Chinese conglomerates. During the five years since Robison published his
findings, these conglomerates have expanded dramatically, and mostly
through projects that receive de facto monopoly or quasi monopoly rights or
state concessions. This point will be discussed in much more detail in a
different context in the following chapter.
In what could be called mainstream analysis or commentary on Indonesia,
another explanation has been the most prominent. This is the notion of
technocratic pressures from within and outside Indonesia. With regard to
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external pressures, it has been pointed out earlier that Indonesian economic
policy since the oil boom of the early 1970s was hardly characterised by
compliance with western industrial interests. It has also been pointed out that
since this independence was gained by elevated oil revenue, it was eroded
by its subsequent fall. This erosion, however, had nothing to do with
technocratic arguments for de-regulation, but with the state's ability to finance
an alternative policy. The key to understanding de-regulation in Indonesia is
certainly not to be found in the course of the twenty year old debate between
technocrats and various political figures, although the debate over industrial
strategy was central to the de-regulation debate at the time.
Although an industrial strategy has never been devised or carried out to
anything like the same extent as in India, or in a very different fashion, Japan,
South Korea and Singapore, the notion of such a strategy has been both
politically and economically important. The economic argument is not the
least based on wishes to emulate the success of some other East Asian
economies, and on rejection of the immutability of existing comparative
advantage between nations. At an ideological level this finds support in
suspicion of foreign dependency and neo-colonialism, and in sentiments of
nationalism and calls for Indonesia's entry into the modern world of
technology and industry. Several powerful figures have advocated various
forms of such a strategy, starting with Murtopo and Humardhani, who worked
with Chinese intellectuals concerned with giving Indonesian Chinese capital
role in such a strategy, to Sudharmono, Kartasasmita, and most notably,
Habibie, whose arguments have revolved around the nationalistic and
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technological side of the matter, and been less concerned with giving role to
Chinese capital.
The economic argument is as complex as the ideological one is simple.
While there has been limited success in altering the division of labour in
Indonesia's favour, as for instance in the plywood and rattan industries, where
higher value is added to products under the shield of export bans on raw
material, made possible by Indonesia's dominant position as supplier, there
are also clear example of wastage caused by protection and by emphasis on
higher levels of technology that the nature and composition of the economy
would seem to call for.
The important political point about this debate, and various strategies devised
and followed, has to do with the concentration of ownership of favoured
domestic industrial concerns in the hands of the state, the military and the
small community of large Chinese and Suharto linked businessmen. Although
a cohesive strategy hardly exists, the notion of such a strategy has been
used for granting government subsidies, licences and concessions to mainly
Chinese and Suharto owned firms that have through this grown into large
conglomerates, each spanning several industries, and collectively dominating
the Indonesian economy . The notion of strategy has in this way given
intellectual and political legitimation to parts of the vast patronage system
instituted by Suharto. A nationalistic ideology has in this way been used to
conceal and legitimise the rapid rise of conglomerates that few in pribumi
society would identify with Indonesian national aspirations. The rise of the
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conglomerates would have been unthinkable without state patronage. As
pointed out below, most of the largest conglomerates relied on monopolies,
concessions and state sponsorship for their growth, while many of the rest
grew under the wings of the these favoured companies.
At the same time, foreign companies were increasingly complaining of the
cost of the capricious licensing system, and increasingly, with de-regulation
elsewhere, they had attractive alternatives. Western governments helped
substantially with increased aid, but this also put them into a strong position
to demand de-regulation, to benefit foreign investment.
Before relaxing the system, however, Suharto instituted one of his more
blatant schemes for what amounted to a private tax on sections of industry.
A monopoly on the import of plastics, tin plates and some other raw material
for important industries was awarded to companies specifically set up for this
purpose. These companies were jointly owned by the Suharto family and
Suharto's chief Chinese business cronies with a few others as partners. The
monopoly increased the price of plastics and tin plates to Indonesian industry,
instead of reducing the price which was the claimed purpose of the scheme.
In effect, what amounted to paper companies, collected tax from the relevant
industries for the benefit of the Suharto family and a few of its cronies. [9]
These monopolies were more serious for the economy than other such
schemes, such as the highly lucrative kretek monopoly shared by Suharto's
brother, Probosutejo, and the President's long time business crony, Liem Sioe
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Liong, or the more recently installed clove purchasing monopoly in the same
industry set up primarily by Suharto's youngest son, Hutomo Putra Mandala,
and his partners, Radius Prawiro's sons being among them. [10]
Instead of only taxing consumers of protected industries, like earlier schemes,
the new monopolies incurred extra cost to important, competitive and
potentially fast growing industries and thus thwarted their growth. This was
particularly serious with regard to industries using plastics, tin plates and
certain types of steel as raw materials and lead to widespread criticism within
the business community in Indonesia. These monopolies affected materials
and goods worth US $ 1.5 billion in 1985.
The significant cost added to Indonesian industry through these schemes was
skimmed off as profits, mainly for the Suharto family, but also for its Chinese
cronies, such as Liem Sioe Liong and Bob Hasan, and a few pribumi
interests, such as the Bakrie family, and in a later stage, the family of chief
technocrat, drs. Radius Prawiro. According to the Asian Wall Street Journal
(24.11.86), the tin plate monopoly may have added 60-70 Per cent to the
price of tin cans. This monopoly was shared by two "cukongs", Liem and
Hasan, and two Suharto family members, Sigit and Sudwikatmono, as well as
with a state owned firm. The tin plate monopoly is just one example of 165
import and trading monopolies in effect in the mid 1980s. This number had
been reduced to 44 by 1991.
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In almost every case, where a lucrative scheme existed for skimming off
profits, often through no more effort than the processing of papers, the
Suharto family was involved, either through one or more of four Suharto
children, Sigit, Bambang, Hutomo and Siti, through one of his two brothers,
Sudwikatmono or Probosutedjo, or through people related to Suharto by
marriage, such as his son in law, Indra Rukmana, his brother in law, Bernard
Ibnu Hardjodjo, or the family of Bulog Chief, Bustanhl Arifin. In a later stage,
as pointed out before, even the two sons, Yusni and Baktinendra, of chief
technocrat, Radius Prawiro, who supposedly, had been at the forefront of
fighting against monopolies, became involved with the Suharto family in a
lucrative kretek monopoly, which was supported by a US $ 250 million low
interest, state sponsored loan to start up in 1991.
These numerous schemes, increasingly monopolised by the Suharto family,
served to further narrow the base of the regime. The Suharto family was by
this time clearly by far the largest beneficiary of the system, and while other
continued to benefit, the system was increasingly centralised, and increasingly
yielding its profits to the very richest players. Several academics and
journalists in Indonesia voiced the opinion in interviews for this thesis that
these monopolies were a highly important contribution to a process of gradual
political alienation of the younger officers from the regime. It has also been
alleged that these monopolies were an important issue between General
Murdani and President Suharto, leading to the removal of the former from
ABRI commancL Serious problems in Australian-Indonesian relations in the
mid to late 1980s were sparked off by newspaper articles in Australia,
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discussing, among other things, these monopolies. Commentators have
argued that the curious over-reaction to these articles in Jakarta was not
unconnected to this allegedly increasing military criticism of the rapacity of the
Suharto family, most nakedly displayed by the import monopolies.
At the same time, the centralisation of the government tendering system in the
State Secretariat, made it far more difficult for military commanders in the
regions and men in influential positions in the bureaucracy to derive benefice
income without the sanction of the State Secretariat under Sudharmono. This,
in turn, may explain some of the intense opposition to Sudharmono within the
military, clearly displayed at the time of his election to tile Vice-Presidency,
and apparently frequently and openly voiced to foreign journalists by military
men since then.
As the military continued to have a firm grip on security, and the political
system blocked any voicing of protest, the most serious challenge to the
ruling group was bound to emerge from within the military. Because of the
centralisation of promotions, both within the military hierarchy, particularly
though after the round of criticism discussed here, and perhaps more
importantly at the time, the centralisation of renumeration and service
assignments in the karyawan system under the ultimate control of the
President, such criticism was also likely to emerge from retired rather than
serving officers. The most important criticism that surfaced from the late
1970s to the early 1980s came from a group of highly eminent retired officers.
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Much of this was dismissed by the regime as grumbles from men that had
lost out in the system.
Behind the criticism were several highly prominent former generals, such as
General Nasution, the long time commander of the army, and later defence
minister, Lt. Gen. Simatupang, the widely respected former army chief of staff,
Lt. Gen. Dharsono, the former Siliwangi commander and a leader of New
Order radicals and alter Secretary-General of ASEAN, Lt. Gen. Mokoginta,
former inter-regional commander of Sumatra and later director of Tn Usaha
Bhakti, Lt. Gen. Jasin, former commander of the East Java Brawijaya divison
and later army deputy chief of staff Lt. Gen. Kemàl Idris, the former
commander of Kostrad, and a leader of the New Order Radicals, Adm. Au
Sadikin, the controversial, but popular and formerly highly powerful Governor
of Jakarta, Lt. Gen. Sutopo Juwono, who had been head of Bakin in the early
1970s, and Lt. Gen. Charis Suhud, also a formerly high placed intelligence
officer, and briefly the deputy head of Kopkamtib. In addition, several highly
placed active officers were known to share their critical views of the way the
ruling group had managed the army's role in society, and the way corruption
and capricious style of government had continued to be the modus operandi
of the New Order.
These people, who form a significant slice of the best known and most
respected group of military figures in Indonesian history, voiced their criticism
in different ways and to different degrees. The history of this protest has
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been extensively researched and analyzed by David Jenkins and will not be
related here. [11]
Two things, however, are of importance in the present context. One is the
content of the debate. Partly this was a re-run of the controversies of the
early New Order, but this simplification should not be taken to far, as not only
were conditions different, but the actors involved were of a far broader base
than the New Order radicals. The concerns expressed by the critics, were,
in a sense, also less partisan, notwithstanding the government's counter
accusation of sour grapes. The main thrust of the criticism was that the
military needed to take a far more principled attitude to its iole in society, and
to give up some of its control and much of its day to day management of
government administration and business concerns through the karyawan
system which by this time involved 17.000 active officers. The right and duty
of the military to retain capacity for being an arbiter in politics and the
defender of the constitution, was not, however, questioned.
The more important point, though, is the fact that even this group which
came close to being the most impressive line-up of Indonesian leaders
imaginable, failed to make a serious challenge to the President or the
remnants of a ruling group that had seen its number seriously dwindle, a
regime that was almost universally acknowledged to be exceedingly corrupt,
and a regime that relied on the coercive powers of a military organisation that
was being increasingly marginalised in business and politics.
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The reasons for the staying power of the regime, as pointed out with regard
to earlier crises, was in the central control of the vast patronage system.
Within the military, the karyawan system, criticised by the ex-officers,
employed 17.000 military men, a substantial part of the officer corps of an
organisation numbering only around 300.000, in occupations that were
normally far more lucrative than a military salary. These men were
answerable to the regime rather than to the military. The commander of the
military was also a Presidential appointee, who in turn controlled promotions
within the ranks.
Important as this may have been in explaining the strength of the regime vis
a vis the military as an institution, and however prominent this was in day to
day politics, longer term developments in the economy and in economic
policy were reshaping political divides and the position of the military to the
extent of making this debate superficial and relatively unimportant for the
political structure of society.
The military was no longer in control of the commanding heights of the
economy. The military owned companies, as pointed out before, had gone
into serious decline and were by the late 1980s not very important in the fast
growing industrial base of the economy. In spite of the size of the state
sector, not the least displayed by the size of the karyawan system, the state
was also playing a rapidly declining role on the productive side of the
economy. State enterprises had generally not grown to anything like the
same extent as the private sector, and had in come cases declined in real
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terms or ceased trading. The banking sector, along with public utilities were
two exception from this. Even in the most traditional of military and state
activities, privatisation of economic activity had taken place, road construction
being one example, where Suharto related companies not only built roads but
also operated them through a system of road tolls. By 1991 three of his
children operated major enterprises of this kind. While the sharply diminishing
economic clout of the military caused a somewhat belated concern in military
circles in the late 1980s, and the importance of this should not be
underestimated as the 1991 military coup in Thailand over not too dissimilar
grievance shows, the military had been much sidelined as an influence over
longer term developments in the Indonesian economy, anJ hence Indonesian
politics. Its power rested on its ultimate power of veto, rather than on an
ability to greatly influence the fast flowing current of change. This loss of
power occurred at the same time as the military kept 17.000 officers in many
of the most important positions of the state, which in turn illustrates how
deceptive a focus on institutional arrangements and political events can be for
understanding longer term developments.
These longer term developments were reshaping the class configuration at the
top of society. In the 1970s a number of Indonesian Chinese business men
began to form an extremely important, if small in numbers, domestic class of
capitalists, and at the same time, a small number of military men, members
of the ruling group and a few other well connected officers, formed a pribumi
group, intimately linked to Chinese capital. Neither of these elements could
exist without foreign capital and technology, and neither element could survive
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without the other. This threefold alliance between foreign, Chinese and
private military-pribumi capital generated such changes as to gradually alter
the very structures of the economy and eventually the state. It is of some
interest in this context to bear in mind the theories put forward by Evans and
others on the "triple alliance" in Latin America between foreign capital,
domestic monopoly capital and state officials, although the comparison should
not be taken too far, as discussed in an earlier theoretical chapter. The
various theories of the state elaborated earlier, both of the instrumentalist
school and of the structuralist kind offer insights into this process. None of
the theoretical discussion of the earlier chapters will, however, be repeated
here.
The classes that had began to form in the late 1980s, their composition and
the emerging politics around them are the subject of the following chapter.
Notes
1. Corporate tax on oil grew from Rp. bn. 2.300 in 1978 to Rp. bn. 8.700 in
1981. Over the same period income tax receipts grew from around Rp. bn.
120 to Rp. bn. 200 and tax on domestic consumption from Rp. bn. 500 to
Rp. bn. 890.
2. Figures are adapted from the World Bank report of 1988.
3. For an early discussion on this see David Ransom's article, The Berkeley
Mafia, in Ramparts, 1970.
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4. Prime example of this view is Ransom's article, as above. This view is
also implicit and occasionally explicit in such writings as The Showcase state
by Mortimer, as above.
5. This general argument is not new and can be found in such diverse
writings as in Ben Anderson's Old State, New Society, as above, and in
Dawam Rahardjo's introduction to Nurcholis Madjid's, 1987, Islam,
Keindonesian, Kemodernan.
6. See Bruce Glassburner, 1978, Political Economy and the Soeharto
Regime, Bulletin of Indonesian Economic Studies, vol. 14, no. 3.
7. Interview with Dorojatun Kuntjoro-Jakti, February, 1989.
8. Figures from a Reuters dispatch, February, 1991.
9. The monopolies and the ownership of the companies concerned was
extensively investigated by the Asian Wall Street Journal which published its
findings and a stinging criticism of the rapacity of the Suharto family in this
respect in a series of articles in November 1986.
10. Both monopolies have been criticised openly, if not forcefully in
Indonesian publications. The former monopoly was discussed by the Asian
Wall Street Journal, while the newer and even more controversial monopoly
was discussed in several articles and news items in the FEER 1990-1991.
11. David Jenkins, 1983, Suharto and His Generals, Cornell Modern
Indonesia Project, Monograph Series.
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CHAPTER 12
THE EMERGING CAPITALIST CLASS
The debate over the existence or non-existence of a capitalist class or a
bourgeoisie in Indonesia has been a lively one in academic circles for a
number of years. Robison, who failed to find any such class in the mid
1970s, found much evidence of its formation in the mid 1980s. His findings
failed to impress Jeffrey Winters, who found the term "capitalist crust" a more
appropriate label for the handful of capitalists identified by Robison. [1]
According to surveys of the largest companies in Indonesia produced by the
business magazine, Warta Ekonomi, no pribumi company was to be found
among the top ten enterprises in the country in 1989-1991. The list for 1991
shows only 11 pribumi companies among the 60 largest enterprises. Six of
the eleven are owned by the Suharto family, one more by a business man
related to the family by marriage, and further 2 by Suharto's military cronies.
One of the two remaining pribumi company enjoys important business links
to the Suharto companies and to the largest Chinese conglomerates. These
major enterprises, Chinese and pribumi, will be discussed below, particulary
in endnotes to this chapter.
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Parallel to the debate about the existence of a capitalist class in Indonesia
there has been a much wider discussion on the existence or non-existence
of a middle class. There have been far more participants in this debate than
in the one on the bourgeoisie, and the debate has been much less
theoretical. Neither of these debates has been grounded in comprehensive
data, although Robison's research on the capitalist class was impressive and
highly useful, if somewhat outdated by now. In the case of the debate on the
middle class, little attention has been paid to lessons that may be drawn from
theories or from the direct experience of other societies, a statement that
holds for much political analysis of Indonesia.
As the debates have run largely on separate tracks, the question of to what
extent these two classes are linked with regard to political interests, and to
what extent they are separate entities with differing interests, has not received
much attention. As most commentators have focused on one or the other
of these two classes, there has been a tendency to fuse the two together by
extending the arguments about one to the other. In the discussion below,
a sharp distinction will be made between what is termed a middle class and
what will be called a capitalist class. This current chapter will discuss the
capitalist class, while the middle class will be discussed in the following
chapter.
With regard to the capitalist class there are four main points of immediate
relevance here. One is the nature of capital accumulation in the largest
Chinese and pribumi conglomerates. A second point is on the extensive and
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intensive linkages between these companies. The third point is on the
concentration of ownership in the economy into the hands of a tiny group of
people. The fourth point is on the identity of the few pribumi businessmen
controlling a handful of businesses that totally dominate the modern pribumi
owned part of the economy, and the links of these to the largest Chinese
owned conglomerates. These crucial points that determine the political
character of the capitalist class in Indonesia can not be adequately put
without a great deal of reference to individual companies. Information on the
companies will, however, be kept to a minimum. In spite of that, it would be
too cumbersome to include this in the main body of the text with the
extensive references required. For this reason most of the this information
is to be found in endnotes to this chapter.
It should be pointed out, and underlined, that although great deal of effort has
been put into collecting this information and cross-checking it, some of it is
based on conjecture, a fact necessitated by the chief method of capital
accumulation prevailing in Indonesia. The contours, however, should be quite
clear, and all the more important of the information should be correct.
It should also be pointed out that the difficulties in collecting this data have
been significant, although much information is coming to light at the time of
the completion of this thesis. These difficulties make the data less complete
and less comprehensive than would have been desirable, although the
outlines of private capital accumulation and the composition and nature of the
tiny capitalist class in Indonesia should be reasonably clear from this. [2]
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The Salim Group of Liem Sioe Liong is by far the largest of the
conglomerates with ten times the turnover of the tenth largest company in
Indonesia, and at least four times that of the third largest group. 3j Its
dominance, along with a few other companies can surmised from the fact that
the Salim group is larger, by turnover, than the combined total of 100 of
Indonesia's 200 largest companies. Along with second placed Astra, Salim
accounts for as much business as 150 of the 200 largest companies in the
country. The group is involved in almost every sector of the economy, but
in almost every instance the group has relied on government disposition of
monopolies, concessions, contracts and privileged acce'ss to licences and
credit, except in some cases, for its recent but fast growing overseas
operations. The group has been inextricably linked to the Suharto family
through family shareholdings, joint monopoly ventures and links to the
Suharto yayasans. Of 44 private monopolies in Indonesia, 17 are held by the
Salim group, including several of the most profitable and long term
monopolies. The group has also spawned some of the other Chinese owned
conglomerates and has extensive links throughout the Indonesian business
world. The Salim group has been rapidly expanding overseas in the most
recent years, particularly in Singapore, where it owns two of the country's
largest companies, in Hong Kong, where its main investment vehicle, the First
Pacific group, is based, and most recently in Holland, where the group
controls a major trading company and is seeking to acquire another major
company in Dutch overseas trading.
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The Second largest group is the Astra group of the Soeryajaya family. [4]
This group has relied on political contacts to a lesser extent than the Salim
group, or some of the large conglomerates, although important early contacts
with Suharto and in particular, with Sutowo, were instrumental, and probably
vital, in its take-off phase. Robison [1977] identified Soeryajaya as one of
Sutowo's main "cukongs". Astra also currently holds six monopolies, more
than any other private or publicly listed company, apart from Liem's Salim
group. Its reputation for a certain detachment from the prevalent New Order
business arrangement has probably more to do with its somewhat limited
integration with the Jakarta business world than with lack of regime
sponsorship. Parts of Astra, however, have now been listhd on the Jakarta
stock exchange, and both Astra, and Summa, another Soeryajaya company
have several joint ventures with other companies, including those of the
Suharto family.
Apart from the pre-eminent position of these two largest groups, limited
unanimity exists on the exact relative position of the largest enterprises in
Indonesia. Several sources, including Warta Ekonomi, put the Sinar Mas
group of Eka Cipta in third place. According to WE this group is about half
the size of Astra and about twice the size of the fourth and fifth placed
tobacco companies, Gudang Garam and Djarum. As recently as 1987, Eka
Cipta was put far lower on the list by Indonesian and American sources. Eka
Cipta has close relationship with the Salim group. It has also important
connections to Suharto, including direct stakes owned by two Suharto family
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members, as well as some joint ventures. The company had past
connections to Murtopo and Humardhani. [5]
Following the two largest tobacco companies, which have a somewhat
different position in the corporate world from that of most of the largest
conglomerates, comes, according to WE in 1991, the DharmaTa group of
Suhargo Gondokusomo, a group slightly lower on the 1990 list.
Gondokusomo was ranked as number three by Expo in 1984. He is the
brother in law of Go Swie Kie, ranked number two by Expo, and as "one of
the wealthiest Chinese in Indonesia" by Kunio [1988], but ranked far lower
in wealth by Warta Ekonomi. Both men have enjoyed clàse connections to
Bulog and more indirectly to Suharto. The Dharmala group benefits from two
separate monopolies. [6]
Two other companies, among the top ten on Warta Ekonomi lists, are those
of Mochtar Riady [7] and Bob Hasan [8] The former is particularly closely
connected to the Salim group and the latter is linked to an array of Suharto
companies, Hasan being Suharto's otdest cronies aTong with Liem. Hasan is
one of the chief private beneficiaries of a government policy to protect and
support the plywood and rattan industries. He has included several members
of the Suharto family as stakeholders in his ventures, including three of
Suharto's children. According to WE list in 1991, the largest Pribumi
company is Bambang Trihatmodjo's Bimantara group, the largest Suharto
enterprise, placed 11th among Indonesian companies. This company will be
discussed below.
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Following Bimantara on the 1991 Warta Ekonomi list are the companies of
Prajogo Pangestu. [9] Prajogo has enjoyed a spectacularly rapid success in
recent years through rapidly growing Suharto connections, particularly with Siti
Rukmana, who has been Prajogo's main sponsor. In two years he has
emerged from a relative obscurity and become one of the foremost
businessmen in Indonesia with vast industrial projects worth several billion US
dollars in the pipelines. Most of these, and probably all the major ones, are
joint ventures with the Suharto family, particularly with Siti Rukmana, but also
with Bambang's Bimantara and with Sudwikatmono. Prajogo's spectacular
rise is a testament to the continued, and even growing, centrality of Suharto
connections in the Indonesian business world.
A little further down the list, are the companies of the Wanandi family [10],
formerly particularly close to Murtopo and Humardhani, Nursalim's Gajah
Tunggal, linked to the Sultan of Yogjakarta group, and its large Sogo store
being Bimantara's tenant at Plaza Indonesia, the Raja Garuda Mas company
of Sukanto, linked to Sinar Mas, Salim, the companies of Ciputra and more
indirectly to Suharto [h1] Ciputra's position, however, is underestimated by
this ranking, as he has a number of companies listed on the top 200 list of
Indonesian companies.[ 12] Ciputra was ranked higher by Expo, and his
presence in various sectors of the Indonesian economy has been growing
in recent years. Ciputra is linked to the army, to the government, to Suharto
and to Liem Sioe Liong through joint ventures and management of public
companies.
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In between these Chinese controlled companies are three Pribumi companies,
that of Soedarpo Sastrosatomo [13], something of an anomaly in Indonesia,
the Humpuss company of Hutomo Mandala Putra, Suharto's third son, and
the Bakrie company, the largest of the few surviving Sumatran trading
company, connected to Suharto through various joint undertakings. [14] A
little further down the list are three Pribumi companies, the Krama Yudah of
Lt. Gen. Sjarnoebi Said, [15] one of the early business generals and an
associate of Sutowo at Pertamina, the Subentra company of Sudwikatmono,
to be discussed below, and the Nusamba company, a company jointly owned
by Sigit, Suharto's eldest son, and Bob Hassan. Sigit's businesses are
discussed below. Still further down the list are four Pribumi companies, that
of lbnu Sutowo [16], those of Siti Rukmana, Suharto's eldest daughter, to be
discussed below, and the Mercu Buana company of Suharto's brother,
Probosutedjo, also to be discussed below, and lastly, the companies of the
late Sultan Hamengkubuwono of Yogjakarta. [17]
The Sultan's companies are listed as number 69 in the WE list, having a
turnover of less than 2 per cent of the Salim group and less than a seventh
of the Bimantara group. Although the Sultan's wealth is probably still
sizeable, his companies, or his shareholdings, are not a major presence in the
economy. The position of the Sultan, relative to the large Chinese
companies, and the Suharto conglomerates, has probably sharply declined
in recent years, reflecting a lack of political muscle.
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Siti Rukmana's companies are listed as number 49, a position grossly
underestimated in the opinion of more than one source in Jakarta in early
1991. These will be discussed below along with other Suharto family
companies. All 35 or so companies in the top 60 positions, whose owners
have not been specifically mentioned, are Chinese owned, and so is the great
majority of the companies that follow lower down the list, as well as, of
course, the majority of the top companies already mentioned.
Two further points of interest with regard to this list may be mentioned. One
is the position of Tn Usaha Bhakti, the largest of the military companies. It
ranks number 95 on the WE list for 1991. Formerly this company figured
large in studies on the Indonesian corporate scene and was seen as one of
the central companies in the Indonesian business world. The second point
is the position of Hasjim Ning as number 100 on the WE list. Ning's
company is along with Bakrie Brothers the best known of the Sumatra trading
companies mentioned earlier in this thesis. Ning secured a number of
automobile franchises in the 1950s and since, such as Chrysler, shared with
Sutowo, Ford, shared with Nursalim, Fiat, originally shared with Dasaad,
another Sumatran trading company, BMW, later given over to Astra, Hino,
later given over to Liem Sloe Liong and Mazda, also given over to Liem Sloe
Liong.
These two anecdotal points illustrate how, in succession, two potential pribumi
nuclei, the outer island trading houses and the military, were comprehensively
eased out of central position in the economy. Instead, as can be seen from
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the endnotes to this chapter, the dynamic core of the economy is now
formed by the Liem - Suharto partnership, which involves and benefits a score
of mainly Chinese owned conglomerates.
This has a greater political significance than any of the hotly debated events
or political arrangements of the New Order era. It should be clear, without
going into speculation on what might have been, that this economic
arrangement, shaping class interests and class formation at the top of society,
produces vastly different results from what would have transpired, if either the
outer island bourgeoisie had come to dominate the economy, or if the military
had maintained its earlier economic position. If the former had been the
case, Indonesia's corporate world would have been dominated by outer
islanders, many of them with political or religious affiliations of a kind very
different from today's captains of industry. If the army had maintained its
position, military companies, would be on par with the largest Chinese
conglomerates, instead of the Suharto companies. The political results of this,
both in short term, and with regard to a possible longer term development
towards increased democracy, would, of course, be extremely different from
what obtains at present.
Another feature of recent changes in corporate ownership is the relative
decline in importance of the yayasans, a peculiar Indonesian business
arrangement briefly discussed in an earlier chapter. Apart from the military
yayasans, such as Tn Usaha Bhakti and the Siliwangi yayasans, several
Suharto controlled yayasans had been mentioned earlier, as these were
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central to the political economy of the 1970s. The yayasans are still important
in many fields, more so politically than economically, but they seem to have
yielded the central position they enjoyed a decade ago. The yayasans figure
particularly prominently in political economy studies of the 1970s and still form
an essential part of Robison's model in the mid 1980s.
Data is always a problem in studies of Indonesian business, and naturally so
as the pattern of accumulation has not followed written regulations or
accepted ethical codes to the letter. With the yayasans the problem is far
greater than with most of the conglomerates. As a legal entity a yaysan has
no members, only a board and assets managed by the board at their
discretion. In practise the yayasan is inextricabty tied up with its founder,
either a person or a formal or informal entity, such as a group of military
officers. There is no independent audit, no shareholders meeting, nor even
a right for the state to inspect or interfere. There is no specific law governing
the yayasans, and their founders' authority is virtually unlimited. Proposed
legislation, aimed at giving the courts legal rights to inspect yayasans and at
preventing yayasans for making direct payments to their founders, has been
held up in the Justice ministry for six years. [FEER 4.10.90]
Suharto himself stated in his 1989 biography that one hundred per cent of the
money collected by the yayasans founded by him was spent on social work.
Various studies and commentaries have cast doubt on this statements.
Robison's studies [1977 and 1986] offer a picture of the Suharto yayasans as
core components of the prevailing New Order capital accumulation process,
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with Chinese conglomerates, private profit for the President and his cronies,
and vast networks of political patronage fused together in these charitable
foundations.
The problem of data precludes any firm conclusions on the size, or relative
economic importance of the yayasans. it seems, however, reasonably clear
from evidence already discussed on the Indonesian corporate scene that the
yayasans no longer play the central role that they seem to have played at the
time of Robsion's and Kuntjoro-Jakti's [1982] studies in the late 1970s to the
mid 1980s. The collective bank deposits of the yayasans in late 1989,
however, were impressive at close to US $ 1 billion. [FER, 4.10.90]. This
substantial sum may overstate the importance of the yayasans in the fast
growing industrial economy. A list of some 150 companies controlled by the
largest yayasans [WE 29.10.90], although impressive for the scope of
activities the yayasans engage in, does not read like a list of successful,
modern and expanding companies. With a few exceptions, the yayasan
controlled banks are relatively unimportant financial institutions, the most
valuable sharholdings seem to be focused on relatively mature industries, and
on the list are a number of companies that have failed to grow in recent
years. Indicative of this is the previously mentioned point that Tn Usaha
Bhakti, the largest army enterprise now ranks as number 95 among
Indonesia's company. The only other yayasan among Indonesia's 200 largest
companies is the Bhumyamca, owner of the Admiral shipping group.
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Several yayasans, however, have stakes in major companies. This is
particularly true of the Suharto controlled yayasans. According to Suharto
himself, in his 1989 biography, his major yayasans have, collectively, assets
of around US $ 200 million. This figure seems remarkably low. For one
thing, Bank Duta, which is 75 per cent owned by three Suharto controlled
yayasans recently lost more than US $ 400 million on foreign exchange
speculation, or twice the entire assets of its owners, if Suharto's figure is
correct. The Suharto yayasans own shares in several large and profitable
companies, particularly companies controlled by Liem Sieo Liong, Bob Hasan,
Sudwikatmono and Suharto's children. Among these Liem and
Sudwikatmono's Indocement and Hasan and Sigit's Nusamba are probably
most important. In addition to the major yayasans mentioned by Suharto in
this context there is the Harapan Kita yayasan controlled by his wife, the
Kostrad Dharma Putra, reputedly controlled by Suharto and the Kartika
Chandra, which owns two Jakarta hotels, usually seen as Suharto
investments. Apart from profits from their own companies, Suharto controlled
yayasans also receive fees and profit shares from at least two monopolies,
the clove import monopoly of Liem and Probosutedjo, the latter being
Suharto's half brother, and the Bogsari flour milling monopoly of Liem,
Sudwikatmono and Bustanil Arifin's wife, who is a Suharto family member.
However impressive the line up of yayasan controlled companies may have
seen a few years ago, and however large, extensive and profitable the yaysan
network may still be, this now pales in comparison to a number of Chinese
and Suharto owned conglomerates.
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More importantly for future developments, the yayasans do not form a
dynamic nucleus, but seem to be used for skimming of profits for private and
political use, which is not a recent feature, but the very reason for their
relative decline. The sums involved in this process are not particulary
impressive either, if Suharto's autobiography is to be believed. He claims
there that Dakab, the Suharto controlled, Golkar related yayasan, which has
been thought to be Golkar's major source of fund, contributes around US $
100 thousand a month to Golkar. (Warta Ekonomi, [29.10.90], in a special
report on the yayasans also uses the same figure, around US $ 100
thousand, but claims this to be the annual rather than the monthly
contribution to Golkar.) Such figures, however, should be taken with caution,
the yayasans being almost impenetrable by outside scrutiny.
At the same time as the yayasans have through lack of investment failed to
keep up with the rapidly expanding Chinese conglomerates, a dynamic
partnership to Chinese capital has been provided by Suharto's children, and
to a lesser extent by several other family members.
There are at least 9 members of the Suharto family engaged in business on
a substantial scale. This is not counting several people who are relatives of
the family or are counted as such, like the sons of drs. Prawiro, the
members of Minister Habibie's family, who is as close to Suharto as the
President's immediate family, or several relatives of Ibu lien's, Suharto's wife.
This is also apart from the President himself, whose main direct links to
business are through the yayasans, and excludes his wife, Ibu lien, whose
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reputedly extensive financial dealings in the early New Order years have
become less important, at least in relative terms, and seemingly confined to
the family yayasans, such as Harapan Kita, and possibly Kartika Chandra.
Harapan Kita, though, has continued to be a lively business concern and
recently became the partner to Humpuss, the company of Hutomo (Suharto)
in toll road construction and operation.
The information on the commercial activities of individual family members is,
like the information contained in endnotes to this chapters, pieced together
from various written sources, particulary Indonesian magazines, such as
Warta Ekonomi, Swa Sembada, Prospek, Tempo and Editor, form the Far
Eastern Economic Review and the Asian Wall Street Journal in Hong Kong,
from the Strait Times of Singapore, and in a few cases from the study of
Kunio [1988], Indonesia Reports of John MacDougal [1987-1990] and from
interviews with knowledgeable but nameless sources in Jakarta. Nothing is
included, however, on the sole basis of this lastly mentioned type of source.
Beginning with the less important of these 9 people, Bernard lbnu HardJodjo,
a brother of Ibu lien was, it seems from earlier studies, one of Suharto's
main link with Liem Sioe Liong's business venture in the early 1970s. He now
seems far less important in this respect and his operations are of a lesser
size than those of several other family members. He has some joint ventures
with Bob Hasan, is involved in logging and is partner with Japanese capital
in cement production. [Kunlo, 19881
282
A rather more prominent, but at the same time, politically somewhat distant
member of the family is Suharto's half brother, Probosutedjo. Probo who was
a high school teacher in Sumatra into his thirties, until he moved into the
Jakarta business world at the time of Suharto's assumption of power, recently
threatened a law suit against a Yogyakarta Professor and the research
institute LP3ES for suggesting that he had grown rich on contacts with
Suharto. He has at times been an outspoken critic of government policies,
not the least the Suharto controlled monopolies, tax evasion among top
business men, and the dominance of Chinese businessmen in the New Order
economy. Probosutedjo, however, holds a particularly lucrative joint
monopoly with Liem Sloe Liong, the kretek import monopoly. His company,
Mercu Buana, seems integrated in Suharto's network of yayasan's, and from
Suharto's 1989 biography it can be surmised that this monopoly, and Probo's
company, have been among the most important contributors of funds to his
yayasans. In his threatened law suit, mentioned above, Probo stated that he
received only a 2 per cent commission on clove imports from 1968 to 1986,
and called his role in the matter a "mission" for his country. Other ventures
include logging operations, plantation business, real estate development and
motor vehicle import and assembly (Chevrolet, Bedford, Opel). Probsutedjo
has been one of the main figures in Kadin, the Indonesian chamber of
commerce which some analysts have looked to as a possible countervailing
force to the regime. Relations between Probo and his brother, Suharto, are
reputedly cool and most of the formers favoured business positions stem from
the earlier half of the New Order period.
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A third family member is Christine, Bustanil Arifin's wife, who holds the second
largest stake in the Bogasari flour mill, one of the chief cash cows of the
Suharto-Liem business arrangements. Their daughter is the principal owner
of a company which, along with Peru mtel, the state telephone company, holds
a monopoly on data transmission through Indonesia's communication satellite.
This monopoly was under criticism in the press in early 1991 for exorbitant
rates and poor service. The only company licensed to bypass this service
is Liem Sioe Liong's Salim group. Bustanil Arifin and his extensive business
dealings have been discussed at length in this chapter and in an earlier
chapter on the financial generals and none of this will be repeated here,
except to reiterate the centrality of the Bulog-Bogasari monopoly arrangement
for financing both sides of the Liem-Suharto partnership.
A fourth member of the family is Sudwikatmono, Suharto's foster brother. His
business interests are very large and varied. His stakes in Bogasari and in
Indocement, two of Liem's largest companies have often been regarded as
being held by him on behalf of Suharto. He is the president of lndocement
and holds 10 per cent share in the company, according to publicly available
records. He is a director of Bogasari, which links together several of the
leading business houses with the President's family. His own company,
Subentra, ranks as no. 33 on the Warta Ekonomi list for 1991. This company
won a government contract in the early 1980s for a large petrochemical
factory.
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Subentra holds two of the 44 remaining import and trading monopolies, one
of these being a monopoly on imports and distribution of motion pictures.
This highly controversial monopoly came under fire from American trade
negotiators in early 1991 and speculation followed in the Indonesian press
that Sudwikatmono would be forced to yield his monopoly position in the
industry to avoid American trade retaliation. Another media venture is a
television station in Surabaya, Surya Citra Televisi. The station aroused
protest last year from muslims for screening western shows they deemed
offensive. The station also showed a peculiar lack of sensitivity by
broadcasting, during Ramadan, a programme showing preparation of pork
dishes. Sudwikatmono was one of the chief beneficiarie of the import and
trade monopolies in the 1980s. He was one of the owners of Panca Holdings
which the Asian Wall Stree Journal (24.11.86) estimated to have netted US $
30 million in 1985 for "just processing paper". He was also a joint owner of
the steel import monopoly and served as its managing director.
Sudwikatrnono is a partner in Mindo Petroleum, which owns 65 per cent of
the Hong Kong based Permindo Oil Trading, a company that has reaped
profits from a monopoly trading in oil on behalf of Pertamina, which owns the
remaining share in the company.
Sudwikatmono is also a partner with Liem Sioe Liong and Eka Cipta in the
large Bimoli cooking oil conglomerate, which dominates the market for its
products. His involvement with Uem is not restricted to the three very large
companies mentioned here, and he has further links with Eke Cipta, who is
Indonesia's third largest business man and a linchpin in the Suharto-Liem
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business arrangement, as well as links with the real estate business of
Ciputra, another core member of this business establishment.
Sudwikatmono's enterprises links him directly with at least a third of the 25
most important conglomerates in the country, and this forms some of the
more essential interlocking of business interests between the major Chinese
conglomerates and the Suharto family.
A fifth family member is Indra Kowara Rukmana, who is married to Suharto's
daughter, Siti. He has a key position in two of the fastest growing
conglomerates in the country, that of his wife's, and the Bimantara group of
Bambang, of which he is the president. Apart from this, Indra has stakes in
two oil trading companies that have enjoyed monopoly positions on behalf of
Pertamina. One is jointly owned with Bambang, and registered in Indonesia,
Samudra Petroleum, and the other with Sudwikatmono, the Hong Kong based
Mindo Petrolium, which has a controlling stake in Permindo oil trading
company. The former company is also involved in shipping natural gas from
Pertamina plants to South Korea.
His wife, Siti Hardjianti Rukmana, the sixth family member in this list, heads
the Citra Lamtorogung group, which many believe to be the fastest growing
enterprise in the country. The company lists Suharto's other two daughters
as shareholders. The Lamtorogung group became prominent and highly
controversial with its toll road construction and operation in and around
Jakarta. The company built the roads under government license and collects
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road toll from their users, the toll being determined by a Presidential decree.
Several toll roads are being built or planned by the company. Another
monopoly business of the company has been operation of a private, but
government sponsored, television station, which was recently granted
permission to broadcast advertisement nationwide, a decision that
contradicted government policy announced a little earlier. Another obvious
favouritism is Siti's long standing 17 per cent stake in Bank Central Asia, the
largest private bank in the country, and a major Liem Sioe Liong business
vehicle.
Siti's main "cukong", however, is not Liem Sioe Liong, although connections
with his companies are important, but Prajogo Pangestu, who has expanded
his businesses spectacularly in recent years on government connection,
mostly, it seems, provided by Siti. Some of their joint enterprises are
mentioned in an endnote to this chapter of Prajogo's companies and will not
be repeated here, except to point out again the scale of two of the planned
joint ventures, US $ 5 billion, both involving government awarded licenses.
The most recent success of Siti was to win a potentially highly lucrative
government contract to provide 350.000 new telephone lines. This contract
was won jointly by Bambang's Bimantara and a new company set up by Siti
for these purposes. As pointed out by the Asian Wall Street Journal
(15.1.1991), Indonesia is regarded as one of the major markets for
telecommunications, and these contracts, substantial in their own rights are
seen by many as only the start of a massive business. The evident
rapaciousness of Siti Rukmana (mbak Tutut) has made her the focus of much
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popular criticism of the President and the venal business practises of the late
New Order.
A seventh member of the family is Suharto's eldest son, Sigit Hardjojudanto.
His initiation into business seems to have been the same as Siti's, a major
stake in Bank Central Asia. Sigit, however, has not built up business on the
same scale as his sister, Siti, or his two younger brothers, Bambang and
Hutomo. He is involved with Hutomo's enterprises as the president of his
main company, Humpuss, in which he may hold a significant share. He is
also a partner in Nusamba, Bob Hasan's main company, and has interest in
private television. Through Nusamba Sigit benefitted from some of the
monopolies discussed above. He was also privately involved in the plastics
monopoly and served as a director of Panca Holdings. Through Nusamba
Sigit has also benefitted from a monopoly on oil sector insurance. Sigit is also
involved with BP and two Japanese companies, Mitsui and Sumitomo in the
construction of a large polyetheline plant in West Java. Even if Sigits holdings
are extensive and varied, and his connections with Liem and Bob Hasan are
important, he does not seem to play anything like as vital or dynamic part in
the business establishment as Sudwikatmono or three of his siblings.
Suharto's youngest son, Hutomo Mandala Putra (Tommy), has expanded fast
in recent years. Still only 28 years old, Hutomo has built up a company that
is placed among Indonesia's 20 largest concerns. Needless to say, his
business acumen may not be the chief reason for this spectacular result of
a very few years of labour by a man who has been as often in the press for
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his free time exploits as for business deals. The company was almost entirely
built up through monopolies and concessions. Its rapid expansion in recent
years has continued to focus on sectors where government favours determine
success or failure.
Hutomo, when in his early or mid twenties, was awarded three lucrative
monopolies from Pertamina. Two were for distribution of petrochemicals,
produced locally by Pertamina, and one for the export of liquified gas to
Taiwan. Profits from this are a matter of conjecture, but FEER [23.8.90]
estimated this Pertamina deal to have netted Hutomo's Humpuss company
consolidated profits of some US $ 30 million in mid 1990. More lucrative
Pertamina monopolies and trading concessions have followed. One is
through the Perta company, which is jointly owned by Hutomo, Bob Hasan
and Pertamina. This company exports oil on behalf of Pertamina, and
supplies oil to the company by acting as a intermediary with foreign oil
companies in Indonesia. The Perta company was a wholly owned subsidiary
of Pertamina until Hutomo and Hasan were given half the shares for an
undisclosed sum.
Humpuss has also expanded into air transport, a heavily regulated sector
where it has won contracts, concessions and licenses. One company, Gatari,
operates 25 helicopters, mainly for Pertamina and other oil companies. In
1989 Humpuss acquired from Tn Usaha Bhakti, the army company, its wholly
owned subsidiary, Sempati Air. While under army control the company had
failed to win license to operate scheduled passenger service and to use jet
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aircraft on its routs, the latter being a privilege restricted to Garuda. Shortly
after Humpus bought the company in partnership with Nusamba, the
company of Bob Hasan and Sigit (Suharto), both licenses were granted to
Sempati. With regard to the use of jet aircraft Sempati leapfrogged over far
more established state owned and private carriers. The six jets bought were
acquired from Hutomo's Fokker, Guinness Peat Aviation and Rolls Royce
Indonesia agencies.
Humpuss, through its partly owned affiliate, is partner with Yayasan Harapan
Kita, controlled by Hutomo's mother, in the construction and operation of a
major toll road between Merak and Tangerang west of Jakarta. The company
will operate the concession for 25 years. The toll is determined by decree
from President Suharto, husband and father of the operators. Hutomo, as the
leader of a consortium, has recently won another huge construction contract
to expand port facilities at Tanjung Priok. The investment required is US $
825 million, according to official sources.
Yet another Humpuss venture is in the clove trade, a major agricultural and
industrial sector in Indonesia. As pointed out earlier, import of cloves are
monopolised by Liem and Probosutedjo, with part of the profits going to
Suharto's yayasans. Home growing of cloves is an even larger business
involving some 5 million farmers. A highly controversial monopoly on buying
cloves from farmers is being instituted, and a firm controlled by Hutomo is to
be its operator, with two Sons of drs Radius Prawiro among his partners. The
official aim is to stabilise prices but the monopoly has been criticised from all
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quarters concerned and is generally seen as a blatant scheme for skimming
of profits. Estimates of the money involved vary, but the size of the venture
can be surmised from official figures, coming from the minister responsible,
Arifin Siregar, indicating that the company will be buying cloves as 8000 rps.
a kilo, while selling the produce, without adding to its value, for 13.000 rps.
Some of the difference is meant to go to a fund for clove farmers, but it
seems that the cut taken by the monopoly may amount to a very large share
of the money earned by the 5 million farmers that rely on cloves. [FEER,
Tempo, Jan-March, 1991] In addition to gaining the monopoly, Hutomo's
consortium was given a huge sum from the Bank of Indonesia to finance its
stocks. The central bank loan, reported at over US $ 200 million, and the
monopoly itself, is said to have generated much criticism from within the
bureaucracy and among military figures in the early months of 1991. [FEER,
interviews in Jakarta, Feb.-March, 1991]
Forestry forms yet another area of business for Hutomo. He holds a major
forestry concession in Sulawesi and is about to expand into Irian Jaya, where
Humpuss has been granted concessions. A final Humpuss venture to be
mentioned here, is a planned fertiliser plant at the site of an existing state
owned plant, Pupuk Kujang. The plant would be the first private participation
in this heavily regulated field, but the state is a major partner in the
consortium with Humpuss. Other partners are Hutomo's sister, Siti Rukmana,
and Yayasan Dakab, controlled by President Suharto for the benefit of Golkar.
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The largest of the Suharto enterprises is Bimantara, controlled by Bambang
Trihatmodjo, Suharto's second son. Declared assets of the company were
said to exceed US $ 500 million in 1988. [Prospek 22.12.90] This figure has
certainly grown substantially over the three years of break-neck expansion
since then, as Bimantara has primarily engaged in protected or monopoly
investments. The figure for 1988 is all the more remarkable for the fact that
the company was started only seven years earlier, when its founder was in
his mid 20s.
Bimantara, the largest pribumi company in Indonesia, is an extremely
diversified conglomerate that has, like the other farriily conglomerates
discussed above, expanded chiefly through monopoly positions and
government favouritism. Much of its business has already been mentioned
in the text or in endnotes on the Chinese conglomerates. Repetition will be
avoided here. As can be seen from the discussion above and the notes on
the Chinese conglomerates, there are few sectors of the economy where
Bimantara has not become involved. As may be surmised from the
discussion on the monopolies, it may have been the largest beneficiary of the
import and trading monopolies of the 1980s. It currently holds 6 monopolies,
on par with Astra and second only to the Salim group, and has continued,
at least until recently to enjoy profits from trading monopolies, such as in the
oil and gas sector.
Bambang's activities link him to several of the Chinese conglomerates, most
notably to the Satim group and to the enterprises of most of the other
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Suharto family members, as well as to pribumi groups, such as Bakrie, and
a number of smaller pribumi investors. The group has probably more of
smaller pribumi companies under its wings than any of the other Suharto
conglomerates. Among the more important ventures with Liem is the Batam
island project which also includes Timmy Habibie, brother of the minister
responsible for Batam. As pointed out earlier, Bambang may be entering a
massive enterprise with Prajogo Pangestu in Sumatra, also involving his sister
Siti Rukmana.
In addition to what has been said, above and in endnotes, a few recent
examples of the companies expansion may be useful. Bimàntara has become
the largest private Television company, other companies being owned by Siti
Rukmana and Sudwikatmono. Bimantara's investment in television in 1990
was US $ 80 million. [Prospek 22.12. Bimantara has also entered the toll
road business, initially monopolised by Siti Rukmana and later involving
Hutomo and Ibu Tien. Bimantara's venture is with the Summa group of the
Soeryadjaya family. One of the larger current projects of Bimantara is the
expansion of the Indonesian telephone service, earlier mentioned in
connection with Siti, the other concessionaire. In this project, as with the
Batam project, Timmy Habibie is Bambang's and Siti's partner. Again, the
minister responsible is Habibie. When this contract was announced, the
President of Perurntel, the state owned telephone company, told the press
that Minister Habibie had informed Perumtel of the identity of the winners of
this much contested contract. [AWSJ, 15.1.91] This, the paper quoted a
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foreign analyst as saying, "reflected the realities of doing business in
Indonesia today".
As can be seen from this discussion there are essentially two interlocked
groups of people that form what is here termed the capitalist class. One is
a group of Chinese owners of large conglomerates, the other a group of
pribumis, which mainly consists of members of the President's family. The
nature of this capitalist class, or nucleus of a class will be discussed in the
conclusions to the thesis.
Notes
1. Jeffrey Winters, 1988, Indonesia: The Rise of Capital; A Review Essay,
Indonesia, no. 45.
2. A number of sources were consulted for the information contained in the
following endnotes. These include several journals and magazines, the most
important being: Warta Ekonomi, Swa Sembada, Prospek, Info Bank, Expo,
Business News, Tempo and Editor, all published in Jakarta, and the Far
Eastern Economic Review, published in Hong Kong. Three newspapers were
regularly consulted, Kompas of Indonesia, the Asian Wall Street Journal of
Hong Kong and the Straits Times of Singapore. Particularly useful among
these were the following: Warta Ekonomi, Prospek and Swa Sembada, which
published vast amount of previously unpublished information on the
Indonesian corporate world in 1989-1991. Some of this, however, was for
obvious reasons in a somewhat coded language and not too explicit on the
more sensitive companies, but clear enough for providing leads for further
enquiries. The two Hong Kong publications were also very useful. The Asian
Wall Street Journal published from 1986-1991, a number of news stories on
the Indonesian corporate scene, two of which lead to its temporary banning
in Indonesia, and a few relevant surveys of the Indonesian economy. The Far
Eastern Economic Review published a number of relevant items, particularly
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1989-1991, not the least items on concessions and licenses awarded by the
government, as well as on the identity of owners of companies engaged in
major projects. Earlier Expo had published sensitive information of this kind
and was banned in 1984, but important, if sometimes seemingly inaccurate
information had then already been published. Little use was made of this,
however, as better information came to light. The Far Eastern Economic
Review also published useful surveys of the Sa!im group, the Raja Garuda
Mas group and the Sinar Mas group in 1990 and 1991, which supplemented
the somewhat more guarded surveys of the same kind published in
Indonesian magazines. Another useful source was John MacDougal's
Indonesia Reports, particularly the Business and Economy Supplement, not
the least edition no. 20, from February 1987, largely based on Expo. Some
useful points are also contained in endnotes to Kunio's book, Ersatz
Capitalism in Southeast Asia, although this is limited and in some cases
outdated. Lastly, three major surveys of Indonesian companies have been
made for Ph.d. theses, a survey of the Salim Group, the yayasans and other
large companies by Robison in the mid 1970s, a survey of the Salim and the
Astra groups by Kuntjoro-Jakti in the late 1970s, and a survey of the Astra
group and several other groups with interests in the automobile industry by
Chalmers in the mid 1980s. The former two are outdated, but important for
understanding the genesis of the two largest Chinese owned conglomerates,
while Chalmer's study is useful for the companies in the sector surveyed. In
addition to written material, several academics, business men and journalists
in Jakarta and in were consulted, most of whom would prefer not to be
named.
As almost every point of information contained in the following footnotes is
based on more than one source, it is not seen as feasible or particularly
useful to index the sources for each point made, except when there is only
a single source, or if the information is on precise figures or details that have
been projected rather than collected from official sources.
3. The Salim Group has been discussed at various junctures in this thesis.
None of the discussion on the early links between Liem and Suharto will be
repeated here. Its composition, operational methods and its links with the
chief power brokers in indonesia have been analyzed by Robison and by
Kuntjoro-Jakti [1982]. The group has, however, expanded greatly, and
changed significantly since Robison and Kunt]oro-Jakti published their findings.
After Suharto became President, the link between him and Liem was mainly
taken care of by the President's brother in law, Ibnu Bernard Hardoyo, who
was Liem's partner in ventures where the state granted monopoly rights to
Salim companies. Later Suharto's foster brother, Sudwikatmono seems to
have largely replaced Hardoyo. Sudwikatmono is Liem's partner in a vast
holding company, called Liem Investors. In addition to this, Suharto's children
have become Uem's partners in various companies. Sigit and Siti Rukmana
own a combined 33 per cent stake in Liem's Bank Central Asia, the largest
privately owned bank in Indonesia, with US $ 4 billion in assets in 1990.
Suharto's second son, Bambang, is Liem's partner in the huge Batam island
industrial estate, along with the brother of Habibie, the minister responsible
for Batam. The brother of Murdani is also involved in one of the major Salim
ventures in this region. Suharto companies are partners with Liem in several
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monopoly ventures, Liem being the single or joint holder of 17 of the 44
privately held monopolies in Indonesia.
The Salim group has interests in almost every sector of the Indonesian
economy. Its chief cash cow in the 1970s was undoubtedly the Bogasari
Flour Mill, which has enjoyed virtual monopoly rights on milling wheat in
Indonesia. Its sole competitor was eased out of this business in 1980.
Bogasari mills wheat and soyabeans for Bulog, the state procurement agency,
which has monopoly on imports, purchase and wholesale on various food,
including wheat. According to FEER (14.3.91) Bogasari now earns US $ 116
per tonne of wheat for milling, which according to the same source, based
on western estimates, may be US $ .40 above production costs. With
monopoly access to one of the larger markets in the world, Bogasari has
produced huge profits for Liem, and the Suharto family over the years. The
Suharto connection in this instance is fourfold, one is through Sudwikatmono's
share in the company. Another is through Lt. Gen. Bustanil Arifin, one of the
chief business generals since the late 1960s, the head of Bulog, Bogasari's
monopoly customer, and a member of the Suharto family through his wife.
Bustanil is responsible for providing Bogasari with most of its business at
inflated prices, while his wife, owns 21 per cent of Bogasari, in an almost
unusually blatant overlapping of private interests with public office. The third
and fourth links are through two yayasans, the Harapan 'Kita, controlled by
Suharto's wife, and Kostrad's Dharma Putra, a foundation set up by Suharto,
who most probably continues to be one of its chief beneficiaries, or
controllers. These two foundations have received between 20 and 26 per
cent of Bogasari's profits through special stipulation in its charter. Among
other large Salim ventures is Indocement Tunggal Praksa, operator of the
world's largest cement factory, a company bailed out by the state through a
35 per cent stake bought after the company had incurred severe losses.
Sudwikatmono is among its chief shareholders. The company was recently
accused, in the Indonesian and Hong Kong press, of failing to pay Pertamina
for gas supplies in an orderly fashion. A third venture is Krakataua Steel,
which Liem is rumoured to have expanded at the request of the government
with little immediate profit. This company is often cited as an example of a
supposed two way link between the state and the conglomerates, where the
latter are said to shoulder burdens for the purposes of a national industrial
strategy. The same has been said of Liem's vast investments in Batam,
which are mostly long term investments with limited initial profits, but a huge
potential for profits later on. Yet another Liem ventures with Suharto
participation were the controversial steel, plastics and tin plate monopolies.
These will be briefly discussed below in sections on Suharto companies. Still
another profitable monopoly shared with the Suharto family is the clove import
monopoly, shared with the President's brother, Probosutedjo. Other large
companies of Liem include Waringin Kencana, a company with various links
with Suharto yayasans, which was singled out in the early 1970s as deserving
special attention in a government investigation into corruption, as mentioned
in an earlier chapter. This investigation failed to take place, in spite of open
criticism in the press at the time.
Monopoly positions granted by the state has been the dominant feature of
Liem's success. Apart from the flour, steel and cement production
monopolies, or quasi-monopolies mentioned above, and the profitable imports
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monopolies, Liem enjoys monopoly rights in several sectors of the economy,
including liquified gas transport, petro-chemical products, chemicals,
agricultura' produce and processed foods. [WE, 21.1.91]
As discussed at relevant junctures in endnotes below, Liem has formed highly
important links with a number of other Chinese conglomerates. His
companies can be seen as the linchpin of the extensive and intensive
integration of major Indonesian companies, a feature of great political
significance, discussed in the main body of the text.
In the past few years Liem has invested heavily abroad, making his
companies global in organisation and scale. According to the FEER and the
AWJ, Liem now derives between third and a half of his turnover from
companies registered abroad. Some of these, however, operate exclusively
in Indonesia, including some of his Hong Kong registered companies. In
1990, tJem became the largest landlord in Singapore with acquisition of a
controlling stake in Singapore Land. The Salim group now controls two of
the ten largest companies in Singapore. The Hong Kong registered First
Pacific Company, controlled by Liem, has operations in several countries of
Asia, Europe and North America. FEER estimates its assets at well over US
$ 1 billion and claims its companies to number 75 in 24 countries. The First
Pacific group has a controlling interest in the Dutch Hagemeyer trading
company, which has expanded in recent years to become' the largest trading
house (handeishuis) in Holland. Hagemeyer has a turnover of almost US $
1.5 billion, profits in 1990 of US $ 150 million, according to the Dutch
newspaper NRC Handelsblad, a presence in Holland, America, Indonesia,
Malaysia and Singapore, and is seeking (in early 1991) to win control of
another major Dutch trading house, the lnternatio-Muller group, a company
with 12.000 employees. [NRC Handelsbiad, 15.5.91]
The American Fortune Magazine ranked Liem as the 32nd richest man in the
World in 1990. The FEER estimated his group turnover in 1990 as US $ 8
billion. Warta Ekonomi suggested a somewhat lower figure of US $ 6 billion.
Pusat Bisnis Indonesia estimated the number of Uem controlled companies
at 236. In early 1991, there were persistent rumours in the Indonesian press
that Liem's son and heir, Anthony Salim, who now oversees daily operations
of the Salim group, would move his domicile, or even his citizenship, to
Singapore.
4. The Astra group of the Soeryajaya family is in many ways quite different
from the Salim group and most of the other large conglomerates. For one
thing, Astra has always relied on manufacturing, which is a more recent trend
with most of the other large conglomerates. Astra has also been far less
integrated with business ventures of Suharto and the ruling group, and has,
in recent years, relied to a lesser extent on political privilege than most of the
other top companies. Astra has, however, enjoyed various monopolies and
presently holds 6 of the 44 privately held monopolies in Indonesia. These
include chemicals, agricultural produce and importation of bulldozers and
forklifts. [WE, 21.1.1991] Political contacts were also probably vital for the
company's initial growth. In the early days of the New Order Astra was
frequently associated with Ibnu Sutowo and some of its business ventures
were linked to the Suharto family through Ibu Tien Suharto. Astra received
early government contacts, such as in power generating and in supply of
trucks, its became early on an attractive partner to Japanese firms, which
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must have meant a degree of assumed political clout, and it engaged in joint
ventures with Pertamina and Sutowo. The company was shaken by the
Pertamina scandal in the mid 1970s, and reorganised in the wake of this.
In spite of these roots of the company, Astra has been seen as somewhat
detached from the Suharto-Liem arrangement that has been a feature of
almost every other sizeable conglomerate. Astra has mainly grown through
manufacture and import of motor vehicles and heavy equipment, the latter
being an area that became highly profitable as construction and infrastructure
development took of in the wake of the oil boom. Astra became the Toyota
agent and manufacturer in a joint venture with the government in 1970, the
Honda agent a year later and since then it added Daihatsu, Peugeot (in joint
venture with Suharto's brother, Probosutedjo), Renault and BMW to its
automotive division. Other automotive businesses of Astra include joint
ventures with the Wanandi family, which has various links to the New Order
generals. In recent years Astra has expanded significantly into computers,
agribusiness and banking. It has also expanded overseas, not the least
through banking ventures in Germany, based on Summa bank, and more
recently in Vietnam where it established the first joint venture bank in the
country in 1990, Bank Indovina. The Summa bank is partner to Nandlatul
Ulama in a banking venture in Indonesia. Astra also has a majority stake in
Bank Universal. Astra has a major forestry division with 250.000 hectares of
forest and investment of US $ 650 million, but its attempt to establish a vast
pulp project with Scott Paper of America where thwarted by international and
domestic popular environmental concern in 1989. A far smaller venture, but
of interest to this discussion, is a Summa - Bimantara (Bambang Trihatmodjo)
license to build and operate a US $ 100 million toll road from downtown
Jakarta to its souther suburbs. Several other schemes of this type had
previously been awarded to Suharto's children, in some cases, at least,
without a °cukong" participation.
The publicly listed part of the Soeryajaya conglomerate, Astra International
reported assets of US $ 750 million in mid 1990. Sales by this company and
companies under its wings were projected at US $ 2 billion that year. [FEER
27.9.901
5. The Sinar Mas group of Eka Cipta Wijaya is primarily engaged in agro-
industry, although it also has important business in real estate, banking,
chemicals and shipping among other things. it is extensively linked to the
Salim group and in a lesser way to Suharto companies and indirectly to
Murdani and Habibie. Bimoli, Indonesia's largest producer of cooking oil is
jointly owned by Sinar Mas and the Salim group, this being the most
important of several connections between Eka Cipta and Liem Sioe Liong.
Bimoli enjoys around 60 per cent market share of this important product.
[WE, 11.2.911 Sinar Mas owns Bank international Indonesia, one of the larger
private banks in the country, as well as a controlling interest in Bank Pelita.
Sinar Mas shares majority control with the Salim group in a large and fast
growing farm venture on Bulan island in the Riau province. This farming
venture, Sinar Culindo Perkasa, aims for a 50 per cent share of the pork meat
market in Singapore in a few years time, currently supplying up to 15 per cent
of all pork eaten in Singapore. [FEER, 18.10.901 Sinar Culindo Perkasa also
represents a Sinar Mas link to two important New Order figures. Along with
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the Salim group, Harry Murdani, Benny's brother, and Timmy Habibie, brother
of Minister Habibie, are partners in this venture.
Sinar Mas is directly linked to Suharto companies through shareholdings in
the company by Sudwikatmono and by Hutomo Mandala Putra. The extensive
links between Sinar Mas and the Salim group were reportedly under some
strain in late 1990. [FEER, 25.10.90.]
6. Suhargo Gondokusomo has primarily built his Dharmala group on trading
in agricultural produce. The group has enjoyed close links with Bulog and
its boss, Bustanil Arifin, who in turn is directly related to the Suharto family
and its enterprises. Gondokusomo is related by marriage to Cow Swie Kie,
whose company has enjoyed even stronger links to Bulog, being its exclusive
agent for procurement of rice and sugar from abroad. His empire, and that
of Gondokusomo was, according to Expo [18.1.84], brought into being by
privileged contracts with Bulog. In recent years the Dharma!a group has
expanded into real estate, construction, banking, insurance and consumer
products. The group has also expanded significantly its international
operations with assets in several countries.
7. The Lippo group of Mochtar Riyadi has particularly strong links to the Salim
group of Liem Sloe Liong. It is strongest in banking, owning the Lippo bank,
one of the major private banks, a 20 per cent share of BCA, the largest
private bank in the country, jointly owned with Liem and two Suharto children.
Riyadi managed BCA on behalf of its main owners for several years. He has
stakes in several other banking ventures, such as Bank Umum Asia and a
merchant bank in Hong Kong. The Lippo group has expanded into electronics
in joint ventures with, among others, the Mitsubishi company of Japan. Riyadi
is related to the owners of Panin bank by marriage, and managed that bank
for some time. Apart from Liem Sioe Liong, Riady has also worked with
Hasyim Ning, one of the three largest pribumi non-Suharto businessmen.
8. Bob Hasan has already been mentioned on several occasions in the main
body of the text and in endnotes to a previous chapter. This indicated the
very strong and early links he has had with Suharto and his family. None of
this will be repeated here.
Bob Hasan's companies include Nusamba, which he owns jointly with Sigit,
Suharto's eldest son. This company holds three different monopolies in oil
transportation, forestry products and furniture. Hasan has a major presence
in Indonesian shipping through three different companies, one of them being
the largest shipping company in the country, according to Expo in 1984. The
largest of his enterprises, however, are in the forestry industry where he has
long enjoyed a preeminent position. His companies, some of them linked to
Suharto companies, are engaged in logging, plywood production and in the
rattan industry. These have benefitted greatly from government policy aimed
at favouring domestic plywood and rattan production. One of reportedly more
profitable of Hasan's business is oil marketing for Pertamina through a Hong
Kong based company, Perta Oil Marketing, which is jointly owned by Bob
Hassan, Hutomo Mandala Putra and Pertamina. This company sells up to
80.000 barrels of oil per day, mainly to China, and supplies some 60.000
barrels a day to Pertamina, mainly bought from foreign oil companies in
Indonesia. Another joint venture with Hutomo's Humpuss group is the airliner
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Sempati, which was previously owned by the army company TUB, but was
granted license to fly jets after Hutomo and Hasan took it over, such a license
having been denied to all other airline companies, except Garuda.
9. Prajogo Pangestu is the largest forestry concessionaire in Indonesia. His
exploitation rights extend to an area two thirds the size of Holland, some 2.2
million hectares of forest. Pangestu works in partnership on several projects
with Suharto's daughter, Siti Hardiyanti Rukmana, and seems to have become
a favourite "cukong" of the Suharto family in recent years. The joint ventures
with Siti Rukmana include pulp and other forestry industry, as well as
petrochemicals and real estate. [WE, 24.4.1990 and 11.2. 1991, and AWSJ,
20.12. 90] Prajogo has also worked on a major project with Bambang's
Bimantara group and with Sudwikatmono. His largest projects to date, and
the largest industrial projects under way in Indonesia are his proposed
petrochemical complex and his pulp and paper complex in Sumatra. These
two projects are collectively worth over US $ 5 billion and rank among the
larger industrial projects currently planned in Asia.[AWSJ 20.12.90] In the
petrochemical project Prajogo's partner is Bambang's Bimantara group, and
in the paper and pulp project the partner is Siti Rukmana's Lamtoro group.
The former project had originally been awarded to a consortium led by the
Shell oil company. One of its minor partners was to be Bmantara. This was
seen by many as a political guarantee for the projects success. The sudden
reversal of the government's position may not have been unconnected to a
larger role given to Bimantara in Prajogo's successful bid and to a role given
to Siti Rukmana's company as well. This incident was covered fairly
extensively in the Indonesian and Hong Kong based international press.
Apart from this project, Prajogo shares another petrochemical venture with
Bimantara, a US $ 260 million project where Sudwikatmono seems to be a
partner too [WE 11.2.91]. Prajogo and Bambang also jointly own a bank,
Bank Andromeda. The third partner in this bank is Henri Pribadi,
Sudwikatmono's close associate, and former director of one of Liem's largest
companies, Indocement.
As can be seen from the above, Prajogo has emerged as one of the main
cukongs of the Suharto family and one of the foremost industrialists in
Indonesia. His companies are thoroughly integrated with the Suharto family
business empire, and Prajogo has emerged as one of the ten or so
individuals that form the core of the Suharto-Liem dominated core of the
Indonesian economy, This is a recent development, as he was relatively
unknown in Indonesia, at least outside the timber industry, only two years
ago. [See e.g. AWSJ 20.12.90]
10. The Wanandi family enjoyed particularly close relations with two of the
ruling group's generals, Murtopo and Humardhani. This was both through
the right wing think tank, the CSIS, which gave intellectual shape to some of
the New Order's policies, not least the system of accumulation pioneered by
Humardhani and Murtopo, and the role of Chinese capital in a "national
industrial strategy", and through ventures with Japanese capital. Following
Humardhani's lead, the Wanandis established joint ventures with Japanese
capital. One of the Wanandi companies with Japanese connections, the
Parkarti group, was jointly owned with Panglaykim, the CSIS economist, and
with Humdardhani's son-in-law. Among the largest of the Wanandi companies
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are battery factories and component manufacturers for the automotive
industry.
11. Sukanto's Raja Garuda Mas originates in Medan. Sukanto has nurtured
links with several of the largest Chinese business houses in Indonesia and
grown through such contacts. The patrons of his business ventures have
included Liem Sloe Liong and Eka Cipta, two of the core companies in the
late New Order business arrangements. One of his original patrons was
Pertamina in Ibnu Sutowo's days. Lt. Gen. Tjokropranolo, the former
Governor of Jakarta and personal aid to Suharto sits on the board of
Sukanto's company. Sukanto's plantation ventures have been primarily
financed through low-interest World Bank money. (FEER, 11.4.91) These
plantations are among the largest in the world.
12. Ciputra, now one of the wealthiest men in Indonesia by most accounts,
started as a manager for Pembangunan Jaya, a company owned by the
Jakarta regional government. When Ciputra, in 1983, put US $ 29 million of
his own money into Liem Sloe Liong's Krakataua Steel, it was pointed out by
Expo (4.1.84) that the total contribution of Pembangunan Jaya to the Jakarta
government for the preceding year had been around 1 per cent of Ciputra's
new stake in Krakataua Steel. Expo also claimed in the same issue that
Ciputra had personally received half of the shares in Hotel Horizon in Ancol
for providing its site through Pembangunan Jaya. (According to Expo, half of
this stake was intended for All Sadikin, then governor, but as he fell out of
political favour before the deal was consummated, Ciputra took the half share
for himself alone) Pembangunan Jaya did not prosper to anything like the
same extent as its manager, Ciputra, and this company, which was at one
time among the most important in Indonesia has fallen by the wayside in
recent years. Expo accused Ciputra quite openly of corruption. The magazine
was banned for this and other similar articles on Indonesia's corporate world.
In recent years Ciputra has become the largest real estate dealer and
developer in Indonesia. He has primarily focused on Jakarta where his
government position and contacts have probably not hurt his business. One
of his residential projects there is the large Pondok lndah project. His main
partner has been Liem Sloe Liong. Their joint company, Metropolitan
Kencana, (Liem's Waringin Kencana, which was accused in the Indonesian
Press of extensive corruption in the 1970s, and Ciputra's Metropolitan real
estate group, which he built up during his long term of office at
Pembangunan Jaya), is the largest realtor in Indonesia. Apart from this
company, Ciputra and Uem have several other close business links, including
a steel mill (other than Krakataua).
13. Soedarpo Sastrosatomo is a clear and almost singular exception from
many of the main features of the Indonesian business world highlighted in
these endnotes and at various points in the main body of the text. Soedarpo
is a Javanese non-military business man, a priyayi trained for the colonial civil
service, who prospered through the Benteng programme in the 1950s. His
contacts were good at the time, his brother being a PSI leader, and he
himself a former diplomat in New York and Washington, but such contacts did
not suffice to build up businesses among other well connected Javanese.





companies in Indonesia. He also has a major stake in a large bank, Bank
Niaga, and companies in the computer and pharmaceutical industries.
14. The Bakrie and Brothers company is by far the largest of the surviving
Sumatran trading companies mentioned earlier in the thesis. Originally the
company traded coffee, rubber, pepper and other agricultural produce in its
home province, Lampung. During the Benteng period, the company
prospered on various connections in Jakarta and after the nationalisation of
the Dutch companies, Bakrie went into steel production and became the
largest producer of steel pipes in the country during the New Order. After
some difficulties in the early New Order period, Bakrie has expanded fast in
recent years, not the least on various links with Suharto companies. One of
these was the plastic import monopoly of the mid 1980s. Nirwan Bakrie, son
of Achmed the founder of Bakrie and Brothers, was a director of Panca
Holdings, along with Bambang, Suharto's son, a company that was set up in
Hong Kong to manage the plastics monopoly. This company made US $ 30
million in one year, according to the AWSJ (25.11.86), for handling paperwork.
Nirwan Bakrie is also involved with Barnbang in several other projects,
including oil trading, and so is Indra Bakrie, his younger brother, a
schoolmate of Bambang's. The Bakrie involvement in lucrative oil trading for
Pertamina was not restricted to Nirwan's association with Bambang. The
Bakries set up a company for these purposes in Hong Kong with
Sudwikatmono, Suharto's foster brother. For a while in the mid 1980s, the
two Suharto related companies, both with Bakrie involvement competed for
this Pertamina business, which was said to produce profits of around US $
1 per barrel of oil. The amount of oil involved was over 1 million barrels a
month. This competition was later ended with an acceptable compromise,
benefitting the Bakries, Bambang, Sudwikatmono and Indra Rukmana,
Suharto's son in law. Bakrie and Brother has expanded into various sectors
in recent years, such as hotels, petrochemicals and telecommunication.
15. Lt. Gen. Sjarnoebi Said is one of the very few military entrepreneurs to
have built a large sustainable business to rival the medium sized Chinese
conglomerates. In this he shares a place with his patron, Ibnu Sutowo. Said
was an intelligence officer in ABRI and later a staff officer with Gen. Nasution.
At the start of the New Order regime he was transferred to Pertamina where
he worked under Sutowo. One of his jobs there was to head a division
responsible for Pertamina's motor vehicles. This provided him with contacts
and position which resulted in him setting up a firm to assemble and
distribute Mitsubishi motor cars. Said ran this venture, which became the
Krama Yudha group, parallel to his work for Pertamina, until he left at the time
of the Pertamina crisis in the mid 1970s. According to Kunio [1988] Said's
capital for the Krama Yudah works came "from saving accumulated during the
Pertamina period". Sutowo was originally Said's partner in Krama Yudah, but
seems to have ended his involvement in the company in 1980. [Chalmers,
1988]
16. Ibnu Sutowo was extensively discussed in endnotes to an earlier chapter.
This will not be repeated here. It suffices to add at this point that Sutowo
has focused on his hotel and shipping business, which is large enough to
make his company no. 45 on WE's list. The Adiguna shipyards, managed by
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Sutowo's son, Ponco, a prominent business man in Kadin, Hipmi and Golkar,
does not figure among Indonesia's 200 largest companies. lbnu Sutowo was
thought to be the richest pribumi business man in the 1970s, and Ponco was
seen only few years ago as potentially a major player in the future. The
relative decline of this father and son illustrates how continued access to
political privilege provides the lifeblood to Indonesian business.
17. It seems clear that the Sultan's companies have declined sharply in
relative terms since the 1970s. Robison [1986] focused on the Sultan group
as the major pribumi concern, apart from Suharto's own interests, which had
at that time, not taken on the form of large conglomerates.
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CHAPTER 13
A NEW MIDDLE CLASS?
Evidence on a group of people, commonly referred to as the middle class,
is scant in Indonesia, largely anecdotal and almost non-existent with regard
to several vital questions. This is the group, however, that most observers
have looked to as the key element of political development in the country.
The search for a middle class in Indonesia and the political values associated
with such groupings in western societies is far from new, contrary to what
may be surmised from much recent commentary on the subject. Although
the term middle class has not been made much use of in the past, the
search for similarly constituted and characterised elements has been a
continuing theme since modern social science was first applied to the country.
This long standing, and often unfruitful search, alerts to important points with
regard to current ventures, one of which will be made here at the outset of
this chapter. This is the assertion that none of the maIn frameworks used for
this search could have adequately prepared their user from what has
transpired with regard to the middle classes, and still less for analyzing their
politics in the 1990s.
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It is not necessary to go into the history of this search here. The analytical
powers, for longer term developments, of the theoretical frameworks in
question has been discussed in a more general context in earlier chapters.
It suffices to point out that culturally focused studies, informed by
modernisation theories, have generally, either organised their description of
society around the Javanese or Indonesian mind, or they have focused on the
patrimonial ways of the country.
Neither approach, related as they are, was likely to find much evidence of
emerging middle classes. Both have, in fact, offered convincing explanations
for the non-existence of middle classes in Indonesia and 'the value systems
associated with them. These frameworks generally offered a static picture of
a society where cultural or psychological factors operated within a tradition
bound patrimonial polity. The dynamics they look for are changes at the level
of an individual, a change of attitude. In their search they focus on events
and reactions to events to find evidence of changes or continuity in culturally
determined patterns. These events and reactions to them, as pointed out at
various times above are, often highly misleading for the nature of the change
taking place. While the politics of the country have continued to be
characterised by ancient symbolism and while bizarre events have captured
much attention, Indonesia has been transformed as an economy and as a
polity.
The static pictures drawn in this way may be highly useful for understanding
day to day expressions of political conflict, but fail comprehensively to explain
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the rapid transformation of the political environment that is currently taking
place. This is not, however, to deny some essential insights offered by such
frameworks, and in the chapter that follow this one, an attempt will be made
to draw on some of this.
It is of much interest to note that to a significant extent, it seems possible to
generalise and say that western academics tend to associate an emerging
middle class in Indonesia with hopes for democracy and "modernisation",
while Indonesian intellectuals tend to view the new middle class in negative
terms, seeing it as a group almost alien to the rest of society, a group
possessing limited political potential, and chiefly characteried by westernised
consumption patterns and foreign lifestyle. [1] These differences are revealing
for the issues at stake, and for the nature of the phenomenon the concept
of a middle class is meant to explain, or at least describe.
For western observers, academics included, a middle class is primarily a
phenomenon associated with a social transformation away from traditional,
patrimonial and arbitrary ways of governing towards modern, rational and
institutionalised systems of politics. Thus, the concept of a middle class does
not so much indicate specific class interests as a constituency for
modernisation and rationality. For this reason, there has been a continuity in
western search for modernisation from the focus on westernised intellectuals
of earlier times to the present focus on the middle classes. The search is not
for a class, as much as for "modernity" in the general sense of rationality in
social organisation arid institutionalised regulation of politics.
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Indonesia provides a rich scenery for a Weberian search for agents of
modernity. The priyayi aristocrats, the patrimonial bureaucrats, the complex
and fused world of Javanese cosmological perceptions, the military politics of
patronage and the prevalence of religious conceptions of society provides a
field where even somewhat unpromising potential agents of modernisation and
rationality receive attention.
This search for modernity, however, is more implicit than explicit in much
commentary on the middle class. The group is seen as a class or an entity
that may, or may not be, a bearer of the values western observers are
looking for. Those who are "pessimistic' point to the continued prevalence
of personalised patronage as the chief means of interest articulation. Those
who are "optimists" point to evidence of an emerging secular, meritocratic,
urbanised culture. In essence the question revolves around the extent to
which a two or three century old European experience is being replicated in
Indonesia. What may look to a western observer as an emerging force for
pushing Indonesia down a well understood historical pathway, may, to an
Indonesian, look like a group that has adopted a foreign lifestyle devoid of
political content.
The pitfall in this case is in the conceptualisation of a middle class. For most
observers, a middle class is defined by shared consumption patterns rather
than by firmly rooted interests. At the same time the class is frequently
associated with political values which would set it apart from much of society.
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The unstated assumption must be that political values are rooted in patterns
of consumption, or in a phenomenon influencing both consumption and
political values. The former possibility, as pointed out below, is not likely to
be a valid assumption, while the latter is certainly possible as radical change
in political values is more likely to be rooted in economic change than in
changing tastes for consumption. The link, however, is far from automatic.
Economic change that leads to changing patterns of consumption does not
necessarily turn all consumers into democrats.
To both westerners and Indonesians, the issue is also one of westernisation,
either in terms of a replication of the historical transformation of western
political experience, or, to many Indonesians, in the sense of aping an alien
and occasionally offensive lifestyle. As pointed out below, the
conceptualisation of a class on the basis of consumption patterns may be of
little used for political analysis, while the general question of westernisation
may not represent the most fundamental issues at stake with regard to middle
classes.
Before examining these issues and analyzing the possible political role of an
Indonesian middle class, it is useful to estimate the size of the groups now
commonly classified as the middle class. Harold Crouch, writing in 1984,
estimated that less than 5 per cent of the population belonged to what he
termed "well off urban classes". [Crouch: 1984] Crouch based his figures
partly on a survey of occupations, which indicated that 6.4 per cent of the
workforce was engaged in administrative or clerical jobs, while just under 13
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per cent were employed in "sales", and partly on surveys of ownership of
consumer durables, which indicated that just over 5 per cent of the population
owned a television set, close to 9 per cent was in possession of a motor-
cycle and just over 2 per cent owned a car. On a similar basis Crouch
estimated the size of the middle class in Singapore at 40 per cent and in
Malaysia at 25 per cent of the population.
This type of criteria is often used for determining the size of the middle class.
Such surveys have been debated in the context of the Philippines, and
extensively in the context of India, where middle class membership is most
often estimated at a far higher level than Crouch's 5 l5er cent figure for
Indonesia. Recent surveys have indicated that up to 200 million people, or
more than 20 per cent of the Indian population may be classified as middle
class on the basis of ownership of television sets, scooters and refrigerators,
and on the more general criteria measuring the extent to which people
procure goods and services through exchange of money.
Mackie, writing in 1986, thought the 5 per cent estimate of Crouch too low.
[Mackie, 1986] He finds a figure of 10 per cent too high, not the least
because this would indicate a pribumi middle class of around 2.4 million
families, as he estimates the Chinese middle class at a minimum of 600.000
families. On this basis, the 5 per cent figure would indicate a pribumi middle
class of around 1 million families, or 4.5 million individuals in the early 1980s.
In pribumi society, less than 3 per cent would then be classified as middle
class. The higher figure, which Mackie finds implausible, would indicate a
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pribumi middle class of closer to 7 per cent of indigenous society. Although
Mackie does not compute his figures in this way, the pribumi middle class,
on this criteria, would be somewhere between the "probably too low" 3 per
cent, and the "almost certainly too high" 7 per cent. Compared to most
societies in Asia, Europe and America, the Indonesian pribumi middle class
is, according to this criteria, a minuscule formation, a conclusion that
eyewitness estimates have tended to support, at least until recently. Figures
for membership of professional groups, which in western societies is one of
the chief components of middle classes, also indicate how small this class
may be. Figures quoted by Mackie may be outdated, but are still indicative,
3.500 lawyers, 15.000 doctors and 40.000 engineers in a opulation of some
160 million in the early 1980s.
However informative these figures on the middle class in Indonesia may be,
they are not of much use on their own, and may be ultimately of little use in
political analysis unless supplemented with a much clearer understanding of
nature of the emerging middle class. For these purposes the middle classes
can not be looked at as an analytical entity but have to be examined as a
collection of diverse groups, where interests may coincide at some points,
and radically diverge at others.
With regard to relations to production, the concept of middle class, if at all
analyzed, is usually taken to cover groups in between the ruling class on the
one hand and workers and peasants on the other. This reference to ruling
classes and lower classes has lost much of its meaning in casual use of the
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term, particularly in several industrialised countries, such as Japan, the United
States and lately, Singapore, where the entire population apart from relatively
small groups of workers are frequently seen as middle class.
In mainstream third world analysis, the term has most often been used to
describe a group consisting of such elements as office workers, both private
and public, academics, professionals, shopkeepers and even skilled factory
workers where such a position is relatively high and rare. The occupational
background, though, most often seems unimportant, except as a source of
earnings. Marxist scholars have tended to use the concept sparsely,
probably not the least because traditional Marxist analysis puts the middle
class on the side of the workers and against the bourgeoisie, a contingency
that would most often seem at variance with reality.
In the context of Indonesia, it is of much importance in this respect to know
the relative sizes of groups earning salaries from the state, groups directly
engaged by private conglomerates, or selling services to such companies and
groups earning their living from independent small businesses. In addition,
the geographic distribution, religious affiliation and racial composition of this
group is of vital importance. Little of this, however, is known, except by
imprecise conjecture based on an arbitrary criteria of middle class
membership.
To remedy this lack of data would require a massive research undertaking
that would be well outside the limited scope of this thesis. The questions
311
raised by the existence and compothion of a group referred to as a middle
class are, however, vital for understanding the chief concerns of this thesis.
Some of these will therefor be discussed in this current chapter and attempts
will be made to deduce limited conclusions from this discussion, informed by
theories and evidence atready presented in earlier chapters.
The first point that needs to be made is on a clear separation between the
small class of people discussed in the preceding chapter, and termed there
as the emerging capitalist class, and a far larger and more diverse grouping
termed the middle class. This separation is not at all clear in all discussion
on class in Indonesia. The argument for this separthion is obvious, if
relations to production, or more generally, occupation, is seen as important.
The case for separation is far less clear, if class membership is determined
chiefly by such basic consumption or life style patterns as procurement of
goods through modern supermarkets and services through exchange of
money.
Such categorisation is not only deceptive with regard to politics because of
a point raised earlier, that is the difference in political implications of, e.g. a
class of independently employed muslim traders in Sumatra, and one of
Chinese christian white collar workers in a Jakarta conglomerate, but also
because of another more subtle factor. This is the question of identification
of interests and loyalties. As immediately evident to a visitor to Indonesian
cities, there is now a fast growing army of pribumi, partly modernist muslim,
workers in air conditioned offices of private and public firms.	 In the
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increasingly neat, cool and comfortable offices, people with very different
salaries rub shoulders. As pointed out by several observers interviewed in
Jakarta, and in numerous newspaper and magazine articles, starting with a
debate and several feature articles in Kompas in 1986 and again in 1989,
something of an identifiable culture, associated with air-conditioned offices,
has sprung up. The vital question in this respect, however, remains entirely
unanswered, and mostly unasked. This is the question of identification and
loyalties of the vast majority of these office workers who return from their daily
air-conditioned existence to nights and weekends in the distinctly less
advantaged kampungs of the big cities. One ex-patriate employer in Jakarta
pointed out that contrary to his experience in most other dountries, his office
workers in Indonesia stayed in their offices long after finishing work at night.
This he presented as evidence of their identification with this particular life-
style rather than with the waiting kampung. In a more decisive situation, than
the question of when to go home, this identification might prove to be
different. This, however, is quite unknown and very little evidence exists as
a basis for any conjecture of the political identification of a middle class,
constituted by elements more related by the way they spend their money than
the ways in which they earn it.
This point becomes clearer if one moves away from the air conditioned offices
of Jakarta. A fundamental difference in political outlook and interests can be
surmised from a point well made in a conference paper by Kenneth Young.
[2] Young points out that the majority of those prospering in rural areas
"have flourished within authoritarian political structures, and have adapted
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their strategies for personal gains to this environment' 1 . Young refers to the
assumed "forward looking" and "modern" aspirations of the urban middle
classes and concludes that their rural counterparts, may be inclined to resist
a capitalist transformation of the countryside. The rural middle class may
indeed resist attempts at dismantling the politics of patronage and is an
unlikely agent of democratisation.
The assumed modern, forward looking and democratic potential of the urban
middle class may also prove elusive. Western academic focus in this respect
has been on the "problem solvers" of the 1950s, the technocrats of the 1960s
and 1970s, the rapidly multiplying professional managers'of the 1980s, their
supposedly professional counterparts in the army, the business men looking
for a regularised and predictable economic environment instead of past
caprice, and the intellectuals writing for Kompas, Tempo and the business
magazines. The accelerating movement towards a modern and democratic
polity that might be assumed from these writings may, however, have less to
do with democracy than modernity.
The development of large middle classes in Latin America did not bring about
democratic politics. As pointed out in a discussion earlier in this thesis on
authoritarian regimes in Latin America, middle class elements frequently
formed the backbone of military dictatorships. These regimes, in their latest,
and just possibly their final phase, served the interests of domestic
monopolistic capital tied to and relying on large, bureaucratic and
interventionist states that both protected domestic capital and facilitated
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investment from international capital. In this they enjoyed much support from
a middle class composed of officials in overgrown bureaucracies, managerial
staff of domestic monopolist conglomerates, privileged professionals and
intellectuals and the officer corps of interventionist military forces.
The drawing of a simplistic parallel with Latin America should be avoided, but
at the same time the comparison is informative. So is a comparison with
other larger and more developed middle classes elsewhere, such as in
Thailand, in Pakistan, in Singapore, in Malaysia and in the Philippines. In none
of these cases can the middle classes be said to have developed an early
inclination for democracy, and in all cases, they have, attimes, acquiesced
to or even supported, to the extent such things can be ascertained or
surmised, moves away from inclusionary politics in favour of the limited
pluralism typical of bureaucratic authoritarian regimes. Such limited pluralism
protects elites from the dangers of a franchise extended to the lower classes,
but allows, at the same time, certain liberties among privileged groups.
In Indonesia, the middle classes, as commonly spoken of, is a collection of
such elites. As pointed out, in a different context, by Abdurrahman Wahid,
"what constitutes the elite in other countries is seen as the middle class in
Indonesia". [3] Wahid further pointed out that the backbone of this class is
not formed by entrepreneurial groups but by civil servants, military officers
and professionals.
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It is in this that the problem lies with regard to the assumed democratic
tendencies of the middle class in Indonesia. The class, as it is constituted
and defined, has only a limited interest in an open, pluralistic and regularised
society, and has much to lose from a rapid development towards an effective
universal franchise.
Samuel Huntington, in a much quoted statement, claimed that the historical
role of the military was to "open the door to the middle class and close it on
the lower class". [4] This statement, made at a time of a growing trend of
military dictatorships in Latin America and in Asia, including Indonesia,
coupled with a shift towards industrialisation and international trade, has
certainly held true in Indonesia. The door was closed on landless peasants
and workers at the birth of the New Order, while the door has now opened
for a creation of what might be termed a middle class. As argued in this
thesis, however, the New Order regime was created not for the benefit of a
middle class, but for a group that is turning into a capitalist class.
The middle class has been a byproduct rather than an intended effect, and
its political clout, or the lack of it is in line with this incidental creation.
Although, as argued before, parallels with European experience of middle
class political values and interests are hazardous, and largely misleading, the
process of middle class creation in indonesia is in many ways similar to what
happened in Europe. This process in Europe, it should be noted, is an
ongoing one. The roots of this process are in the growing complexity of
business, production and of society in general. The need for professional
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managers in powerful positions, both in private enterprise and in government
departments grows in tandem with this complexity. An army of managers,
often in a position of real economic and political power, and of professionals
vastly outnumbers the owners of firms and members of political elites in
exclusionary polities. This process is very clearly under way in Indonesia.
It has, so far, however, not lead to a discernable process of middle class
political interests articulation, but, as argued before, only to a very limited
extension of a carefully managed system of elite inclusion.
This is much in line with the way the more dynamic sections of the middle
class seem to be formed. No data exists on this, of' course, but from
interviews in Jakarta with business men, academics and journalists, a strong
impression is formed of a middle class growing and expanding in a process
closely related to the way the capitalist class has grown around the Suharto -
cukong partnership. Small business men, professional managers at various
levels, professionals and academics are in fast increasing numbers securing
a comfortable existence under the umbrellas of conglomerates, banks and
state institutions. Political contacts at a high level are not needed for this, it
suffices to establish contacts at lower reaches of the numerous overlapping
hierarchies of patronage. One Indonesian academic explained: "If you have
an empty garage and some basic contacts you can set up as a distributor
for firms that in turn rely on conglomerate or state business. If you have a
university degree, some basic contacts and a computer, you set up as a
consultant, usually once or twice removed from the conglomerates, but still
dependent on the business they generate, unless of course you use your
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computer to turn out something for the development business, and then also,
once or twice removed from the real source, which is state controlled".
Outside the big cities there are different hierarchies at work. As explained by
Kenneth Young, there are parallel hierarchies in rural area consisting of
officers of regional and local governments, village officials, village heads,
military officers, police officers, local representatives of ministries and planning
agencies, officers of Bulog and functionaries of state banks, cooperatives and
irrigation schemes. j]
It is through such interlocking hierarchies, public and private, ultimately
controlled by New Order political and economic arrangement, that the middle
class, or its most dynamic sectors is growing. This shapes the class and in
particular, it shapes its interests, at least in the short term.
Again, the process that is of importance here, is not the way society is
becoming middle class, but the way privilege is being gradually extended to
a larger elite. The politics of this group may therefor be better understood
from the position of privilege and inclusion this group is attaining, than from
assumed middle class values of universal franchise and liberty.
With regard to institutions, both Golkar and Kadin have in the past been
frequently cited as possible vehicles for middle class, or at least upper middle
class aspirations. The nature of the two official political parties, PPP and PDI,
as bodies controlled by government intervention without having a channels to
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power, like Golkar, removes the two from most political equations. Recently,
the formation of ICMI, the Ikatan Cendekiawan Muslim Indonesia, has added
a third possible platform for increased pluralism within government tolerated
bodies of political articulation.
Within Kadin, criticism of import monopolies emerged in the late 1980s, and
while Kadin became generally more assertive and vocal, it seemed to have
a blessing from the regime for an enhanced role. A list of figures associated
with leadership in Kadin does not give the impression that this is an
organisation likely to fight for middle class aspirations. Most of the leadership
is distinctly closer to the capitalist class than to the middl class and several
prominent figures are directly related to the core of this class, among them
such men as Probosutedjo, the President's brother, Ponco Sutowo, son of
Ibnu Sutowo, and Bambang Yogasugama, chairman of HIPMI, the young
business men's association, son of Yoga Sugama, head of Bakin. Others
include people directly related to some of the larger conglomerates.
With regard to Golkar, a similar picture emerges. Golkar has in recent years
coopted a number of individuals that might be described as potential agents
of pluralism and democracy. Several of the newly adopted individuals,
however, are either intellectual apologist for the integralist and non democratic
principles of 'Pancasila Democracy", such as dr. Alfian, or business men close
to the core of New Order economic arrangements, Ponco Sutowo being one
example. At the same time, several new military figures have emerged within
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Golkar as ABRI has attempted, belatedly, to make up some of the political
ground lost over the past few years.
ICMI will be briefly discussed in the chapter that follows, but it is of interest
to note here that the 45 member executive board of this religious - intellectual
association includes such figures as Minister Habibie, Minister Harmoko, Lt.
Gen. Bustanil Arifin, General Rudini, Lt. Gen. Tirtosudiro, Minister Fuad
Hassan, Prof. Mukti Au, Prof. Mubyarto and Prof. Emil Salim, a group that
certainly includes intellectuals, and muslims, but would not be noted for its
independence from the regime. This is a feature that along with a similar
relationship to the oligarchic and monopolistic conglomeates characterises
much of the middle class in Indonesia, a powerful countervailing factor against
any assumed democratic tendencies of such a class. Like with the capitalist
class, the middle class in Indonesia is also racially divided, which is yet
another question mark after any assertion on the middle class as class.
The position of the middle classes in this regard, and with respect to




1. There are numerous examples of this. With regard to western academics,
the belief in the modernizing and democratising influence of groups that would
normally be brought together under the concept of a middle class, is evident
from the early post-independence writings of Feith and later in the works of
writers such as Lev, Emmerson, Liddle, Sundhausen and Mackie, as well as
being prevalent in a more casual commentary on Indonesia. Among
numerous examples of the more negative view held by Indonesian academics,
the commentaries of Taufiq Abdullah, Ignas Kieden, Toety Heraty and Sjahrir
in a series on the middle class run by Kompas, October 2-9, 1989, can be
mentioned. This view is also variously expressed in magazine articles and
commentaries by several muslim scholars, such as Amien Rais, Adurrahman
Wahid, and Aswab Mahasin, and from commentaries from secular scholars,
such as Arief Budiman.
2. See K. Young, 1990, The Extra-urban Dimension, in Tanter and Young
(eds.), The Politics of Middle Class Indonesia, Monash Conference Papers on
Southeast Asia no. 19, Melbourne: Monash University.
3. Aburrahman Wahid, 1990, Indonesia's Muslim Middle Class, in Tanter and
Young (eds.), as above.
4. Samuel Huntington, 1968, Political Order in Changing Societies, Yale
University Press.
5. Kenneth Young, 1990, The Extra Urban Dimension, in Tanter and Young
(eds.) The Politics of Middle Class Indonesia, Monash Conference Papers on
Southeast Asia no. 19.
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CHAPTER 14
ISLAM, CLASS AND STATE
For a number of reasons that will become clear in the discussion that follows,
muslim elements of the middle class in Indonesia deserve a separate
attention. The subject itself, politics of religious identifièation, falls largely
outside the scope of the thesis. The intention of this short chapter is not to
discuss the issue in substance, but to put it into the context of the preceding
discussion, in the briefest possible way.
Practising muslims, conscious of, on the one hand, the universality of their
religion, and on the other, of its specific tenets that set it apart from the
syncretised tendencies prevalent in the country, continue to form a large
conspicuous minority in Indonesia. This minority has set itself apart from the
rest of society in politically important ways. [1]
During colonial times this was expressed in their maintenance of specific
religious-cultural identity. This distinct and somewhat separate identity evolved
into insistence from orthodox muslims on Islamisation of state and society, a
dominant issue in post independence politics. This was articulated through
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participation in national politics where Islamic state and Islamic judicial and
political system was demanded. The muslim element has, however, never
formed a monolithic block, far from it. Divisions within the community have
been a major feature characteristic of Indonesian Islam. This division, mainly
organised, on the one hand into the East and Central Java based
traditionalist, kiyayi lead Nandatul Ulama, with reasonably well off peasants
and small landowners as a main constituency, and on the other hand into
Muhammadya, the modernist, outer island and West Java based organisation
representing, among others, traders and lower middle class groups like
school teachers and functionaries. This division was of crucial importance
in post independence politics but is now of much lesser re'levance for several
reasons, which mostly fall outside the scope of this thesis. [2]
The muslim trading class of earlier times was discussed in earlier chapters.
This lengthy discussion will not be repeated here but reiteration of some of
the main conclusions may be in order. It was pointed out how the
development of this class was thwarted by political realities under various
regimes, most importantly through three factors, demographic, geographic
and historical, that came into play during the Old Order regime. This lead to
political patronage favouring Java based, politically connected elites, ultimately
benefitting in a more substantial and lasting way the closely knit networks of
Chinese commerce.
Economic policy that strangled outer island commerce was ultimately rooted
in Javanese dominance of electoral politics. The demographic factor behind
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this was coupled with a geographic one, the location of exportable resources
in the outer islands, with attendant local sentiments. There were also two
historical factors that influenced the situation. One was the way Islam had
spread in the outer islands without the mediating influence of Javanese
culture. The other was the way the war of independence forged an
autonomous military organisation.
All of this lead to a political situation, and a chain of events, where muslim
elements not only lost economic opportunities but also their political voice.
This in turn was an important cause of the class formation that transpired.
At the top came a tiny class of capitalists made up of tw elements, one of
military business men and another from the Chinese commercial networks.
Below a middle class is emerging with diverse origins. This class, however,
is largely shaped by the nature of the capitalist class. This is reflected in its
large state sponsored and large capitalist conglomerate sponsored elements,
while the muslim element, and the partly overlapping element of independent
traders is far smaller and politically far weaker than what would have been
expected from the situation obtaining at independence.
These historical developments can also be seen as responsible for the
subdued political nature of the present day muslim middle class. This is not
a class fighting for an Islamic state, nor a class that, politically, sets itself
apart from the rest of the middle class. The muslim middle class of the
present is a group fighting for its inclusion in the exclusionary political system
of the New Order, rather than a group with a specific political agenda. A
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recent manifestation of such politics is the foundation of 1CM!, the lkatan
Cendekiawan Muslim Indonesia. The organisation, which brings together
many of the best known muslim intellectuals in Indonesia, as well as several
influential figures better known for other things than studies of Islam, was
founded under the chairmanship of Minister Habibie, a figure that is involved
in the politics and the patronage business at the highest level. The
organisation was founded with the same kind of Javanese numerical
symbolism as characterises Golkar's functions. The members of its board
and committees number 17, 8 and 45, a reference to Indonesia's
independence date. More importantly, the composition of its leadership,
particulary the position of Habibie, the inclusion in its executive of several
cabinet ministers and former New Order politicians, some with limited Islamic
credentials, and its endorsement by Suharto points strongly to its purpose,
an inclusion of an elite in the New Order system of limited pluralism.
It is of some interest to note that in interviews conducted in Jakarta for this
thesis, four present board members of ICMI uniformly stressed democracy as
the main point on any Islamic agenda in Indonesia, along with the logical
exclusion of the military from politics. Questions on moves towards
democracy were mostly met with caution and an emphasis on the need for
a longer term, sustainable, programme towards "real" democracy. In all cases
the western type of liberal democracy was acknowledged as the ultimate aim,
a sharp contradiction of prevailing ideology. Repeated questions on a socio-
political agenda revealed nothing that would, in substance, not be
automatically included in a manifesto of all social democratic and christian
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democratic parties in Europe, and mostly conceptualised in such a way as
making it fairly unremarkable in the Indonesian context.
The day to day politics of any such group is outside the scope of this thesis
and will not be entered into here. It suffices to point out that the politics of
this group are focused on fusion with other middle class elements, which is
a radical departure from the earlier politics of Islamic identity.
This fusion has been recently described by Aswab Mahasin, the social
scientist who is now a board member of ICMI, as the "priyayisation° of the
santri. [3] The santris Mahasin refers to is an influential group modernist
"secular" muslims that has rooted itself within the New Order system. He
points out that this group prefers political status quo, pleads for harmony and
for a peaceful acceptance of the system, while mixing easily with bureaucrats
and Chinese financiers. These people adopt middle class lifestyles and
middle class symbols, but at the same time, as pointed out by Mahasin, they
nurture santri group solidarity.
This is their base which secures them a representative status within the New
Order. Their santri background and their work among the santri community
is what makes them politically important to the regime and is their basis for
an inclusion in the exclusionary New Order system. This inclusion is through
cooptation and through a privileged status. This group, like many other
components of the middle class, has to be understood as a privileged elite
rather than as a middle class in a general western sense of the concept.
326
The process that is of importance here is, once again, not the same as the
well analyzed historical pathway of middle class Europe with its attendant
interests in universal franchise or citizenship, liberty, democracy and pluralism.
This is not society becoming middle class but a process of gradual inclusion
of elite groups and a gradual fusion of elite interests. The politics of elite
fusion is a new phenomenon, at least in the form it is now taking. Apart from
priyayi - santri fusion, this also partly involves the Chinese middle and
capitalist class, both through a fusion of capital and interests, most clearly
represented by the already discussed interlinkages around the Suharto family
interests, and also through increasingly shared educatiohal background of
elite members.
The lack of identifiable political agenda among muslim groups, on the other
hand, is not a new phenomena. Although political conflict in Indonesia has
frequently been analyzed in terms of the muslim factor and although day to
day politics have often revolved around this issue of religion, Islam has not
contributed greatly, at least in a positive sense, to what might be termed as
the net result of Indonesian politics. Politics, of course, is about power, its
distribution and its exercise. It would be difficult to make a case for saying
that Islam has had a positive impact on the way power is distributed or
exercised in Indonesia. The most fundamental question of Indonesian politics,
the issues of mass poverty and of the powerlessness of the vast majority of
Indonesians, seems unaffected, even unaddressed by the politics of Islam.
The Islamic agenda, in so far it has existed, has more often revolved around
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such issues of communal living as inheritance, marriage and procreation,
rather than around the issue of who does and who does not enjoy political
purchase and economic benefit.
It has been pointed out by Ben Anderson that muslim political articulation in
Indonesia, at least that of NU, has taken place within a framework that is
different from the one analyzed by political scientists. [4] Anderson pointed
to what is in some sense at least a non-political agenda of political activity
that is the preservation and extension of a religious way of life. Politics of a
very different kind have, of course, surfaced at times under Islamic banners
during the New Order, but this has been without much positive consequence.
It should, however, be noted that Islam continues to form a potential forum
for political protest, in spite of some well documented problems in achieving
political unity and political expression in general. [5] Experience from
neighbouring Malaysia has shown how rapidly rising Islamic consciousness
can affect politics, although it should be pointed out that many of the causes
of this development in Malaysia are not present in Indonesia in quite the
same measure, although some may be. [6]
How Islam may provide a non-elite forum is at present more a matter of
speculation than analytical deduction. Although past experience in Indonesia
and recent developments in Malaysia may offer insights into this process, the
development of divisions within the middle class may be the most pertinent
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factor to look for. This, however, falls outside the limited scope of this thesis.
A few points on this may be made on this, however. One is the upsurge of
orthodox (slam that has been noted over the last several years. This is
reflected in attendance at mosques and Quran readings, and in various
anecdotal evidence produced by numerous observers. In the late 1970s and
into the 1980s there was also much evidence of a growing self confidence
among younger muslim scholars, such as the Salman group from Bandung,
that looked with certain admiration to Iran and somewhat radical tendencies
in the Middle East. During the 1980s, however, political Islam was decimated.
The PPP, which had been destroyed as a political force long ago by
sustained government intervention, and whose main stand against the
government had been on aspects of marriage laws and communal living, was
made a secular party in the late 1980s. NU, the largest muslim organisation
in the country, and for long an influential political party, withdrew from politics
at a similar time. At the same time, the government campec öovn on
various organisations and "spontaneous" networks (organisasi tanpa bentuk).
Most dramatically this lead to the Tanjung Priok massacre, followed by trials
of activists, and the Usroh trials of the mid and late 1980s. {7J
At the same time as Islam was growing as a religion and declining as a
political force the circumstances of many of its adherents were changing. In
the mid 1970s it seemed as if small town Islam was becoming more firmly
rooted and wider in its appeal with small scale commerce among its
adherents doing well and elements of the lower middle classes joining up. [8]
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This development may have been challenged by another. Although there is
little hard evidence on such developments in Indonesia, it seems clear that
since the mid 1970s conglomerates and Chinese owned commerce in general
has penetrated smaller cities and towns, probably at some disadvantage to
modernist muslim traders, and almost certainly so in relative terms. A similar
trend may have occurred to some extent with regard to land, although on a
smaller and far less concentrated scale. This, however, is not certain to be
of much importance and Mackie has shown that concentration of land
ownership and increase in landlessness is hardly of the proportions
sometimes indicated in casual commentary. [9] The point about such
changes that may have been occurring in smaller cities, towns and villages,
is the potential of Islam as a forum for articulating interests of the lower
middle classes and middle groups that may be loosing out economically.
There are examples of related things happening in Indonesian history, such
as with Sarekat Islam, and more recently, with the revolt of the disadvantaged
bazaar economy of Iran against the Shah and his favoured conglomerates,
although simplistic parallels should be avoided here. This, however, once
again, alerts to the fact, that divisions rooted in economic interests should be
searched for an understanding of the longer term political potential of religion
and organisation.
The problem here is with data. Little is known on class formation in general
and very little on the religious affiliation of the various groups that make up
the middle classes. Much is therefor a matter of conjecture. This problem
will not be entered into in this thesis as this largely falls outside its limited
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scope, focused as it is on the structures shaping the capitalist class, its
relations to the state and the implications of this for democratisation. With
regard to the same problem that is the concern of this thesis, if looked at
from below, as opposed to its focus on the top, these questions on the
middle class in general, and not the least on Islam, are of much pertinence.
Longer term impact on politics must be measured on such criteria as effects
on power relations and distribution of economic and political power among
groups in society and most of past and present Islamic political articulation
in Indonesia has continued to bee outside this essence of olitics. What may
well be the greatest intended impact of political activity under the banner of
Islam, the massacre of left leaning, largely landless peasants in 1965-1966, is
better understood with reference to the politics of landownership and
landlessness than through a religious dichotomy. This and related matters,
is indeed the reason for the focus in this thesis on allocation of resources
rather than ideological politics, political institutions and political events.
Nevertheless, what might be termed as the negative political impact of Islam,
is of much consequence. The term negative is not used here to indicate a
value judgement, but to effect a separation between intended result of political
activity and an outcome that is caused by negative reaction to the group or
its political presence. The negative impact of Islam in this sense, has been
its position, along with liberalism and communism, as one of three relatively
clear political or cultural alternatives, each of which has seemed unacceptable
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to the majority of politically active Indonesians. The presence of these
alternatives, imagined or real in terms of politics as they may be, may have
made the military-authoritarian alternative more sustainable.
It is with regard to this that the new trend of elite fusion and politics of elite
inclusion are of vital interest. This process is central to the question of
democracy but outside the scope of this thesis.
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AND THE QUESTION OF DEMOCRACY
As stated in the introduction, the general concern behind this thesis is with
democracy in Indonesia. Democracy, as indicated in the introduction, is
understood here in a most general sense, namely the extent to which
individuals enjoy a measure of equality in their influence on the way society
is governed. Total equality in this regard is, of course, not the experience of
any society, nor is it likely to be. That, however, does not cloud the huge
and crucial differences that exist between societies in this respect. However
imprecise measurements of democracy are bound to be, the fundamental
point remains that few would give Indonesia a very favourable ranking on a
scale of societies drawn up with this criteria. Almost every imaginable
application of a general criteria of democracy, rooted in a general and
traditional understanding of the concept, yields the impression of lndones;a,
as a distinctly undemocratic polity.
This is well known, and generally accepted. The reasons for this are less
uniformly agreed on. Consequently, the same can be said of impediments
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to democratisation. In mainstream analysis of Indonesia these have been
identified as being rooted in patrimonial and religious culture. The key to
democratisation has therefor been seen to lie in changes in attitudes, chiefly
effected through a process of modernisation.
It has been argued above that the roots of authoritarianism are not chiefly to
be found in cultural predisposition to this form of government. It has been
argued that it is politics of access to economic resources that has determined
the forms government has taken. Consequently, it has been argued, the key
to democratisation in Indonesia is not to be found in the evolution of culture
and attitudes, but in imperatives generated by conflids over access to
economic resources, and in class formation rooted in the outcome of such
conflicts.
Above, an attempt has been made to understand this through application of
three concepts and attendant theories to recent political history of Indonesia.
For these purposes, it was argued, the state is best defined as being both
the site of a struggle between various factions of dominant groups, or
classes, and at the same time as the integrating principle, which not only
condenses, reconciles and represents the interests of the classes or groups
with access to state power, but also at times structures these interests, a
point of particular relevance to the state dominated politics and economics of
Indonesia. The state was seen to consist of the permanent institutions of
335
government, such as the institutions of coercion, the military and the judiciary,
and the institutions of the executive, such as the ministries, the office of the
President and the cabinet, as well as being made up of the ensemble of
class relations rooted in these institutions. It was further pointed out that the
state responds to imperatives generated by these class relations, and to
imperatives generated from the position of the economy in the wider world
economy, as well as, at times, structuring such class relations through it own
longer term structures, which may partially, at least in the short term, and with
regard to specific manifestations, be understood through analysis of culture,
as well as through economically rooted analysis.
The position of the state in the economy, it was argued, has been paramount,
and this for several reasons. Foremost amongst them have been factors of
class formation. At independence there was no class with direct roots in the
economic organisation of society strong enough to dominate the state. Unlike
in most Asian countries there was no landowning class, nor was there an
industrial bourgeoisie, or even a strong class of traders, particularly after
demographic, geographic and religious factors combined to put traders on the
loosing side in a conflict with state spawned classes. Instead the state came
to be dominated by politicians who chiefly represented, and fought over,
access to economic resources through the state, rather than in productive
economy.
The importance of access to the state was further augmented by Indonesia's
position in the world economy. The state came to control foreign access to
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local economic resources as well as access to Indonesia's consumers, and
access of locals to the international economy. Foreign capital, foreign
technology and foreign markets were required for development of local
resources. It was argued, however, that the Dependency Paradigm,
developed in the context of Latin America and occasionally used in analysis
of Indonesia, failed to explain both the conditions and dynamics characterising
Indonesia's position. During the Old Order, the Indonesian regime attempted
to alter Indonesia's position in this respect, resulting in economic collapse,
while the New Order regime managed to capitalise on this position and to tax
foreign access to Indonesian resources and markets. Through this taxation,
which took various forms, such as tax on primary exporth and the de facto
tax on foreign investment presented by requirements for local partners, a
process of private capital accumulation started. This was because the state
itself was not the primary beneficiary of the various forms of taxation imposed
on exploitation of Indonesia's resources and markets, but favoured individual
companies. The identity of these, companies was determined by those
controlling the state. These people formed the regime.
The executive of the state was represented in the analysis through the second
main concept, the regime. This concept was used to refer to the individuals
occupying the most powerful positions within the state, while also referring to
the overall political and economic strategy jointly followed by these individuals.
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It was shown that the state, in this sense, forms a set of constraints and
opportunities facing the regime. The state, in this way, does not dictate the
policy of the regime, but the state's structures, and the imperatives they
generate, may dictate the outcome of regime policy.
The understanding of the state presented here and used throughout the
thesis clearly borrows from the structuralist tradition. The inclusion of a
separate theory of a regime, on the other hand, makes it possible to draw on
the insights of the instrumentalist school of thought. A clear separation of the
two, state and regime, opens a new way of looking at the Indonesian state
and its links to class formation.
This theoretical separation helps to overcome a crucial problem in studying
the Indonesian state, its policies and its links to class formation. The state
is clearly something much more than the Sukarno regime or the Suharto
regime, or a military regime. The latter, that is the regime, is frequently seen
to be constituted by the former, while the reverse is occasionally held to be
true. Neither is the case, as argued in the text. The Indonesian state has
also clearly not been ruled by a ruling class, nor has it been run for the
benefit of such a class. This is immediately evident from the non-existence
of such a class. Furthermore, it has gradually come to light, as argued in the
thesis, that neither is the military in power in Indonesia, nor has the
Indonesian state been used to further its interests in the past several years.
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At the same time it is quite clear, as extensively argued in the text, that the
Indonesian state is not a cultural construct constituted by ideological
preferences, or an entity living its own life for its own benefit. It is the centre
of the accumulation process, the centre that allocates access to economic
resources, economic privileges and political power. In this it does not move
in mystical ways but quite clearly for the benefit of a few individuals.
It is equally clear that the Indonesian state has not been controlled for the
benefit of a bourgeoisie class, a non-existent phenomenon in Indonesia, or
a landowning class, a politically inactive entity in Indonesia, with a notable
exception from the mid 1960s, to the extent that it xists at all. The
Indonesian state would seem a construct that primarily lends itself to a purely
structuralist treatment.
This, however, is not the case, as shown in the text. The Indonesian state
has been run by a regime, at the heart of which has been a ruling group,
probably not acutely conscious of its corporate existence, and gradually
diminishing in size, but a group that has spawned a tiny capitalist class that
is now at the heart of the Indonesian economy.
It was shown in the thesis that the Indonesian state continued to be of
essentially the same character, through several assumed watershed events.
Without denying the importance of these events, such as the attainment of
independence, the onset of Guided Democracy, the assumption of power by
the New Order military regime and the Malari riots, it was shown that
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structures of state and economy remained largely in tact through these
turbulent events.
The real change, as argued in the text, came with the huge increase in oil
revenue in the mid 1970s, coinciding with the Malari riots and therefor most
often misunderstood as originating in that event. The system of patronage,
already in existence for some time, was further centralised in the hands of a
ruling group and immensely augmented with new funds. As argued above,
this centralisation of the patronage system in the hands of the President and
his hand picked entourage served to sideline the military as an institution from
political power, while the increased liquidity of the system made possible a
form of a national industrial strategy, as well as purchasing political following.
This strategy, however feeble in economic impact if compared to several
countries of eastern Asia, served as a basis for the creation of several large
conglomerates. These were mostly Chinese owned until the 1980s when
several companies owned by various members of the Suharto family started
to expand with great speed on the back of access to state patronage,
monopolies, licenses and concessions.
Another important change came in the 1980s when liquidity in the patronage
system was reduced with a fall in oil revenues. This was gradually met wth
an opening up of the economy, after the Suharto family and a few of its
business partners had enjoyed huge income from import, trading and
transport monopolies. This opening up of the economy also meant
privatisation of economic activity previously in the hands of the state, further
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sidelining the large group of military officers which continued to run state
corporations. Instead the Chinese and Suharto conglomerates took on new
business opportunities, having gained financial strength for larger
undertakings. These also reaped benefits from an increase in large scale joint
ventures with foreign firms, where political clout determined the identity of the
local partner.
The Indonesian economy was transformed during the 1980s. In political
terms, a regime constituted by the interests of a rent seeking ruling group of
military officers, was replaced by a regime, largely consisting of the same
individuals, but now nurturing the interests of an economy dominated by
several vast industrial and trading conglomerates. What effected this change
was the industrial policy from the mid 1970s, the policy of granting and taxing
monopolies, the indirect "privatised" taxation of foreign investment all of which
served to spawn the large Chinese conglomerates, and later, the decision of
Suharto and a few other well placed generals to invest their rents in
companies enjoying state patronage.
The late New Order regime, however, is still based on the same combination
of military coercion and political and economic patronage as before. The
politics of the late New Order are the same as before, the politics of inclusion
in the exclusionary state centred polity.
The origins of this are, of course, in the state centred economic and political
life of earlier times. In the earliest phase of the New Order, military rank was
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the chief credential for political and economic inclusion, although patronage
was extended down through vast hierarchies of civilians. The rank itself was
never the main determinant of influence, however, Initially ideological politics
played some part in this, but later, and crucially for the shape Indonesia was
to take, the group of like minded business oriented generals around Suharto
formed a ruling group that used the military as an instrument of coercion
without being controlled by it as an institution.
There was, however, the illusion of a military regime. This was not an illusion
in the sense that the military used coercion on behalf of the regime. The
illusion had to do with three other characteristics of the indonesian political
system. The first was the karyawan system. Thousands of military officers
served in positions of influence in the Ministries, in state enterprises and in
state institutions of various kinds. This vast system was not, however,
ultimately controlled by the military, but by the regime. The karyawan officers
served the regime, not the military. Their career, their rewards and the policy
they were to follow were all under the control of the regime, not the military
institution.
The second was the parallel hierarchy provided by the military to civilian
government at regional and local level. This was real enough in terms of
coercion, and particularly in earlier times, real in terms of economic
opportunities for the military officers involved. The all important financial
liquidity of the system, however, was provided by the President's office. Vast
sums of money going into rural areas that underpinned the rural patronage
342
system came from extra-budgetary items controlled by the President and the
State Secretariat. The military had no central control over these resources.
Increasingly this system was centralised in the State Secretariat, further
reducing the financial clout of military commanders in the regions, and
creating a rift between the military and the powerful State Secretary.
The third characteristic was existence of the ruling group and its control over
the military through its control over sources of patronage. The power of
Suharto's entourage of financially minded generals was often cited as an
example of the pervasive military control of society. The reverse was true.
These men were first and foremost business men, who conveniently controlled
a military organisation to protect their regime. The military had no control
over any of the individuals in the ruling group, and still less the over the
group itself.
For all those reasons, and several more discussed in the text, both
conventional regime theories, popular in analysis of Indonesia, and theories
of military regimes, a few of which have been applied to Indonesia, fail to
illustrate the nature of Indonesia's state and regime and further fail to explain
the dynamics of Indonesian politics over the past few decades. It was also
argued that the popular Bureaucratic Authoritarian Regime/State theories
developed in the context of Latin America did not adequately grasp the crucial
position of the regime in Indonesia, its relations to the state, and most
importantly, the relations between the regime and class formation in
Indonesia. These theories, however, at least in a particular form presented,
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alert to the important feature of limited pluralism that is partly shared by
Indonesia and several past military regimes in Latin America. This factor is
directly related to the politics of inclusion in the exclusionary New Order
system, frequently referred to in the latter part of the thesis.
The regime's political channel to the population, Golkar, is a vehicle for such
limited inclusion and pluralism. It has continued to be constituted by three
elements, the military, the centralised system of patronage and the politics of
elite inclusion. The military, having realised belatedly how its economic power
and its political clout had been decimated by the economic transformation,
and the corresponding change in regime interests, of the 1980s, tried to gain
increased control over Golkar in the late 1980s. At the same time Golkar was
the scene of the regime's attempts to extend is base through including a few
more elite representatives, not the least people with Islamic credentials.
This political system, centred on a one man dominated regime and
characterised, on the one hand by ad hoc cooptation of individuals and
groups, and on the other by legislative institutions of appointees and a
political party where civilian elements vie with the military institution for control,
is increasingly ill suited for realities created by the economic and class
transformation of the country.
The intention of the regime is still clearly to include new elites but at the same
time to close the door on mass political participation. These interests have
little to do with the frequently assumed interests of a state in a state versus
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society conflict. This is a continuation of politics of access to economic
resources. These are the interests of the capitalist class in the making, the
owners of private conglomerates with their symbiotic linkages to one another
and to the state, still dependent on privilege, monopolies and concessions,
and above all, dependent on an economic environment constituted by their
own interests rather than those of the general public.
This class is represented by the regime. This is in two ways. One is the
instrumentalist way of the regime being dominated by individuals who are also
members of this tiny class. The pribumi section of the class is almost entirely
made up of people who either are key members of the"regime, are family
members of such people, or have been members of the regime in the past.
This is also in the structural way that no Indonesian regime would be able to
move against the general interests of the conglomerates without causing deep
economic crisis. The private conglomerates now control such a huge section
of the economy that the economic welfare of Indonesia, at least in the short
term that any democratic regime would have to think in, is intimately tied up
with their success.
The conglomerates have at the same time formed a second circle of
inclusion, side by side with the state. Like the state extends patronage and
coopts individuals for economic and political privilege, the conglomerates now
collect hundreds of smaller firms under their wings and thousands of the best
educated people as managers. This, along with the state is the centre of
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middle class formation in Indonesia. For the emerging middle classes, the
health of the conglomerates is an essential interest.
The state, under the leadership of the present regime, and the largest
conglomerates, form in this way two concentric circles around the President.
The interests of those inside these circles is to widen them but certainly not
to break them up or to open them up for control by the vast army of
outsiders.
There are however some potential divisions within these twin circles of elite
inclusion. It is in these divisions that a certain hope fr democracy may
emerge. These are partly of economic nature and partly with roots in cultural
realities.
The former refers to three sources of conflict. One is between the favoured
conglomerates and the increasingly frustrated smaller business men who in
some cases have prospered under conglomerate patronage but find
themselves at much disadvantage in competing for new opportunities, not the
least with the rapacious Suharto conglomerates.
Many of the smaller conglomerates may side with smaller business men in
this instance, and favour a more predictable and regularised form of
government. It seems however, highly unlikely that many capitalists and
sizable traders would favour a government constituted by the interests of the
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general masses of poor people over a regime they would chiefly criticise for
favouring one business section over the other.
Another source of conflict of this type is the rapidly growing need for the
regime to tax the capitalist and middle classes. The regime built up its
system of patronage, which both sustained it through various crisis and
provided basis for private capital accumulation, without taxing Indonesians.
As recently as 1989 far less than one million people in Indonesia paid any
income tax at all and most of these paid sums distinctly modest in relation to
their means. This is now changing. The tax net is being widened and
tightened as the need for domestic non-oil revenue 'rapidly increases.
Taxation does not automatically lead to calls for representation but may do
so, particularly if taxation is imposed by a state seemingly unfairly favouring
competitors of those who pay.
A third possible economic conflict is also with cultural roots. This is the
antagonism felt by many pribumis towards Chinese control of the economy.
This was met by Suharto in 1990 when he invited the heads of around 30 of
the largest conglomerates in the country to his ranch at Tapos to announce
on television that ownership of these firms should be shared with cooperatives
formed by their workers. Although Suharto's scheme has so far come to
almost nothing, the weak and even hazardous position of the Chinese in
Indonesia may prompt further attempts at including pribumi middle class in
economics and politics.
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On the cultural side the Islamic dimension continues to be the one of greatest
potential, although Islam has not greatly affected Indonesian politics, except
in an unintended and negative way, as pointed out in the preceding chapter.
The cultural and racial division of the middle class is of greatest interest here,
although, as pointed out, important sections of the elite of muslim middle
class has adopted policies of middle class fusion and elite inclusion, while
much of the rest of the muslim elite has increasingly followed a policy of
greater religious and cultural tolerance.
This is speculative, however, and beyond the scope of this thesis. The
emerging middle class, economic, occupational, religious and geographic
divisions within it, the interests of its various fractions with regard to the two
sides of the capitalist class, to the regime and to the military need to be





The Asian Wall Street Journal, Business daily, Hong Kong.
Asiaweek, News weekly, Hong Kong.
Business News, Business bulletin, Jakarta.
Editor, News weekly (Indonesian), Jakarta.
Expo, Business bi-weekly (Indonesian), Jakarta. (banned in 1974)
Far Eastern Economic Review, News weekly, Hong Kong.
Info Bank, Business monthly (Indonesian), Jakarta.
Kompas, News daily (Indonesian), Jakarta.
NRC Handeisbiad, News daily (Dutch), Rotterdam.
Prospek, Business monthly (Indonesian), Jakarta.
The Strait Times, News daily, Singapore.
Swa Sembada, Business monthly (Indonesian), Jakarta.
Tapol, Political newsletter, London.
Tempo, News weekly (Indonesian), Jakarta.
Warta Ekonomi, Business weekly (Indonesian), Jakarta.
1
Academic Works
Ahmed, Haji Zakaria and Harold Crouch (eds.), 1985, Military-Civilian
Relations in Southeast Asia, Singapore: Oxford University Press.
Alavi, Hamza, 1972, The State in Post-Colonial Societies, New Left Review,
no. 74: 59-81.
_________ 1975, India and the Colonial Mode of Production, Economic and
Political Weekly, India, vol. 10 (35): 1235-1262.
__________ 1982 State and Class under Peripheral CapitaUsm, in Alavi and
Shanin (eds.), Introduction to the Sociology of Developing Societies,
Macmillan.
__________ 1983, The State in Crisis, Class and State, in H. Gadezi and J.
Rashid (eds.) Pakistan, The Roots of Dictatorship, London: Zed Press.
Anderson, Benedict R. O'G., 1972, Java in Time of Revolution, Occupation and
Resistance 1944-1946, Cornell University Press.
__________ 1977, Religion and Politics in Indonesia Since Independence.
In Religion and Social Ethos in Indonesia, Monash University: (conference
papers, 1975 conference, Australia-Indonesia Association and the Centre for
Southeast Asian Studies, Monash.)
__________ 1978, The Last Days of Indonesia's Suharto?, Southeast Asia
Chronicle, no. 63: 2-17.
Anderson, Benedict, A. O'G. and Audrey Kahin (eds.), 1982, Interpreting
Indonesian Politics, Thirteen Contributions to the Debate, Cornell Modern
Indonesia Project, Interim Reports Series no. 62, Ithaca: Southeast Asia
Programme, Cornell University.
2
Anderson, Perry, 1974, Lineages of the Absolutist State, London: New Left
Books.
Androoij, F. et al (eds.), 1979, Between People and Statistics: Essays in
Modern Indonesian History - Presented to P. Creutzberg, The Hague:
Martinus Nijhof.
Anspach, R., 1969, Indonesia. In Anspach et. al. (eds.), Underdevelopment
and Economic Nationafism in Southeast Asia, Cornell University Press.
Bachtiar, Harsja, 1988, Siapa Dia? Perwira Tinggi Tentara Nasional
Indonesia: Angkatan Darat (Who is Who? Officers of the Indonesian Army),
Jakarta: Djambatan.
Bardahan, Pranab, 1984, The Political Economy of Dev.plopment in India,
Oxford: Basil Blackwell.
Barry, Brian, 1965, Political Argument, London: Routledge and Kegan Paul.
Benda, Harry J., 1958, The Crescent and the Rising Sun, The Hague and
Bandung: W. van Hoeve. (Re-issued, 1983, Dordrecht: Foris)
Boeke, J. H., 1951, Economics and Economic Policy in Dual Societies,
Haarlem: H. D. T. Willink.
Boland, B. J., 1971, The Struggle of Islam in Modern Indonesia, The Hague:
Martinus Nijhoff.
Booth, Anne and Peter McCawiey (eds.), 1981, The Indonesian Economy
During the Soeharto Era, Kuala Lumpur: Oxford University Press.
Bourchier, David, 1984, Dynamics of Dissent in Indonesia: Sawito and the
Phantom Coup, Cornell Modern Indonesia Project Interim Reports Series no.
63, Ithaca: Southeast Asia Program, Cornell University.
Bowen, John R., 1986, On the Political Construction of Tradition, Gotong
Royong in Indonesia, Journal of Asian Studies, vol. 45 (3): 544-561.
3
Britton, Peter, 1983, Military Professionalism in Indonesia; Javanese and
Western Military Traditions in Army ideology to the 1970s, M.A thesis,
Department of History, Monash University.
Bruinessen, Martin van, 1990, Indonesia's Ulama and Politics, Prisma (Engi.
ed.) no. 49: 52-69.
Budiman, Arief, 1987, Indonesia, in Kyong-Dong Kim (ed.), Dependency
Issues in Korean Development, Seul: National University Press.
Bulkin, Fachran, 1984, Negara, Masyrakat dan Ekonomi (State, Society and
the Economy), Prisma (Indon. ed.), no. 8: 3-17.
Cardoso, Fernando, 1973, Associated-Dependent Development, in A.
Stephan (ed.), Authoritarian Brazil, New Haven: Yale Uriversity Press.
__________ 1979, On the Characterization of Authoritarian Regimes in Latin
America, in D. Collier (ed.), The New Authoritarianism in Latin America,
Princeton University Press.
Cardoso, Fernando and Enzo Faletto,1979 Dependency and Development in
Latin America, Berkely: University of California Press. (orig. pub. in Spanish,
1971)
Castles, Lance and Herbert Feith (eds.), 1970, indonesian Political Thinking
1945-1965, Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press.
Chalmers, lan, 1989, Economic Nationalism and the Third World State: The
Political Economy of the Indonesian Automotive industry, 1950-1984, Ph.D.
thesis, Australian National University, Canberra.
Chowdhury, Hasanuzzman, 1985, State and Mode of Production in
Bangladesh, Dhaka: (pub. not given)
Clapham, Christopher, 1985 (ed.), The Political Dilemmas of Military Regimes,
London and Sydney: Croom Helm.
4
Collier, David (ed.), 1979, The New Authoritarianism in Latin America,
Princeton: Princeton University Press.
Creutzberg, P., 1979, (presented to), F. Andreooij et al (eds.), Between People
and Statistics: Essays in Modern Indonesian History - Presented to
P.Creutzberg, The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff.
Crouch, Harold, 1975, Generals and Business in Indonesia, Pasific Affairs,
vol. 48 (4): 519-40.
-, 1978, The Army and Politics of Indonesia, Ithaca and London:
Cornell University Press.
___________ 1979, Patrimonialism and Military Rul in Indonesia, World
Politics, vol. 31 (4): 571 -87
___________ 1984, Domestic Political Structures and Regional Economic
Cooperation, Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies.
__________ and H. Zakaria Ahmed (eds.), 1985, Military-Civilian Relations in
Southeast Asia, Singapore: Oxford University Press.
__________ 1986, The Missing Burgeoisie: Approaches to Indonesia's New
Order. In Chandler and Ricklefs (eds.), Nineteenth and Twentieth Century
Indonesia: Essays in Honor of Prof. J.D. Legge, Melbourne: Centre of
Southeast Asian Studies, Monash University.
Dahl, Robert, 1963, Modern Political Analysis, New Jersey: Prentice Hall.
Dharmaputera, Eka, 1982, Pancasila and the Search for Identity and
Modernity in Indonesian Society, Ph.D. thesis, Boston College.
Dick, Howard, 1985, The Rise of a Middle Class and the Changing Concept of
Equity in Indonesia: An Interpretation, Indonesia, no. 39: 71-92
Dijk, Cees van, 1981, Rebellion Under the Banner of Islam: The Darul Islam in
Indonesia, The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff.
5
Doornbos, Martin, 1989, The African State in Academic Debate, The 1989
Dies Natalis Address, Institute of Social Studies, The Hague.
Dunleavy, Patric and Brendan O'Leary (eds.), 1987, Theories of the State,
London: Macmillan.
Dyson, K., 1980, The State Tradition in Western Europe, Oxford: Martin
Roberts o n.
Eldridge, Philip, 1985, The Political Role of Community Action Groups in India
and Indonesia, Alternatives, vol. 10 (3): 401-34.
___________ 1989, NGQs and the State in Indonesia, Prisma (Engi. ed.), no.
47: 34-56.
Elliott, David, 1978, Thailand, The Origins of Military Rule, London: Zed Books.
Emmerson, Donald K., 1976, Indonesia's Elite: Political Culture and Cultural
Politics, Ithaca: Cornell University Press.
___________ 1978, The Bureaucracy in Political Context: Weakness in
Strenght. In Jackson and Pye (eds.)
___________ 1983, Understanding the New Order: Bureaucratic Pluaralism
in Indonesia, Asian Survey, vol. 23 (11): 1220-41.
Engels, Friedrich and Karl Marx, 1848, Manifesto of the Communist Party,
Collected Works, vol. 6, Lawrence & Wishart, vols. 1-43, 1974-1988.
__________ 1878, Anti-Duhring, Collected Works, vol. 25, Lawrence &
Wishart, vols. 1-43, 1974-1988.
___________ 1894, Origin of the Family, Collected Works, Lawrence &
Wishart, vols, 1-43, 1974-1988.
Evans, Peter, 1979, Dependent Development, The Alliance of Multinational,
State and Local Capital, Princeton University Press.
6
Evans, Peter, Dietrich Rueschmeyer and Theda Skocpol (eds.), 1985,
Bringing the State Back in, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Faletto, Enzo and Fernardo Cardoso, 1979, Dependency and Development in
Latin America, Berkeley: University of California Press.
Feith, Herbert, 1962, The Decline of Constitutional Democracy in Indonesia,
Ithaca: Cornell University Press.
__________ 1963, Dynamics of Guided Democracy. In Indonesia, Ruth. T.
McVey (ed.), New Haven: Human Relations Area Files, Yale Univesity.
1968, Suharto's Search for Political Format, Indonesia, no.6:
88-1 05
__________ and Lance Castles (eds.),1970, Indonesian Political Thinking
1945-1970, Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press.
__________ 1980, Repressive Dvevelopmentalist Regimes in Asia: Old
Strenghts, New Vulnerabilities, Prisma, no. 19: 39-55.
Finer, Samuel, 1976 (2nd ed.), The Man on Horseback: The Role of the
Military in Politics, Penguin.
Frank, Andre Gunder, 1967, The Development of Underdeveiopment in Latin
America; Historical Studies of Chile and Brazil, New York: Monthly Press.
___________ 1969, Latin America: Underdevelopment or Revolution, New
York: Monthly Press.
Furnivall, J., 1944, Netherlands India: A Study in Plural Economy,
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Geertz, Clifford, 1960, The Religion of Java, Chicago: The University of
Chicago Press.
7
___________ 1971, Agricultural Involution: The Process of Ecological Change
in Indonesia, Berkeley, University of California Press.
Gerschenkron, Alexander, 1962, Economic Backwardness in Historical
Perspective, Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press.
Girling, John, 1981a, Thailand, Society and Politics, Ithaca: Cornell University
Press.
___________ 1 961 b, The Bureucratic Polity in Modernising Societies,
Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies.
Glassburner, B. (ed.), 1971, The Economy of Indonesia: Selected Readings:
Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press.
__________ 1978, Indonesia's New Economic Policy and its Sociopolitical
Implications. In Jackson and Pye (eds.).
__________ 1978b, Political Economy and the Suharto Regime, Bulletin of
Indonesian Economic Studies, vol.14 (3): 24-51
Gordon, Alec, 1978, Some Problems of Analysing Class Relations in
Indonesia, Journal of Contemporary Asia, vol. 8 (2): 21 0-1 8.
__________ 1982, Plantations and the Post-Colonial Mode of Production,
Journal of Contemporaiy Asia, vol. 12 (2): 168-87.
Geoffrey C. Gunn, 1979, Ideology and the Concept of Government in the New
Order Indonesia, Asian Survey, vol. 19 (8): 751-69.
Gunnarson, Christer, 1985, Development Theory and Third World
Industrialisation, Journal of Contemporary Asia, vol. 15 (2): 183-206.
Habibie, B. J., 1986, Industrialisasi, Transformasi, Teknology dan
Pembangunan Bangsa (Industrialisation, Transformation and National
Development), Prisma (Indon. ed.), vol. 15 (1): 45-53.
8
Hassan, Muhammad Kamal, 1980, Muslim Intellectual Responses to New
Order Modernization in Indonesia, Kuala Lumpur: Dewan Bahasa dan
Pustaka Kementerian Pelajaran Malaysia.
Hawes, Gary, 1987, The Philippine State and the Marcos Regime, The Politics
of Export, Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press.
Hewison, Kevin, 1981,	 The Financial Burgeoisie in Thailand, Journal of
Contemporary Asia, vol. 11 (4): 395-412.
__________ 1985, The State and Capitalist Development in Thailand. In
Higgot and Robison (eds.).
____________ 1989, Power and Politics in Thailand: Esseys in Political
Economy, Manila: Journal of Contemporary Asia Press.
Higgot, Richard and Richard Robison (eds.), 1985, Southeast Asia: Essays in
the Political Economy of Structural Change, London, Boston and Melbourne:
IRoutledge & Kegan Paul.
Hill, Hal, 1987, Concentration in Indonesian Manufacturing, Bulletin of
Indonesian Economic Studies, vol. 23. (2): 71-100.
Hirschman, Alfred, 1971, The Political Economy of Import Substitution
Industrialisation in Latin America, New Haven: Yale University Press.
Houtart, Francois, 1974, Religion and Ideology in Sri Lanka, Louvain
University, Belgium.
Huntington, Samuel, 1968, Political Order in Changing Societies, New Haven:
Yale University Press.
Jackson, Karl, 1978, Bureaucratic Polity: A Theoretical Framework for the
Analysis of Power and Communication in Indonesia. In Jackson and Pye
(eds.)
Jackson, Karl and Lucian Pye (eds.) 1978, Political Power and
Communications in indonesia, Berkeley: University of California Press.
9
Jenkins, David, 1983, Suharto and His Generals: Indonesian Military Politics,
1975-1983. Cornell Modern Indonesia Project Monograph Series no. 64,
Ithaca: Cornell University Southeast Asia Program.
Jessop, Bob, 1982, The Capitalist State, Oxford: Martin Robertson.
de Jesus, Ed. C. and A. McCoy, 1982, Philippine Social History, Global Trade
and Local Transformations, Manila: Ateneo de Manila University Press.
Johnson, Dale, 1985 (ed.), Middle Classes in Dependent Countries, Beverly
Hills: Sage Books.
Jones, Sidney, 1980, It Cant Happen Here: A Post Khomeini Look at
Indonesian Islam, Asian Survey, vol. 20 (3): 311-23.
__________ 1984, The Contraction and Expansion of the Umat and the Role
of the Nandatul Ulama in indonesia, Indonesia, no. 38: 1-20.
Kahin, Audrey and Ben Anderson (eds.), 1982, Interpreting Indonesian
Politics: Thirteen Contributions to the Debate, Cornell University Modern
Indonesia Project Interim Reports Series no. 62, Ithaca: Southeast Asia
Program, Cornell University.
Kemp, Tom, 1983, Industrialisation in 19th Century Europe, London:
Long man.
1988, Industrialisation in the Non-Western World, London:
Long man
King, Dwight, 1982, Indonesia's New Order as a Bureaucratic Polity, a Neo-
Patrimonial Regime or a Bureaucratic Authoritarian Regime: What Difference
Does it Make?. In B. Anderson and A. Kahin (eds.)
Kuntjoro-Jakti, Dorojatun, 1982, The Political Economy of Development; The
Case of Indonesia under the New Order Government 1966-1978, Ph.D. thesis,
University of California, Berkeley.
10
Larkin, j ., 1972, The Pampangans, Colonial Society in a Philippine Province,
Berkeley: University of California Press.
Lev, Daniel S., 1966, The Transition to Guided Democracy, monograph,
Cornell University.
____________ 1985, Colonial Law and the Genesis of the Indonesian State,
Indonesia, no. 40: 57-74.
___________ 1990, Intermediate Class and Change in Indonesia: Notes on
the Middle Class and Change in Indonesia. In Tanter and Young (eds.).
Leys, Cohn, 1975, The Overdeveloped Post-Colonial State: A Re-evaluation,
Review of African Political Economy, no. 5: 39-48.
___________ 1977, Underdevelopment and Dependency: Critical Notes,
Journal of Contemporary Asia, vol. 7: 92-1 07.
Liddle, William, 1973, Evolution from Above: National Leadership and Local
Development in Indonesia, Journal of Asian Studies, vol. 32 (2): 287-309.
__________ 1977, Indonesia 1976: Challenges to Suharto's Authority, Asian
Survey, vol. 17 (2): 95-106.
1978a, Participation and Political Parties. 	 In Jackson and Rye
(eds.)
__________ 1978b, Indonesia in 1977: The New Order's Second
Parliamentary Election, Asian Survey, vol. 18 (2): 175-185.
__________ 1985, Soeharto's Indonesia: Personal Rule and Political
Institutions, Pasific Affairs, vol. 58 (1) 68-90.
1990, Indonesia is Indonesia, in Tanter and Young (eds.).
Liem, Soei Liong, 1987, Indonesia: Muslims on Trial, London: Tapol.
11
__________ 1988, Indonesian Muslims and the State: Accomodation or
Revolt, Third World Quarterly, vol. 10 (2): 869-96.
Linz, Juan, 1970,	 An Authoritarian Regime: Spain, in Allardt and Rokkan
(eds.), Mass Politics: Studies in Political Sociology, New York: Free Press.
MacDonald, Hamish, 1980, Suharto's Indonesia. Melbourne: Fontana.
MacDougal, John, 1982, Patterns of Military Control in the Indonesian Higher
Central Bureaucracy, Indonesia, no. 33: 89-121.
___________ 1988, MHitary Penetration of the Indonesian Government: The
Higher Central Bureaucracy, Indonesia Reports, no. 14: 2-14.
Mackie, Jamie, 1967, Problems of the Indonesian lnflatio,,, Monograph Series
no. 42, Ithaca: Cornell University Press, Modern Indonesia Program.
-, 1984, Property and Power in New Order Indonesia. In Tanter
and Young (eds.), 1990
McCoy, Alfred and E. de Jesus, 1982, Philippine Social History, Global Trade
and Local Transformations, Manila: Ateneo de Manila University Press.
McVey, Ruth T., 1963, Indonesia. New Haven: Human Relations Area Files,
Yale University.
__________ 1969, The Management of Ideological Conflict in Indonesia,
introduction. In Sukarno, Nationalism, lslam and Marxism, Cornell University
Modern Indonesia Project, Translation Series. Publication no. 48, Ithaca:
Cornell University Southeast Asia Program.
__________ 1982 (orig. 1977), The Beamtenstaat in Indonesia, in Anderson
and Kahin (eds.).
__________ 1983, Faith as the Outsider, Islam in Indonesian Politics.	 In
James Piscatori (ed.) lslam in the Political Process, Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press.
12
Madjid, Nurcholis, 1985, An Islamic Appraisal of the Political Future of
Indonesia, Prisma (EngI. ed.), no. 35: 11-26.
___________ 1990, Indonesia in the Future: Sophisticated and Devoutly
Religious, Prisma (Engi. ed.), no. 49: 77-82.
Mahasin, Aswab, 1990, The Santri Middle Class: An Insider's View, in Tanter
and Young (eds.).
Marx, Karl, 1843, Critique of Hegel's Philosophy of the State, Collected Works,
vols. 1-43, Lawrence & Wishart, 1974-1988.
__________ 1850, Class Struggles, Collected Works, vol. 10, Lawrence &
Wishart, vols. 1-43, 1974-1988.
__________ 1852, The Eighteenth Brumaire of Lois Bonaparte, Collected
Works, vol. 11, Lawrence & Wishart, vols. 1-43, 1974-1988.
__________ 1871, The Civil War in France, Collected Works, vol. 23,
Lawrence & Wishart, vols. 1-43, 1974-1988.
__________ and Friedrich Engels, 1848, Manifesto of the Communist Party
Collected Works, vol. 6, Lawrence & Wishart, vols. 1-43, 1974-1988.
Mas'oed, Mochtar, 1983, The Indonesian Economy and Political Structure
During Early New Order 1966-1971, Ph.D thesis, Ohio State University.
Miliband, Ralph, 1969, The State in Capitalist Society, London: Weidenfeld &
Nicholson.
__________ 1970, The Capitalist State - Reply to Nico Poulantzas, New Left
Review, no. 59 (Jan.-Feb.): 67-78.
-, 1973, Analysing the Burgeolse State, Marxism and Social
Classes, New Left Review, no. 82 (Nov.-Dec.): 83-92.
1983, Class Power and State Power, London: Verso and New
Left Books.
13
Mortimer, Rex, 1973, Showcase State: The Illusion of Indonesia's Accelerated
Modernisation, Sydney: Angus and Robertson.
__________ 1982, Class, Social Cleavage, and Indonesian Communism. Ir
B. Anderson and A. Kahin (eds.)
Muhaimin, Yayah, 1990, Muslim Traders: Stillborn Burgeoisie, Prisma (Engi.
ed.) no. 49: 83-90.
Murtopo, All, 1973, The Accelleration and Modernization of 25 Year's
Development, Jakarta: Yayasan Proklamasi and CSIS.
Muzaffar, Chandra, 1987, Islamic Resurgence: A Global View, in Abdullah and
Siddique (eds.) Islam and Society in Southeast Asia, Singapore: ISEAS.
Nakamura, Mitsuo, 1976, The Crescent Arises over the Banyan Tree: A Study
of the Muhammadfyah Movement in a Central Javanese Town, Ph.D. thesis,
Cornell University.
Nasution, Abdul Hans, 1956, Tentara Nasional Indonesia (The Indonesian
Armed Forces), Jakarta: Yayasan Pustaka Militer.
Niel, Robert van, 1960, The Emergence of the Modern Indonesian Elite, The
Hague: W. van Hoeve. (re-pub. in 1984 by Foris Publications, Dordrecht.)
Noer, Deliar, 1973, The Modernist Movement in Indonesia 1900-1942, Kuala
Lumpur: Oxford University Press.
Nordlinger, Erik, 1977, Soldiers in Politics, Military Coups and Governments,
Prentice Hall.
O'Donnel, Guillermo, 1973, Modernisation and Bureaucratic Authoritarianism:
Studies in South American Politics, Berkeley: University of California Press.
__________ 1977, Corporatism and the Question of the State. In J.Malloy
(ed.), Authoritarianism and Corporatism in Latin America, University of
Pittsburgh Press.
14
__________ 1979, Tensions in Bureaucratic Authoritarian State and the
Question of Democracy. In D. Collier (ed.), The New Authoritarianism in Latin
America, Princeton University Press.
O'Leary, Brendan and Patric Dunleavy (eds.), 1987, Theories of the State,
Macmillan.
Onghokham, 1975, The Residency of Mad/un: Priyayi and Peasants in the
19th Century, Ph.D thesis, Yale University.
Paauw, D. S., 1963, From Colonial to Guided Economy. In Ruth. T. McVey
(ed.).
Palmer, Ingrid, 1978, The Indonesian Economy Since 1965 A Case Study of
Political Economy, London: Frank Cass.
Parsons, Talcot, 1967, Sociological Theory and Modern Society, New York:
Free Press.
Pauker, Guy J., 1962, The Role of the Military in Indonesia. In J. J. Johnson,
The Role of the Military in Underdeveloped Countries, Princeton University
Press.
Polak, J. J., The National Economy of the Netherlands Indies, 1921-1939,
New York: Institute of Pasific Relations.
Poulantzas, Nico, 1969, Capitalism and the State, New Left Review, no. 58
(Nov.-Dec.): 67-78.
__________ 1973, Political Power and Social Classes, London: New Left
Books and Sheen & Ward.
1975, Classes in Contemporary Capitalism, London: New Left
Boo ks.
1976, The Capitalist State, New Left Review, no. 95 (Jan.-Feb.):
63-83.
15
Pranarka, 1985, Sejarah Perkembangan Pemiki ran Tentang Pancasila
(History of the Development of Thinking on Pancasila), Jakarta: CSIS -
Yayasan Proklamasi.
Purdy, Susan, 1984, Legitimacy of Power and Authority in a Plural Society:
Pancasila and Civil Religion in Indonesia, Ph.D. thesis, Columbia University.
Rahardjo, Dawam, 1985, Transnationalisation of the State, Working Papers of
the United Nations Project on the State in Southeast Asia, Tokyo: United
Nations University.
___________ 1991, Basis Sosial Pemikiran Islam di Indonesia Sejak Orde
Baru (The Social Foundations of Islamic Thinking in Indonesia During the
New Order), (unpublished manuscript)
Ransom, David, 1970, The Berkeley Mafia and the Indonesian Massacre,
Ramparts, no. 9: 28-49.
Reid, Anthony, 1974, The Indonesian National Revolution, 1954-1950,
Melbourne: Longman.
Reeve, David, 1977, An Alternative to the Party System in Indonesia: An
Historical Evaluation of the Functional Group Concept, Ph.D. thesis, University
of Sydney.
Ricklefs, M. C., 1979, Six Centuries of Islamization in Java. In Levtzion (ed.),
Conversion to Islam, New York & London: Homes and Meler.
__________ 1981, A History of Modern Indonesia, London: Macmillan.
Riggs, Fred rick, 1964, Administration in Developing Countries: The Theory of
Prismatic Society, Houghton Mifflin.
___________ 1966, Thailand: The Modernization of a Bureaucratic Polity,
Honolulu: East West Centre Press.
16
Robison, Richard, 1977, Capitalism and the Bureaucratic State in Indonesia,
1965-1975, Ph.D. thesis, University of Sydney.
__________ 1978, Towards a Class Analysis of the Indonesian Military
Bureaucratic State, Indonesia, no. 25: 17-30.
__________ 1981, Culture, Politics and Economy in the Political History of
the New Order, Indonesia, no. 31: 1-29.
__________ 1982, The Transformation of the State in Indonesia, Bulletin of
Concerned Asian Scholars, vol. 14 (1) 48-60.
__________ 1985, Class, Capital and the State in New Order Indonesia. In
Higgot and Robison (eds.)
1986, Indonesia: the Rise of Capital, Sydney: Allen & Unwin.
Rocamora, Joel, 1970, Nationalism in Search of an Ideology, The Indonesian
Nationalist Party 1946-1965, Ph.D. thesis, Cornell University.
Rostow, William, 1963, The Economics of Take-off into Sustained Growth,
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Said, Salim, 1 985a, The Genesis of Power: Civil-Military Relations in
Indonesia During the Revolution for Independence, Ph.D. thesis, Ohio State
University.
___________ 1 985b, The Political Role of The Indonesian Military: Past,
Present and Future, Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies.
Samson, Allan, 1978, Conceptions of Politics, Power and Ideology in
Contemporary Indonesian Islam. In Jackson and Pye (eds.).
Schiller, J. W, 1978, The Development Ideology in New Order Indonesia, MA
thesis, Ohio University.
Shivji, I., 1976, Class Struggles in Tanzania, London: Heineman.
17
Skocpol, Theda, 1979, States and Social Revolutions, Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press.
__________ et al (eds.)1985, Bringing the State Back in, Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press.
Slamet, ma, 1982, Cultural Strategies for Survival: The Plight of the Javanese,
Comparative Asian Studies Paper, Rotterdam: Erasmus University Faculty of
Social Science.
Sobhan, R, 1982, The Crisis of External Dependence, London: Zed Books.
Soepomo, 1970, An Integralist State. In Feith and Castles (eds.), indonesian
Political Thinking 1945-1970, Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press:
188-92.
Stauffer, Robert, 1985, The Philippine Political Economy: Dependent State
Capitalism in the Corporatist Mode, in Higgot and Robison (eds.),
Sundhausen, Ulf, 1971, The Political Orientation and Political Involvement
of the Indonesian Officer Corps, 1945-1966, The Army Headquarters and the
Si//wang! Division, Ph. D. thesis, Monash University.
__________ 1972, The Military in Research on Indonesian Politics,
Journal of Asian Studies, vol. 31 (2): 355-65.
___________ 1982, The Road to Power, Indonesian Military Politics 1945-
1967, Kuala Lumpur: Oxford University Press.
__________ 1985, Slow March into an Uncertain Future, in Clapham and
Philips (eds.), The Political Dilemmas of Military Regimes, London and
Sydney: Croom Helm.
Stepan, Alfred, 1973 (ed.), Authoritarian Brazil, New Haven: Yale University
Press.
18
Sutter, John 0., 1959, Indonesianisasi: Politics in a Changing Economy,
1950-1955, vols. 1-4, Data Paper no. 36, Ithaca: Department of Far-Eastern
Studies, Cornell University.
Syafi-Maarif, A, 1985, Islam and Constitutionalism, The Indonesian
Experience, Prisma, (Engi. ed.), no. 35: 83-96.
Tamara, Natsir, 1986, Indonesia in the Wake of Islam, Kuala Lumpur: ISIS.
__________ 1990, Islam under the New Order: A Political History, Prisma
(EngLed), no. 49: 6-30.
Tanter, Richard, 1988, The Rentier-Militarist State in Indonesia: Global
Preconditions, Paper prepared for the Conference on State and Civil Society
in Indonesia, Centre of Southeast Asian Studies, Monash University.
Tanter, Richard, and Young, Keneth, 1990 (eds.) The Politics of Middle Class
Indonesia, Monash Conference Papers on Southeast Asia no. 19, Melbourne:
Monash University.
Therborn, Göran, 1 978, What does the Ruling Class do when it Rules,
London: New Left Books.
Thomas, K., 1973, Indonesia, the Effects of Past Policies and Suharto's Plans
for the Future, Melbourne: CEDA.
Tornquist, OlIe, 1984, Dilemmas of Third World Communism: The Destruction
of the PKI in Indonesia, Londond: Zed Books.
Trimberger, Ellen K., 1978, Revolution from Above: Military Bureaucrats and
Development in Japan, Turkey, Egypt and Peru, Transaction Books.
Wahid, Abdurrahman, 1985, The Islamic Masses in the Life of State and
Nation, Prisma, (Engi. ed.), no. 35: 3-10.
__________ 1988, The Nandlatul Ulama and Islam in Present Day
Indonesia, in Abdullah and Siddique (eds.), Islam and Society in Southeast
Asia, Singapore: ISEAS.
19
1990, Indonesia's Muslim Middle Class. In Tanter and Young,
(eds.) 1990.
Ward, Ken, 1974, The 1971 Elections in Indonesia, Clayton: Monash Papers
on Southeast Asia.
Wertheim, W. F., 1964, Indonesian Society in Transition, The Hague: W. van
Hoeve.
__________ 1979, Whose Plot? New Light on the 1965 Events, Journal
of Contemporary Asia, vol. 9 (2): 197-21 5.
___________ 1980, Muslims in Indonesia, Majority with a Minority Mentality,
Occasional Paper Series, James Cook University.
Winters, Jeffrey, 1988, Indonesia: The Rise of Capital: A Review Essey,
Indonesia, no. 45: 109-28.
Young, Kenneth and Tanter, Richard, 1990 (eds.), The Politics of Middle Class
Indonesia, Monash Conference Papers on Southeast Asia no. 19, Melbourne:
Monash University.
TEM PLEMAN
LLBBARY
20
